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ABSTRACT 
 
In the fall of 2015, after a Canadian federal election rife with negative rhetoric toward Muslims 
and a concurrent rise in anti-Muslim incidents that occurred alongside November terrorist attacks 
in Paris, the Canadian Ahmadiyya Muslim community launched a Twitter hashtag campaign 
called #JeSuisHijabi. With it, the organization stated that it aimed to challenge misconceptions of 
Islam and Islamic garb that led to anti-Muslim attacks across Canada. An offline campaign 
accompanied the hashtag; information booths sought to teach non-Muslims about Islam and the 
hijab, while encouraging them to try on the garment. With analysis of tweets generated with the 
hashtag #JeSuisHijabi and consideration of qualitative interviews conducted with Muslims in 
Winnipeg, MB and St. John’s, NL on their use (or not) of hashtags and the Internet in general, I 
show that the way in which some Canadian Muslims use hashtags to communicate identity 
complicates the so-called separation between religious and secular spheres. This thesis argues 
that “religious” hashtags can complicate common notions of a religious/secular binary at work in 
contemporary Canada, and can serve as a means to understand everyday religiosity in the public 
sphere. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
On a cold, gray November morning in Winnipeg, Canada in 2016 I sat down for breakfast to 
interview “Dauood.” 1 Dauood is 36, born in Pakistan, and has been living in Canada since 2004. 
If there was one thing that I learned very quickly about Dauood, it was that he loves food. “I eat 
out a lot,” he told me. “So if you know good restaurants, you are my good friend. If you cook 
you are my really good friend. If you don’t ask me to do dishes you are my best friend.” We both 
laughed. “So, I don’t care what your religion is. As long as you’re not feeding me pork, I’ll be 
eating your food every day.” 
Dauood is a self-identified Muslim and throughout our two hour-long interview we talked 
about more than just food. Like the focus of this thesis, we got together to discuss how, as a 
Muslim, he uses the Internet. Among other topics we talked about his favorite imams on 
YouTube, how the Internet is helping him decide who he wants to marry, and, as was on 
everyone’s mind at the time, what he thought about Donald Trump, elected as President of the 
United States only a few weeks earlier. In particular, I was curious about how he used hashtags, 
and whether he uses them expressly to challenge misconceptions about Islam. When I asked him, 
“Do you use hashtags? If so have you ever used them to challenge misconceptions about Islam?” 
He responded, "Kind of. You know what baklava is?" 
“Yeah.” I said, confused but intrigued. He responded: 
                                                                 
1 I would like to gratefully acknowledge the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for 
funding this research. This thesis research falls under a larger SSHRC-funded project entitled Canadian Muslims 
Online: New Muslim Public Spheres in the Digital Age . As a research assistant for this project the interviews that I 
conducted are used as data for this thesis and for the larger project as a whole. For more information about the larger 
project, see http://canadianmuslimsonline.uqam.ca/en. All participants’ names have been anonymized. 
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It was my first picture on Instagram, I hashtagged it #MuslimFerreroRocher. So kind 
of in that aspect, you know, if you don’t come to a masjid [mosque], you don’t talk 
to us, you’d think all Muslims are some crazy maniac people. The word Islam, 
what’s the first thing to come to your mind? Even to my mind, because in the media 
whenever somebody says Islam it’s a black [and white] picture of someone with an 
AK-47. And even though I’m a Muslim, it comes to my mind, when beautiful things 
should come to my mind, but unfortunately that’s what we see. So I do use hashtags 
to kind of show, hey, we follow a certain religion, but we also have a family, we also 
have birthdays, we also have weddings, we also have food fests, we also go and 
watch movies in cinemas, we have Muslim desserts that we call non-Muslim names, 
that you can kind of relate to. So I do use hashtags, but for engaging people. Like we 
had #WinnipegEid, the MIA [Manitoba Islamic Association] was using it, so I used 
that in a couple of pictures. 
       
Like many Muslims, Dauood feels like his religion is portrayed poorly by the media and is 
fundamentally misunderstood in Canadian society as monolithic, violent, overly serious, 
dogmatic, and anti-Western. Even as a devout Muslim himself, he admits that it is starting to 
affect how he thinks about himself and his own religion. To him #MuslimFerreroRocher, is one 
way in which he, as an individual, can circumvent and subvert this narrative, and make his 
religious identity “more relatable,” by humorously showing the world that he is just a regular 
person, who, alongside being Muslim, does many of the everyday things that non-Muslim 
Canadians do. In doing so, he aims to make a popular Pakistani dish more palatable for what he 
presumes is a non-Muslim audience. 
 I found Dauood’s story about #MuslimFerreroRocher fascinating, because to him, a 
hashtag was something that he used to creatively communicate Muslim identity to a public 
audience in a way that highlights the so-called “secular” aspects of his religious identity. In part, 
this conversation led me to hypothesize that perhaps hashtags can shed light on the ways in 
which the religious and the secular, which are often perceived as being in a binary relationship, 
coalesce in the lives of Canadian Muslims. This thesis is a result of my exploration of this 
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hypothesis, and argues that the way in which some Canadian Muslims use hashtags to 
communicate identity and navigate public life, complicates notions of so-called religious and 
secular spheres that undergird hegemonic narratives about Islam, highlighting and nuancing the 
blurred, and as Robert Orsi (2005) calls, “braided” relationship between religiosity and secularity 
in the lives of Canadian Muslims.  
 Even if used in a menial or mundane fashion, the “#” (or hashtag symbol) is by no means 
an uncommon or insignificant contemporary symbol for Muslims and Canadian society (see 
CBC News 2015d), in general. Today, hashtags can be found on billboards, store fronts, product 
labels, pamphlets, and protest signs, and have even managed to seep their way into spoken 
vernacular. Whether online or offline, typed by religious or non-religious people, hashtags are 
being used daily to expeditiously communicate and organize ideas and identities in ways that did 
not exist before they were introduced by the social media platform Twitter in 2007. 
 In an age where online and offline, private and public, religious and secular are 
increasingly intertwined (as discussed by theorists including Aupers and Houtman 2010: 25; el-
Nawawy and Khamis 2009: 59), hashtags and the way that they are used seem to be a visible and 
communicative manifestation of this reality. In 2015, 25% of Canadians claimed to be on Twitter 
(canadiansInternet.com 2015; see CBC News 2015e), a social media site where hashtags first 
appeared and are commonly used to communicate ideas, organize discussions, and express 
emotions. While no quantitative data exists on the subject, there is no reason to doubt that 
Muslim Canadians are also active on Twitter.  
 This thesis considers how Canadian Muslims use hashtags to articulate and complicate 
religious and secular identities and organize social critique through personal use of hashtags as 
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well as hashtag campaigns. To do so I combine two methodological approaches by (1) gathering 
qualitative data based on seventeen semi-directed interviews with self-identifying Canadian 
Muslims and (2) compiling and analyzing tweets under a hashtag started by Canadian Muslims 
called #JeSuisHijabi.2 #JeSuisHijabi, which translates from French as “I am hijabi,” is a 
campaign started by the Canadian Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at in 2015, and, based on statements 
made in their press release, sought to influence public opinion on hijabs and the Muslim women 
who wear them. The campaign launched on December 1, 2015 in the form of a press release, 
which throughout the campaign served as part of the campaign’s manifesto. The release stated 
that the campaign seeks to “highlight the Canadian values of multiculturalism, plurality and 
tolerance…and give Canadians an opportunity to hear from Muslim women firsthand and 
understand what their faith and identity means to them” (Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at 2015). The 
campaign started in response to a rise in anti-Muslim attacks and rhetoric after the November 
2015 Paris terrorist attacks.3 In fact, a Toronto police report stated that 22 anti-Muslim hate 
crimes were reported in November 2015, which was almost double compared to the year before 
(Simcoe 2016).4  
                                                                 
2 Throughout this thesis project, I have hyperlinked all of the hashtags that are mentioned by myself and 
participants. These links are intended to help readers to quickly access and better understand the hashtags that I 
discuss, and to flag hashtags which I believe may offer insight into people’s lived religious experiences, thus serving 
as a potential subject of study for future researchers. 
3Hashtags that directly respond to terror attacks appear often after such events. The most popular hashtag at the time 
of writing was #JeSuisCharlie, a hashtag that appeared as a statement of solidarity with France and Charlie Hebdo 
after a deadly shooting at the offices of the satirical French magazine on January 7, 2015, leaving 12 people dead. 
Within twenty four hours of the attack, over five million tweets containing the hashtag were created (Ulanoff 2015). 
It is difficult know definitively whether the #JeSuisHijabi campaign is influenced by the #JeSuisCharlie hashtag in 
anyway, despite their common resonance. Nowhere does the #JeSuisHijabi campaign claim to intentionally use the 
French wording of “Je Suis” to make a statement about or connect to the discourses surrounding #JeSuisCharlie.  It 
may, at the very least, have adopted the “Je Suis ____” format by observing how effective it was as the 
#JeSuisCharlie hashtag and aiming to parallel its universalist aims.  
4A less official, but still important website managed by The National Council of Canadian Muslims tracks anti-
Muslim incidents across Canada. In November of 2015, they tracked 16 anti-Muslim incidents, compared to 6 in 
November of the previous year (See National Council of Canadian Muslims 2017). 
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 The campaign had a two-fold, online-offline approach that launched a hashtag while also 
setting up booths in public spaces across the country (see Fig. 1), garnering nation-wide media 
attention (see CBC News 2015a; 2015c; Javed 2015; Griwkowski 2015; Ngabo 2015; Crosier 
2015; Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at Canada 2015). The Ahmadiyya Muslim community is a 
particularly media savvy minority within Islam itself with messianic beliefs in their founder 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who founded the Ahmadiyya movement at the end of the 19 th century 
(Gualtieri 2004: viii). In a 2013 Vancouver Sun article on the Ahmadiyya Community in Canada, 
one reporter claimed that although there are only 25,000 Ahmadi Muslims in Canada he, 
“receive more emails and news releases from the Ahmadiyya Muslims than from the rest of 
Canada’s roughly one million Muslims combined” (Todd 2013). To be clear, however, while this 
campaign was started by Ahmadis, there were a considerable amount of non-Ahmadi Muslims 
who participated in the campaign, because it spoke to something larger than specific Ahmadi 
beliefs and applied to Muslim, and particularly hijabi, identities in general.5  
 A Toronto Star interview with one of the #JeSuisHijabi campaign’s organizers, Farheen 
Khan, who in the past started a hashtag called #MuslimsActually and runs a blog that shares 
stories about everyday Muslims,6 also helps to shed light on the hashtag campaign’s main goals 
and somewhat echoes Dauood’s reasoning for using #MuslimFerreroRocher. She stated that, 
“The reason why this all came out is because there is a need for us to create positive stories and 
images of Muslims in the media…It gives people an opportunity to normalize and show that 
Muslims are just like everybody else” (Javed 2015). None of my participants told me that they 
themselves participated in the campaign, but nevertheless, examining the campaign alongside 
                                                                 
5 Very few tweets were specific to Ahmadiyya Muslim identity, and was a hashtag designed to be used by Muslims 
who do not necessarily identify as Ahmadi. It is for this reason that I refer to Muslims more broadly throughout this 
thesis and not specifically to Ahmadis. 
6 The blog began as an independent online publication, but has since been incorporated into the Muslim Media 
website MuslimLink  (see MuslimLink 2017). 
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interviews with Muslims themselves offers a more holistic understanding of hashtags and how 
they are used to express religious identities. Like Dauood, the goal of #JeSuisHijabi is not just to 
communicate religious identity, but to subvert mainstream media narratives about Islam by 
communicating identity in general. 
 
(Fig. 1) Two women (left) express in a tweet support for the campaign and how they feel about hijab. Five women 
(right), all in hijab or niqab, pose for a picture, including one police officer, and what may be non -Muslim women 
trying on the hijab.7 
 I have selected to examine and critique #JeSuisHijabi as a hashtag because the multitude of 
individual identities and ideas expressed through it reflects the subjective nature of Islam in 
Canada. In addition, #JeSuisHijabi is a hashtag that was developed by Canadian Muslims to 
simultaneously influence public opinion and provide a discursive space, online and offline, for 
Muslims and non-Muslims to express their understandings of Islam and Muslim identity in a way 
that challenges popular perceptions of a binary relationship between religiosity and secularity. 
To be clear, however, while this hashtag did generate hundreds of tweets and garner a significant 
amount of media attention in Canada, following the launch of the campaign in December 2015, it 
                                                                 
7 All tweets under #JeSuisHijabi that I mention or show pictures of in this thesis come from a refined advanced 
search, the link to which can be found in my bibliography (see Twitter 2017b). 
12 
 
did not trend worldwide.8 Nevertheless, prior to its launch, the hashtag did not exist, meaning 
that it created space for people to discuss the role of Islam and the hijab in the public sphere in a 
way that would not have existed otherwise.9 By looking closer at #JeSuisHijabi and its language, 
rhetoric, reasoning, and tactics, this thesis demonstrates that in looking closer at how my 
participants use hashtags to show that “Muslims are just like everybody else,” scholars are able 
to obtain a deeper understanding of the everyday lived religious and secular identities of 
Canadian Muslims and how they seek to be understood in the Canadian pubic sphere. 
 It is important, however, to acknowledge that the study of hashtags and tweets has its 
limitations. The 140-character limit of tweets coupled with the performative and self-censoring 
nature of social media, can really only tell us how people wish to be perceived, which is still 
significant, but resembles only the tip of the identity iceberg. Therefore, by complementing my 
online analysis of tweets that use #JeSuisHijabi with in-depth interviews of Muslims about life in 
Canada, their online practices, and how they use hashtags, I offer a deeper understanding of the 
identities beneath the surface that inform and generate those tweets. In so doing, this thesis 
explores the stories of Muslim Canadians who use hashtags and the Internet in general, to 
navigate awkward workplace conversations, justify their decision about whether or not to wear 
hijab, navigate the perceived tension between gay and Muslim identities, and challenge 
hegemonic discourses about Islam and its place in Canadian society (see Chapter 4). 
                                                                 
8 I will outline my methodology for gathering and analyzing tweets under #JeSuisHijabi in Chapter Three.  
9 When a hashtag is “trending” it means that it is one of the most frequently used hasht ags on Twitter during a 
certain period of time, and may even be featured on Twitter’s home page. For example, shortly after the March 2016 
terror attacks in Brussels, the hashtag #StopIslam became one of the highest trending hashtags on Twitter just below 
#Brussels and #PrayforBelgium. However, while on first impression one may think that #StopIslam was trending 
due to a high occurrence of Islamophobic tweets, it was actually trending because everyone who logged on to 
Twitter saw that it was trending and tweeted about their disappointment in how it was trending, which ultimately, 
and ironically, contributed to it being one of the highest trending tweets that day (see Dewey 2016). 
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 In short, through conducting, coding, and analyzing interviews as well as tweets using 
#JeSuisHijabi, I argue that hashtags, and the way that some Muslims use them, help to bring 
representations of religious identities that were once only able to be kept private into the public 
sphere, enabling Muslims to better challenge “secular” norms that inform hegemonic discourses 
online and offline. In the process of articulating religious experiences and identities publically to 
a Muslim and non-Muslim Canadian audience, Muslims communicate the secular aspects of 
their identities alongside their religious identities, blurring an often perceived strict binary 
between so-called secular and religious spheres. Through making this argument, I seek not only 
to nuance the understanding of the relationship between Islam, online media, and 
religious/secular identities, but to also make a significant contribution to the emerging literature 
on hashtags, illuminating their role in communicating religious identities and the impact they 
may have in understanding religion’s place in the modern public sphere. On these two fronts, this 
investigation thus constitutes an advancement in the field of hashtags and religion. 
Context  
Canadian Muslims in Winnipeg and St. John’s 
 Muslims have a long history in Canada that goes back well before the Internet age. One of 
the first known arrivals of Muslims into Canada was a family from Scotland who arrived in 1850 
(Environics 2016:1). In 1882, only fifteen years after Confederation, a group of Arab migrants 
from Ottoman Syria, some of whom were Muslim, came to Canada fleeing conscription into the 
Ottoman army (Zine 2012a: 4). After World War II, Canada lifted many of its exclusionary 
wartime policies aimed at keeping out non-European and non-white immigrants who were 
deemed as possible threats. This shift opened doors for more Muslims from around the world to 
enter Canada in greater numbers, mostly as skilled workers. By the 1950s, Canada’s Muslim 
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population was estimated to be about 3,000, and has grown steadily since then (Zine 2012a: 6). 
Today, there are over one million Muslims in Canada and, while remaining a very small 
percentage, approximately 3% of the entire population, Islam is one of the fastest growing 
religions in the country (Environics 2016: 1).  
 Christianity is the religious tradition of most Canadians. In 2011 67% of Canadians 
identified as Christian, and the aforementioned 3% identified as Muslim (Statistics Canada 
2011a). Winnipeg, where 12 of my participants live, is a medium sized prairie city known for its 
religious and cultural diversity (Hameed 2015: 16). In the 2011 National Household Survey, 
64% of Winnipeggers identified as Christian and 1.5% as Muslim (Statistics Canada 2011c). On 
the other hand, St. John’s, where 5 of my participants live, is one of the least religiously diverse 
capital cities in Canada, a result of its relative geographic isolation and small population. In 
2011, 90% of citizens in St. John’s identified as Christians; 0.5% of the city’s population 
identified as Muslim. Despite this fraction, Muslims are the city’s second largest religious group 
after Christianity (Statistics Canada 2011b). St. John’s more ethno-religiously homogenous 
population thus differs from Winnipeg’s population, which more closely parallels national 
averages for religious groups and visible minorities.  In Winnipeg, many of the Muslims who I 
interviewed are professionals who, for the most part, call Winnipeg their permanent home, and 
all 5 of the Canadian-born participants in my study are from Winnipeg. In St. John’s, 3 of the 5 
participants that I interviewed are international students who have been living in St. John’s for a 
while and plan to move elsewhere after their degrees. The other two consider St. John’s their 
permanent home. 
 Certainly, the identities of my participants are impacted by the contexts of Winnipeg and 
St. John’s, which I touch on throughout this thesis. However, since this thesis focuses primarily 
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on how Muslims in these two cities use the Internet and hashtags, I do not spend any significant 
amount of time comparing or analyzing the precise impacts that these cities have had on my 
participants, or what responses from participants say about them. Instead, I look closer at what 
their stories may say about Canadian Muslim identities, the impact the Internet has had on those 
identities, and how they are communicated online.  
 Even as a small minority within Canada, Canadian Muslims are themselves quite diverse. 
Ismailis, Ahmadis, Shi’a and Sunni Muslims have a variety of ethnic identities, political 
leanings, and personal aspirations. However, this diversity and subjectivity is often overlooked in 
media narratives of Islam.  Geopolitical events like 9/11 combined with much of the wider 
Canadian population’s understanding of religion and its role in modernity have meant that 
Muslims, as a religious and often racialized minority, are often perceived as practicing a religion 
that is monolithic, conservative, and anti-Western (Masquelier and Soares 2016: 26). This 
perception is one that many Muslims feel impelled to change, and some are taking to the Internet 
to do so. 
 The demographic make-up of my 17 participants and the ways in which they use the 
Internet reflects this diversity. Participants, born in Canada or not, came from a variety of ethnic 
backgrounds: Bangladeshi, Kurdish, Anglo-Saxon, Malay, Pakistani, Indian, British, and Somali; 
of my participants, 5 were born in Canada, one of which is a convert. While all of my 
participants identify to varying degrees as Sunni, which reflects the majority of Muslims, but not 
necessarily the denominational diversity of Islam in Canada, they certainly reflect its 
subjectivity. Interestingly, 12 participants, when asked, “What Muslim group or community do 
you affiliate with?” were reluctant to identify as anything else other than Muslim, and hesitantly 
identified with Sunnism, responding with answers like “I just say I’m Muslim. I would say 
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honestly, like, if someone pushes me to specify I’ll just say I’m Sunni Muslim. But other than 
that, no." Another Canadian-born participant from Winnipeg said, 
I’ve always referred to myself as Muslim, but I guess if you want to be more specific 
I guess you can say Sunni Muslim. But as far as things go, I don’t want to say I’m 
transient, but I take from a few different things. You know, I’ve had my stint about 
learning about Sufism and I take element from in it my life and still use elements of 
that practice in my life, but I wouldn’t identify as a member of that group 
necessarily, though I take elements from it. 
This subjective, and somewhat ecumenical, sense of Muslim identity was common amongst 
participants in their discussions of the significant role that the Internet plays in shaping and 
exploring what it means to them to be Muslim, reflecting a keen observation made by Stef 
Aupers and Dick Houtman (2010) who note that religion in the modern digital age constitutes “a 
relocation of the sacred to the subjective world of the individual and to the world of 
technological objects; a sacralization of the self and the digital in other words” (25).10 This 
observation that the Internet is facilitating the twining of religiosity and individuality coincides 
with the fact that religious observance amongst Canadian Muslims, particularly Muslims 
between the ages of 18 and 34 is on the rise (Environics 2016: 5), an age demographic in which 
15 of my participants fall under.11 Interestingly, it also just so happens that the median age of my 
participants is 26, not far from the median age of Canada’s Muslim population, 28 (Statistics 
Canada 2011a). 
 Both genders are also represented in my interviews. 9 participants that I interviewed were 
men and 8 were women. Of the women, 7 wore hijab and 1 did not. While this is a small sample, 
the proportion of hijab wearers in my study is significantly more than the 48% of Canadian 
                                                                 
10 To be clear, the desire to be identified as “just Muslim” alongside a strong sense of subjectivity I do not find 
ironic or contradictory, but instead indicative of a turn towards a use of less traditional Muslim labels, which the 
ubiquitous term “just Muslim” allows for, as opposed to the historically and culturally saturated terms of “Sunni” or 
“Shi’a.” 
11 The full age of my participants ranges from 19-40. 
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Muslim women who are said to wear hijab (Environics 2016:18). Each woman however, has her 
own unique stories and experiences pertaining to why they practice hijab, or don’t. The Internet 
played a significant part in many of these stories and experiences, which I explore in more depth 
in Chapters Four and Five.  
 My participants, overall, are well educated. Every participant had at least some university 
education. In terms of the highest level of education achieved, six participants completed some 
or were currently pursuing an undergraduate education. Five participants held Bachelor’s degrees 
as their highest degree obtained, two of which were pursuing an MA and Law degree 
respectively. The remaining six participants all had Masters degrees, two of which were pursuing 
their PhDs. With this in mind, Canadian Muslims do tend to be more educated than the Canadian 
public as a whole, nevertheless, they are disproportionately well educated compared to even the 
average Canadian Muslim population (see Kazemipur 2014). 
 This section has sought to demonstrate how my participants are situated within Canada’s 
historical, geographical, and demographic context, briefly shedding light on how modernity and 
technology influence Muslim subjectivities in the Canadian public sphere. Now, before moving 
on to discuss their experiences in more detail and what they say about the interplay between 
religious and secular identities (see Chapters Four and Five), I would like to first look closer at 
the specific socio-political context of Canada at the time leading up to the launch of 
#JeSuisHijabi on December 1, 2015, a period that precludes my interviews as well. This was a 
time when Canadian Muslim identity was particularly prominent in Canadian political and media 
discourses, online and offline, and considering it in more depth will help to illuminate the 
hegemonic narratives that inform particular understandings of Islam and the perception of a rigid 
separation between the religious and the secular. 
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Internet, Securitization, and Muslim Identities in Canada 
 Internet usage amongst Canadians is amongst the highest in the world. In a study 
conducted by the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) (2014) of Internet usage 
worldwide, Canada ranked 16th overall in 2015 for Internet penetration, but was first in the world 
for the number of websites visited per month. Where the world average was 2,300 websites per 
month, Canadians averaged well over that, visiting 3,700, with the most common online activity 
being social media (CIRA 2014). According to a 2015 survey 59% of Canadians use Facebook 
and, as mentioned previously, 25% use Twitter (canadiansInternet.com 2015). There is no reason 
to believe that Canadian Muslims are any different, meaning that their religious practices, 
expressions, and articulations in the public sphere are also shifting with this new medium. 
 The post-9/11 era has also reshaped life for many Canadian Muslims, with heightened 
securitization and suspicion towards Muslims (see Harvey-Crowell 2015; Cesari 2013; Fox and 
Akbaba 2015). At the same time, the influences of modernity continue to place a heavy emphasis 
on individual freedoms and the self (Taylor 1991). I see these two contexts of post 9/11 
suspicion and modern Western individualism as intertwined in how they affect and are evident in 
how Canadian Muslims use the Internet to construct and communicate their individual and 
collective identities, navigate and negotiate societal norms and institutions, and build 
communities. In other words, securitization affects the way Muslims express this “sacralization 
of the self and the digital” (Aupers and Hautman 2010: 25) and needs to be taken into account.  
Fox and Akbaba (2015), define the securitization of Islam as a “process that includes 
discourses constructed around a perceived Islamist threat and the promotion of actions outside 
other normal bounds of political procedure that requires commitment of greater resources in 
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order to eliminate it” (177). While Muslims may be able to use Twitter, and social media in 
general, to challenge certain discourses, the discourse of securitization, as it pertains to Islam, is 
a powerful one that is present in both online and offline public spheres. Muslims live, and in turn 
tweet, post, and share within this discursive power dynamic. 
Securitization pervades daily life for Muslim Canadians. An anecdote from Liam Harvey-
Crowell’s (2015) thesis that drew from his own interviews for the New Muslim Public Spheres in 
the Digital Age project illustrates this point well, by shedding light on how securitization in 
Canada affected the recruitment and responses of his Muslim participants.12 While recruiting 
participants for his thesis, Harvey-Crowell recalls being approached by five members of the 
Muslim Students Association (MSA) at Memorial University. He writes that  
this group of five people informed me that they had heard of my project (and even 
read my pamphlet on the project) but were still suspicious of it, fearing that saying 
‘the wrong thing’ or having something taken out of context would get them or the 
MSA in trouble (72).  
 
This anecdote is telling. It shows that as much as Muslim Canadians may wish to and are 
constitutionally able to express themselves fully online or offline, there is a wider political 
context that may be holding them back from doing so or affecting their choice of words.  
This was the context in 2015, when Islam was at the centre of Canadian identity politics, 
making Islam and Muslims a common issue in media and political discourses online and offline; 
discourses that would often reinforce securitization and stereotypes of Muslims.  An anti-
terrorism bill passed by the Conservative federal government in 2015, for example, called Bill C-
51, raised numerous concerns amongst the Muslim community as well as legal scholars (see 
Elghawaby 2015; Forcese and Roach 2015) about expanding the powers of the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The bill 
                                                                 
12 Harvey-Crowell’s thesis was also associated with the New Muslim Public Spheres in the Digital Age project. 
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aimed to take more preventative action against suspected terrorism, monitor and censor the 
Internet, and prevent transportation in and out of the country by giving these organizations more 
power. This bill was widely criticized as legislation that would disproportionally and unjustly 
target, discriminate, and undermine the rights of Canada’s Muslim population, a population that, 
in the post 9/11 context, was already under a heavy amount of suspicion and surveillance by law 
enforcement and the public eye in general. 
 The passing of this bill in the summer of 2015 and public discourse surrounding it was 
followed by a federal election that, especially on the part of the Canadian Conservative Party, 
appealed to this suspicion by making Islamic beliefs, practices, and identity an election issue. 
Prior to the election, a ban on wearing niqabs in citizenship ceremonies was proposed by 
Conservative Prime Minister, Steven Harper, arguing that the niqab was “rooted in a culture that 
is anti-women” (Chase 2015).13 Due to its questionable legality under Canadian law however, it 
was challenged by defendant Zunera Ishaq, a Muslim woman who was affected by the ban. Since 
it was an election year, her case was then prioritized by Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal to 
determine whether she would be able to vote, cementing the niqab ban as an election issue. 
Before election day, the court ruled the ban as unlawful, and Ishaq participated in the citizenship 
ceremony and was subsequently allowed to vote (CBC News 2015f).   
Likewise, Federal conservatives also vowed in the election to expand their commitment to 
the “Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act,” which was given royal ascent that 
June; promising to allocate more funds to create an RCMP phone-in tip line for citizens to report 
neighbours if they suspect that they were engaged in practices like forced underage marriages or 
                                                                 
13 In response to the ban, the hashtag #PMDressCode emerged criticizing Stephen Harper for telling women what 
they should wear. Canadians used it to criticize Harper in a number of ways. Many Muslim women tweeted it along 
with pictures of themselves wearing hijab or niqab, as a means of showing that Islamic dress is acceptable in 
Canadian society. 
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honor killings.14 Canada’s Minister of Citizenship and Immigration at the time, Chris Alexander, 
even connected the niqab ban in citizenship ceremonies, and in turn Islam, to the Act and the tip 
line. When commenting on this election promise, he said, "We need to stand up for our 
values…We need to do that in citizenship ceremonies. We need to do that to protect women and 
girls from forced marriage and other barbaric practices" (Powers 2015). The Conservatives lost 
the election to Justin Trudeau’s Liberal party, but the negative rhetoric surrounding Islam that 
was used by politicians during the election played a part in empowering people with once 
nascent Islamophobic worldviews to speak out and act on them. The November 2015 terrorist 
attacks in Paris and the subsequent rise of violence and anti-Islamic rhetoric against Muslims in 
Canada followed soon after, which spurred the launch of #JeSuisHijabi.   
With these factors in mind, my study will focus on the modern facet of social media that is 
the hashtag, and how it is being used by self-identified Muslim Canadians to work towards 
subverting hegemonic discourses of fear and misunderstanding that arise out of a climate of 
securitization and navigate the Canadian context by creating unique spaces for identity 
expression, construction, and discussion. Looking closer at hashtags offers a way forward in 
beginning to understand the complex ways in which Muslims are using new forms of media 
online to articulate religious identities within a socio-political context that often characterizes 
Islam as a threat to so-called ‘secular’ values, thus using hashtags to problematize, complicate, 
and nuance modern notions of a rigid separation between ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular.’ With 
this aim in mind, I turn to Kim Knott’s (2013) eloquent observation that,  
                                                                 
14 #BarbaricCulturalPractices became a trending hashtag on Twitter during the 2015 Canadian federal election, but 
in a way that criticized and lampooned the Conservative’s proposal of a RCMP tip line, making jokes, for example, 
that people should report their neighbours for barbaric cultural practices if they see them commit a fashion faux pas 
like wear socks with sandals. Likewise, the hashtag would turn the term on its head by framing the party’s 
reluctance to address the issue of Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and ‘muzzling’ of scientists as 
#BarbaricCulturalPractices (CBC News 2015b). Canadians are still using the hashtag at the time of writing, 
particularly to criticize Chris Alexander during his run for leader of the Conservative Party of Canada.  
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The tacit boundaries between ‘religion’ and the ‘secular’, and ‘religion’ and 
‘politics’, continue today to be reproduced in various ways in public discourse, for 
example, in the making of laws, in policy and security debates, in political struggles 
for communal identity, and in media commentaries on the nature of contemporary 
plural societies. In the process, the concepts themselves are reworked, re-imagined 
and co-produced. Their relationship is far from settled. (151) 
 
Hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi are a way that Muslims can weigh into public discourses about 
Islam, showing, in a very public manner, just how unsettled this relationship is, which upsets 
hegemonic discourses that separate the religious and the secular and associate Islam solely with 
the former, informing laws and policies like The Barbaric Cultural Practices Act and informing 
the types of opinions that lead the violence and hatred that Canadian Muslims experienced not 
only in 2015, but to this day. 
 This section has explored the hegemonic narratives and discourses of securitization that 
inform certain understandings of Islam in Canada, understandings that informed discriminatory 
policy and violence towards Muslims, which undergirds discussions with interviewees and 
spurred the launch of #JeSuisHijabi. I will now discuss, contextualize, and clarify, the concept of 
secularism in Canada itself, and how hashtags and social media may be shifting society’s 
understanding of it.  
 
Contextualizing Hashtags, Religion, the Secular 
As social media and mainstream media are becoming more intertwined by the day, the 
ways in which modern society communicates with itself are changing. Hashtags are a modern 
manifestation of this twining, further blurring and reshaping modern boundaries between 
medium and message, online and offline, public and private, self and cyber, thus allowing for 
anyone with access to the Internet to potentially insert their voices into and (re)shape public 
discourses that they would not be able to otherwise. Hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi, and the many 
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others that I will discuss in this thesis, illuminate the complex identities and subjectivities at 
work in the everyday lives of Canadian Muslims, and have the potential to further complicate 
modern understandings of the relationship between the religious and the secular. 
Hashtags came into being in 2007, when Twitter sought, based on the suggestion of its 
users, to make it easier for people to categorize their tweets and find tweeters of similar topical 
interests (Bruns and Burgess 2015:26).15 Hashtags soon proved useful as a means of organizing 
and communicating during natural disasters like the San Diego bush fires in 2007 (ibid), and 
soon became used to proliferate and organize ideas, events, and movements; from 
#BlackLivesMatter, a civil rights movement fighting for Black citizens to be treated equally in 
societal and governmental institutions, to #elxn42 or #cdnpoli, hashtags used as a means of 
organizing discussion and events surrounding the Canadian federal election and Canadian 
politics. It is also not uncommon for people to even express emotions through hashtags like 
#happy, #sad, #blessed, or #MuslimRage, a rather brash hashtag created in 2012 by Newsweek 
to discuss the Islamic world’s ‘angry’ reaction to a controversial online video called ‘The 
Innocence of Muslims’. This hashtag, however, as a means of subverting the vitriolic rhetoric 
embedded in the hashtag, was adopted by Muslims themselves to humorously and ironically 
communicate the mundane everyday frustrations that Muslims face, like not having halal options 
at restaurants or regularly being asked to explain terrorism (see Schwell 2015).16   
Hashtags, in very complex, multifaceted, and dynamic ways are being used every day to 
communicate a wide variety of ideas, emotions, and meanings, including so-called religious 
                                                                 
15 Twitter began in 2006 as a micro-blogging site, allowing users to upload posts that were, and still are, limited to 
140 characters. Posts can then be liked, replied to, or “retweeted” by other users, which reposts the tweet on another 
user’s page. Currently Twitter boasts 313 million active users on their site worldwide, and is a preferred method of 
public communication by many prominent figures including Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and most 
famously, or infamously, U.S. President Donald Trump (Twitter 2017a). 
16 See Chapter Two for a deeper discussion of #MuslimRage. 
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ones. A particularly interesting and unique example of this is Ann Gleig’s (2015) study of an 
American Buddhist media organization called Buddhist Geeks, where she noted how one of the 
founders, Vincent Horn, developed a technique called ‘#hashtag meditation’ which he considers 
a form of vipassana mediation, a Buddhist mediation technique that focuses on self-reflection. 
On the Buddhist Geeks website, Horn writes a blogpost about his approach to ‘#hashtag 
meditation’, saying that  
when posting an update to social media, the #hashtag is usually used to denote 
context to the update. #hashtag’s are used to add humor, to tag where one is located 
(and event of physical location), or to emphasize something. In the case of #hashtag 
meditation, what we’re wanting to tag is what we’re noticing in our experience as 
we’re posting the update. What kind of thoughts, or emotions, are arising as we 
construct our Twitter, Facebook, or Google+ update? (Horn 2015) 
 
In Gleig’s discussion of this practice she notes that Horn, “draws a parallel between the social 
media use of the ‘#hashtag’ as a way to notice and emphasize activity and the identification of 
thoughts, emotions, or sensations that occur in vipassana ‘noting’ practice” (193). There is not 
necessarily a specific Islamic spiritual practice associated with hashtagging that I am aware of, 
but there is no doubt Muslims are using hashtags for expressing, articulating, and even 
constructing their religious identities (see Wills and Fecteau 2016). Nevertheless, despite their 
presence in daily life, the connection between Islam and hashtags in Canada has yet to be studied 
in depth. For Muslims, hashtags like #PBUH17 #alhamdulillah,18 #MuslimProblems, 
#MuslimsActually or #JeSuisHijabi twin the modern religious self and the digital, and are being 
used to express and construct individual religious and national identities, and when studied 
closer, they can tell us much about modern Islam in the Canadian context, given the significance 
of the Internet in Canadian life. A significance that cannot be underestimated. To date, however, 
                                                                 
17 PBUH stands for “peace be upon him,” a phrase  commonly said after invoking the name of the prophet 
Muhammad. 
18 Alhamdullilah is a commonly invoked Arabic phrase that loosely translates as “praise be to God.” 
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there is only one published study done by Peter Beyer and Rubina Ramji that looks at the way 
Muslim Canadians are using the Internet to construct identity. 
Peter Beyer and Rubina Ramji (2013) interviewed 93 second-generation Canadian 
Muslims. Drawing on this data, a further study of Islam and the Internet by Ramji (2014), 
confirms Aupers and Houtman’s observation of the connection between religion, technology and 
the self as it applies to the modern Canadian context. Beyer and Ramji studied how second 
generation Canadian Muslims create their identities, and noticed that of the 93 young Muslims 
that they interviewed, the vast majority believed that identity construction was a task to be 
undertaken by the individual, not by parents or one’s religious community (Beyer 2013:56). In 
Ramji’s paper on Canadian Muslim youths’ use of the Internet, she found that individual identity 
construction manifested itself in how these Canadian Muslim youths use the Internet. She added 
that 
accessing Islam online added to their sense of identity but did not affect their sense 
of ‘citizenship.’ While they are engaging in unique constructions of their faith, they 
do not distinguish between being Muslim and being Canadian, between Islam and the 
West, or between homeland and diaspora (Ramji 2014:115). 
From my research, participants in St. John’s and Winnipeg echo a similar sentiment, with many 
claiming that it is easier and more fulfilling to be a Muslim in “secular” Canada than it would be 
in a Muslim majority country (see Chapter Four). Religious, national, and individual identities 
seem to similarly be co-expressed through hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi and express an 
understanding of secularism that is much more complex than an understanding of it as the 
absence of religion, which is something that needs to be explored further before diving deeper 
into my analysis. 
Since my thesis centres around how hashtags serve to complicate perceptions of 
secularism I want to make very clear what I mean when I use terms like “secular” and 
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“secularism.” Throughout my thesis I use the terms in two ways: how secularism is commonly 
perceived and how it is critically conceptualized. In referring to how is it is commonly perceived 
I refer to it as so-called secularism, or “secularism.” Secularism or the secular is a concept that, 
for a number of historical and social political reasons, manages to be commonly perceived in the 
West as static, neutral, singular, and defined by what it is not: religion (Bakali 2015; Valenta 
2009; Jansen 2009). Many scholars, myself included, see it quite differently and take issue with 
this perception and how the religious secular binary undergirds problematic perceptions of Islam 
verses the West. 
Like religious identity itself, I critically conceptualize the secular and secularism as a 
dynamic, multifaceted, and by no means neutral, facilitator and manager of expression, be it 
religious, political or otherwise. A concept that ideally, but not necessarily in practice, seeks to 
ensure that all citizens of a diverse society, regardless of religious belief or background have 
equitable say in the public sphere. This definition of secularism that I present here, most closely 
resembles and is most heavily influenced by Elizabeth Hurd (2012), who in her study of 
secularism’s influence on international politics eloquently suggests that,  
Rather than take secularism to be a neutral or natural space for politics that emerges 
once religion has been privatised, displaced, or diminished, it takes shape here as a 
contingent series of legal and political claims and projects that are deeply implicated 
in the definition and management of religion, religious freedom, toleration, diversity, 
and so on. Secularism is not the absence of religion, but enacts a particular kind of 
presence. It appropriates religion: defining, shaping and even transforming it. (995)   
The use of hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi and #MuslimFerreroRocher, as I hope to demonstrate 
throughout this thesis, in mounting social critique and shedding light on Muslim identity, are a 
way in which Muslims are tacitly working to shift perceptions of secularism more towards this 
nuanced, problematized, and complicated understanding of secularism – showing the positive 
and negative ways in which secularism defines, shapes, and even transforms religion. 
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I, as well as other scholars, are particularly critical of perceptions that secularism is 
neutral, because it is a concept that is historically constructed with roots in the protestant liberal-
West (see Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2008, Asad 2003), and this lack of neutrality often becomes 
apparent when laws and policies are implemented or proposed in the name of secularism. As a 
result, its lack of neutrality is most apparent to those whom those laws, policies, and attitudes 
discriminate against. Recently in Canada, and Western countries in general, these policies, laws, 
and attitudes, while in the name of equality, show implicit favour towards more traditionally 
Christian worldviews, while Muslims are often the ones who are targeted. In France and Quebec 
for example, laïcité, a type of secularism that perhaps most strictly perceives a separation 
between religious and the secular is based on the assumption that society “can be held together 
only by a formal separation between religious belonging and political status, and by the 
allocation of religious belief to the private sphere” (Asad 2009). This position is evidenced by 
Quebec’s proposed 2013 Charter of Values, which sought to ban public servants from wearing 
conspicuous religious symbols like hijabs, turbans, or large crosses, but insisted on keeping the 
“cultural” symbol of the crucifix in the province’s National Assembly (Brean 2013).  
The rest of Canada seems to practice a more “open” approach to secularism (see Taylor 
2006), in which the public sphere is ideally seen as a place where all forms of religious 
expression are given equal voice in the public sphere so long as they fall within the rule of law, 
which on the surface may seem like a more nuanced approach, but is still fraught with 
problematic perceptions of a rigid separation between the religious and the secular and orientalist 
assumptions that some religions are more compatible with so-called secular-liberal ideals than 
others. The proposed niqab ban in citizenship ceremonies in 2015 and the negative public 
discourse towards Muslims surrounding the 2003-2005 “sharia debate” in Ontario after the 
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province allowed for Imams, Rabbis, Priests, to perform religious arbitration, for example, 
illustrate this well (see Selby 2013). 
This variance in understandings and approaches to secularism within Canada itself is 
partly due to the fact that there is no constitutional separation in Canada between religion and the 
state. Nevertheless, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees freedom of religion 
and freedom of conscience (see Beaman 2008; Beyer 2008). Likewise, the Canadian 
government, through its Multiculturalism Act recognizes,  
religion as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and is committed to a 
policy of multiculturalism designed to preserve and enhance the multicultural 
heritage of Canadians while working to achieve the equality of all Canadians in the 
economic, social, cultural and political life of Canada (RSC 1985). 
Note here how, within this landmark piece of Canadian legislation, religion, along with 
race, ethnicity, nationality, are all recognized as things that have an equal place within Canada’s 
social, and even its political, fabric. This understanding points to a form of secularism at work in 
Canada, at least on the federal level, that instead of pushing religion and religious identity away 
from the public sphere, which is what it is commonly perceived to do, seeks to ideally blend it 
with other aspects of public life. This blending can manifest in a complex array of forms. To 
illustrate how this manifestation takes place for at least one Canadian Muslim, I turn to a 
participant who I have given the pseudonym of Mariam.  
When reflecting on how her religious identity has changed over time since moving from 
Kurdish northern Iraq to Canada, Mariam told me about how she used to take her religious 
identity for granted when she lived in Iraq. Since almost everyone there self-identified as 
Muslim, she practiced Islam but did not think much about why. When she came to Canada as a 
teenager she was suddenly exposed to a number of diverse religious identities and practices, 
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including practices within Islam itself, which led her to question who she was as a Muslim 
woman, and for a while stopped wearing the hijab. From there it was not a slow progression 
towards a more private, implicit form of religiosity, or even a-religiosity. Instead, Mariam 
eventually decided to start wearing the hijab again, and told me that “now, when I practice Islam, 
I think it’s because I live in a country, in a secular plural country.” In Mariam’s eyes, she cannot 
simply separate the religious and the secular in her life. They are intertwined and are both a part 
of who she is. This, along with findings from my analysis of #JeSuisHijabi echoes an 
observation made by Moghissi, Rahnema, and Goodman (2009), who in their study of Canadian 
Muslim immigrant youths, of which many of my participants would be considered, note that in 
the face of certain barriers that liberal society places in front of many young Muslims,  
Muslim youths (or a significant proportion thereof) refuse to abandon Islam or its 
public expression in order to overcome or circumvent those barriers […] for youth 
socialized and raised in the West, religiosity can also mark out a sort of reflexive 
questioning of the secular values of the larger society, that in their view, has become 
stuck in its colonial mentality (11-12). 
 The problematic, powerful, ethno-centric, and even neo-colonial perception of 
secularism as neutral and preferable to religion affects Canadian Muslims, who are often 
depicted as unwilling (or unable) to separate the religious and secular aspects of their identities. 
With Moghissi, Rahnema, and Goodman’s observation and Mariam’s story in mind, which I 
explore in more depth in Chapters Four and Five, I do not believe that Canada is “secular” in the 
conventional sense that it is the absence or even opposite of religion, but am well aware that it is 
commonly perceived as such. This thesis demonstrates how hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi, 
#MuslimFerreroRocher, and the ways that Canadian Muslims use them, tacitly nuance this 
perception by deprivatizing identities and ideas that are simultaneously influenced by religious 
beliefs and the secular contexts in which they exist. Ideas and identities that Canadian Muslims 
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have understood for a long time, but the wider “secular” public, due to historically and politically 
constructed perceptions of a binary relationship between the religious and the secular, has not. 
Thesis Overview 
Now that I have outlined the context in which my thesis is situated, I will move on in the 
next chapter to review the relevant literature, beginning with a brief discussion of hashtags and 
the recent literature that explores and theorizes their role in the public sphere and their relation to 
Islam and secularism. Following this discussion, I will review and synthesize English-language 
research on the study of Islam and the Internet, Twitter as a public sphere, and online everyday 
activism to demonstrate how they work together to help begin to explain #JeSuisHijabi’s 
presence and function as a hashtag in the public sphere.  
In Chapter Three I describe in more depth my two-pronged methodological approach that 
I used to gather and analyze the content of tweets under these hashtags as well as conduct 
seventeen qualitative interviews with Muslims in Winnipeg, Manitoba and St. John’s, 
Newfoundland and Labrador. In doing so I note the challenges and advantages of drawing on 
offline and online spaces for data.   
Following this, in Chapters Four, I analyze themes and issues that arose out of the 
interviews and shed light on how Muslims are using the Internet and hashtags to construct, 
negotiate, and communicate religious and secular identities. In doing so, I look closer at how 
using the Internet within a secular context, like having to communicate to both a Muslim and 
non-Muslim audience simultaneously, illuminates that nature of religious and secular identity in 
the lives of Muslims in Winnipeg and St. John’s. 
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 Chapter Five, builds on observations from the stories and identities discussed in Chapter 
Four and uses them to further analyze tweets that reference #JeSuisHijabi. By looking closer at 
the rhetoric and tactics used in tweets that contain the hashtag alongside participants’ 
understandings of the relationship between the hijab, the Internet, and Muslim identity, I show 
how tweets with #JeSuisHijabi tacitly work to shift common understandings of a rigid separation 
between religious and secular that inform stereotypes and assumptions about Muslims, their 
practices, and their place in the public sphere. 
I then conclude by overviewing some of the potential contributions of this research to the 
study of Islam and online religion as well as its limitations. In doing so, this thesis project aims 
to add to the on-going conversion about Islam and Internet studies, by bringing the voices and 
experiences of Canadian Muslims into a forum that generally pays a disproportionate amount of 
attention to extremist or radical versions of their traditions online.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented the overarching question that this thesis seeks to address: 
What can hashtags and the way Muslims use the Internet tell us how the relationship between the 
religious and the secular are understood by and manifest in the lives of Canadian Muslims? I’ve 
contextualized this question by discussing the role of the Internet in Canadian life and how it 
relates to the modern context of individualism, secularism, Canadian identity and the 
securitization of Islam, introducing how hashtags manifest themselves in such a context. 
With this context established, this study seeks to begin to fill a gap in the research of 
Islam online. Currently, there is yet to be comprehensive research published into how Canadian 
Muslims use social media to navigate public life. The examination of hashtags offers a way 
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forward in this endeavour. As a technological and communicative object, hashtags are being 
used by Muslims to address and cope with the many issues, whether mundane or severe, which 
come with being Muslim in the modern, “secular” Canadian context. By interviewing Muslims 
about their use of the Internet and hashtags, and analyzing tweets that use #JeSuishijabi, I hope 
to not only nuance the ways in which hashtags are being used by Muslims to challenge 
discourses and express identities, but also demonstrate the efficacy in using hashtags to 
understand the complex connection between religion, secularism, social media, and their roles in 
the public sphere. To this end, I will now discuss and synthesize the relevant literature 
surrounding the study of hashtags, religion, Islam online, and how they connect to scholarly 
understandings of secularism, social media, everyday Islamic identity, and activism online. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
 Scholarly research on online religion is necessarily, and understandably, behind 
developments on the Internet. This delay makes the study of religious phenomenon online just as 
exciting as it is challenging (see Helland 2005). It is for this reason that scholars must aim to 
capture the dynamic and diverse nature of online religion and build theories and methodologies 
that work with rapidly changing online religious worlds.19 With this evolving context in mind, 
this chapter examines theories and methods that are most useful in making sense of how 
religious ideas, practices or movements manifest in the form of a hashtag. Specifically, I 
consider how this literature can illuminate religion, hashtags, their connection, and their role in 
the public sphere. 
 To do so, this literature review, in three sections, analyzes three bodies of literature: (1) 
hashtag theory and online religion (2) Twitter as a proxy for the public sphere, and (3) Muslim 
hashtags as everyday activism. I aim to synthesize these bodies of literature throughout. When 
examined together, this literature sheds light on the roles that hashtags play in the everyday lives 
of some Muslims in Canada, specifically how they are used to express stories, identities, and 
emotions that emerge from those lives, thus setting the theoretical and discursive stage for my 
examination of in-person interviews and ethnographic analysis of tweets using #JeSuisHijabi as 
                                                                 
19 My use of the term ‘online religion’ is intentional and follows Christopher Helland’s (2005) work on the 
difference between “religion online” and “online religion.” Helland argues that the former explains websites that 
simply list information about religion, whereas the latter takes into account the interaction that takes place by 
religious people online (Helland 2005: 1), which is key to understanding the connection between hashtags and 
religion. 
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means by which Muslims hashtags and the Internet complicate hegemonic narratives about 
secularism and Islam in Canada.  
Hashtag Theory and Online Religion 
 Emerging in the mid 1990’s, the study of online religion is a relatively new and developing 
area of academic inquiry. Despite this recent focus, a number of scholars describe a “third wave” 
beginning in the mid-2000s. In contrast to the first two waves of theory – described by Campbell 
(2013: 9) as (1) descriptive and (2) categorical – this third wave is marked by its more theoretical 
and interpretive focus on the web. I situate my research and this literature review within this 
theoretical and interpretive wave. At the same time, I aim to answer the call of Jose Casanova 
(1994), who in refuting traditional notions of secularization as a gradual phasing out of religion 
in the public sphere, claims that  
What we need are better theories of the intermeshing of public and private spheres. 
In particular, we need to rethink the issue of the changing boundaries between 
differentiated spheres and the possible structural roles religion may have within those 
differentiated spheres as well as the role it may have in challenging the boundaries 
themselves (7). 
 
Hashtags are technological manifestations of these changing boundaries that Casanova discusses, 
and by exploring how hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi or #MuslimFerreroRocher and others 
challenge transcend the boundaries between public and private, online and offline, religious and 
secular, I aim to make a primary, yet significant, contribution to the study of online religion and 
secular theory by widening and overlapping the theoretical domains of these two fields to include 
hashtags and their relation to modern religious expression in the public sphere. I must first, 
however, discuss hashtag theory itself before diving deeper into how it pertains to secularism and 
online religion. 
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 To date, the most comprehensive social scientific-based theorization on hashtags and their 
potential roles in the public sphere is the edited volume, Hashtag Publics (2015a), upon which I 
draw heavily in this literature review. Other scholarly works from which I draw are focused on 
hashtags and their connections to social movements and hegemony (see Jackson and Foucault 
Welles 2015; Meulman and Boushel 2014; Bonilla and Rosa 2015; Schwell 2015; Graham and 
Smith 2016, Croeser and Highfield 2014), a function of hashtags that cannot be overlooked. 
Moreover, all of the above-mentioned sources explore the socio-political aspects of hashtags, but 
they do not all cover their relation to expressions of religion. There is only a very limited body of 
literature that treats social media, hashtags and religion in any significant way. Gleig’s (2015) 
work on Buddhist “hashtag meditation” discussed briefly in Chapter One and van den Berg’s 
(2014) broad overview of hashtags and their relation to Christian theology make useful 
contributions to the study of Buddhism and Christianity respectively, but do not significantly 
explore the nature or form of hashtags themselves. I am aware of only two scholarly treatments 
of Islam relating to these three themes to date (Schwell 2015; Wills and Fecteau 2016), that I 
analyze closely in this literature review alongside literature that more specifically speaks to these 
themes, in order to establish a theoretical connection between hashtags, social media, social 
movements, online religion, Islam and their role in the public sphere. 
 To begin, one must first understand what hashtags are, a significant component in the 
current study of hashtags. There are many ways in which scholars seek to define hashtags. For 
example, in their discussion of social media, social movements and the expression of everyday 
experiences, Bram Meulman and Corra Boushel (2014) propose a functionalist definition of 
hashtags, helpful for understanding their most basic purpose. For Meulman and Boushel, 
“hashtags function as markers that provide the reader with a digital context and a set of 
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preliminary instructions for how to read a tweet” (2014:57). Put differently, tweets with hashtags 
like #BlackLivesMatter or #OccupyWallStreet automatically situate the tweet into a broader 
topic or conversation. However, while this functionalist definition of hashtags is accurate, it only 
defines one aspect of hashtags. 
 In their study of #Ferguson, Bonilla and Rosa (2015) propose a similar functionalist 
definition of the hashtag as an “indexing system” (5), but they also acknowledge how hashtags 
“function semiotically by marking the intended significance of an utterance. […] Hashtags allow 
users to not simply ‘file’ their comments, but to performatively frame what these comments are 
‘really about,’ thereby enabling users to indicate a meaning that might not be otherwise 
apparent” (5). This acknowledgment of the performative and semiotic aspects of hashtags is 
crucial to understanding how they are used and the meanings ascribed to them. Bonilla and Rosa 
go on to point out that this semiotic function gives hashtags an “interdiscursive capacity” (6) and 
situate the tweet in a more complex discourse or set of discourses. It is this ‘interdiscursive 
capacity’ combined with their accessibility on pubic domains like Twitter, that imbues hashtags 
with the potential to empower voices, like those of Muslim women, to challenge and insert 
themselves in discourses that they would otherwise be excluded from. 
 Hashtag Publics acknowledges this discursive capacity and takes it a step further by using 
the discourses created by hashtags to further theorize their form and function, which is a much 
needed academic endeavour at this point in time. In its introduction, cultural and 
communications theorist, Nathan Rambukkana (2015b:2), describes hashtags as “technosocial 
events”, in how hashtags connect technology and discourse. To my mind, Rambukkana offers the 
most compelling and comprehensive definition of hashtags to date:  
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As actants and actors in the networks they perpend to, we can see them as pathways 
to an open and non-predefined set of communicative encounters and architectures, a 
crossroads between form and matter, medium and message entangled […] They are a 
technic (which is to say, both a technique and a technology) of the social, and in their 
performativity are events that map together and encompass not just the tag itself but 
the network of human and nonhuman actors that come together in such 
configurations: tags, technologies, taggers, conversations, press coverage in other 
media (Rambukkana 2015b: 4). 
 
Rambukkana’s definition underscores hashtags as “pathways” where the “medium and message 
[are] entangled,” in so doing exposing their deeper function beyond Meulman and Boushel’s 
(2014) definition of providing a “digital context” (57). Unlike others, Rambukkana’s definition 
illuminates the social and performative aspects of hashtags as “technique and technology” that 
serve to “map together” networks that would not exist otherwise, thus creating new discourses of 
power and meaning.  
More cautiously however, Rambukkana (2015b) does not tout hashtags as new 
revolutionary forms of communication that necessarily empower users and engage audiences. 
Throughout his theorizing of hashtags, Rambukkana is intentional about using the word 
“sometimes” after discussing the functions that hashtags serve for social communication and 
political change (2). Indeed, many hashtags are used more trivially and, depending on their 
context and who is using them, they are not necessarily imbued with any social significance or 
political power. My own approach to this question will thus follow Rambukkana and others (see 
Bruns and Burgess 2015; Rambukkana 2015a, 2015b: 30; Rocheleau and Millette 2015; 
Veenstra et al. 2015: 95; Bonilla and Rosa 2015:6) who recognize hashtags’ potential to create 
powerful and influential networks and discourses by spurring, organizing, and disseminating 
information quickly and effectively, while being careful not to frame them as necessarily 
inserting underrepresented voices into mainstream media discourses. 
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 Bruns and Burgess’s chapter in Hashtag Publics theorizes the networks created by 
contrasting what they call ad hoc and calculated publics that arise from hashtags. They argue 
that ad hoc publics are formed quickly around developing events or news stories (Bruns and 
Burgess 2015: 15) like #OttawaShooting or #Elbowgate.  Calculated publics are created by 
hashtag users with a premeditated agenda and are designed specifically to benefit specific 
stakeholders (Bruns and Burgess 2015: 15). The hashtags themselves can also be created and 
promoted by certain organizations or institutions to serve agendas, like #JeSuisHijabi, launched 
in a press release by the Canadian Ahmadiyya Muslim community. However, due to the bottom-
up nature of Twitter and the ability for anyone to post using any hashtag, multiple discourses 
arise that do not all necessarily serve the originally intended purpose of the hashtag. In this case, 
it was not only Ahmadiyya Muslim women who were using the hashtag, but Muslim and non-
Muslim men and women outside of the specific community (see Chapter 5).  In fact, the 
dominant discourses surrounding such hashtags can in some circumstances serve the opposite 
purpose intended by its creators, which is known as “hijacking” (Antonakis-Nashif 2015: 106).20   
Consistent throughout the theories presented in Hashtag Publics (2015) is that hashtags – 
depending on who uses them and the contexts in which they are created – create multiple 
discourses. These discourses, created by many different publics, become useful entryways to 
appreciating contemporary issues (see Rambukkana 2015a, 2015b; Bruns and Burgess 2015; 
Antonakis-Nashif 2015; Rocheleau and Milette 2015). #JeSuisHijabi, is no exception to this, and 
is used by multiple users to create multiple discourses about Islam, hijab, and Canadian identity 
(see Chapter Five).  
                                                                 
20 #myNYPD is a good example of ‘hijacking’. Created as a response to numerous cases of police brutality, the New 
York Police Department created the hashtag to allow citizens to showcase police officers doing good in their 
communities. Instead the majority of tweets that used the hashtags included images of police misconduct, thus  
undermining the intended purpose of the hashtag and creating an ad hoc public out of a calculated one (see Jackson 
and Foucault Welles 2015). 
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Emily Regan Wills and André Fecteau’s (2016) work on #muslimcandyheartrejects 
draws on the work of Bruns and Burgess (2015) and is one of the first studies to sort out and 
analyze the discourses created by a hashtag related to a Muslim religious identity in the Western 
context. I draw on their methodological approach in greater detail in Chapter Three. Their study 
explores the discourses surrounding tweets with the hashtag #muslimcandyheartrejects, which 
imitated and put a humorous, tongue-in-cheek “Muslim twist” on the cheesy candy hearts that 
emerge around Valentine’s Day. Since Valentine’s Day has become a Western “secular” holiday, 
which can make Muslims who do not date before marriage feel uncomfortable, an ad hoc public 
emerged in 2012 around the hashtag #muslimcandyheartrejects, and as argued by Wills and 
Fecteau, it served to reinforce and further construct a Muslim diaspora identity and provides an 
outlet to express their identities and discomfort through language and humor (33). Examples of 
tweets under this hashtag include “Be Mine (Or you won’t be able to make Haj cuz you won’t 
have a mahram) [a male guardian] #muslimcandyheartrejects,” (42) and “Let’s go back to my 
place and yell at FOX News #muslimcandyheartrejects” (43). 
What is perhaps most insightful about Wills and Fecteau’s exploration of 
#muslimcandyheartrejects is how they distinguish it from hashtags that represent people or 
events like #obama or #BlueJays. While not as humor focused, #JeSuisHijabi, similar to 
#muslimcandyheartrejects, deliberately creates a space for Muslims and advocates to share ideas 
and experiences as a means of fostering solidarity, constructing identity, and, as I will consider 
in Chapters Four and Five, negotiating “secular” norms. Wills and Fecteau’s study usefully 
shows how hashtags are spaces created by Muslims for the purpose of constructing and 
expressing individual and collective identities (2016: 35). Overlooked in their analysis however, 
is how the hashtag can also be analyzed through the lens of “secular” norms related to 
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Valentine’s Day, and how “secular language” is used in the tweets to express a religious identity. 
My analysis of #JeSuisHijabi draws on Wills and Fecteau’s observations to understand how such 
hashtags communicate an amalgamation of religious and secular identities. In doing so, I hope to 
show how identifying and analyzing hashtags like #muslimcandyheartrejects and #JeSuisHijabi 
is an important task for anyone who seeks to understand not only online religion, but how 
religious identity is expressed within a so-called secular context. 
Internet culture is culture, and conceptualizing hashtags as dynamic and discursive 
cultural texts can help scholars to theorize their function and establish a methodology for their 
study. Bonilla and Rosa (2015) move this dual process forward by coining the idea of ‘hashtag 
ethnography’, a methodological approach that I discuss further in Chapter 3. Their study (2015: 
5) considers #Ferguson, an ad hoc hashtag (Bruns and Burgess 2015) that quickly became a tool 
for organizing protests and challenging racialized media portrayals of Michael Brown, an 
unarmed black man from Ferguson, Missouri who was shot by a white police officer. In their 
study, Bonilla and Rosa carefully conceptualize hashtags as a space for anthropological inquiry 
by asking, “can a hashtag become a field site?” (5). They aim to distinguish between “the town 
of Ferguson, Missouri” and “‘hashtag Ferguson’” to determine “how each of these contributed to 
the formation of the larger ‘event’ of Ferguson” (5). This observation is insightful for my 
analysis of #JeSuisHijabi. While this hashtag is used by Muslims, and more specifically hijabis, 
as a tool to negotiate and challenge “secular” norms online and offline, when analyzing them I 
avoid drawing general conclusions from these hashtags about life for Muslim hijabis. For that I 
draw on qualitative interview data.  
Instead, I focus on how hashtags contribute to and challenge wider discourses on Islam, 
secularism, and their place in the public sphere; hegemonic discourses that, prior to the rise of 
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social media, were more difficult for Canadian Muslims to access. While exploring the potential 
that the Internet has for the study of religion, Christopher Helland (2008) notes that “No 
religious group can be censored or suppressed by another religious [or secular] group on the 
World Wide Web, and because of this, the online environment has become a unique map of 
Canada’s religious mosaic, constantly being updated and transformed” (128). Studying hashtags 
like #JeSuisHijabi more closely and more often is a way in which we can begin to track and 
understand such transformations. 
Through exploring theoretical and methodological discussions of the hashtag and 
merging them with the very recent and small body of literature on Islam and hashtags, this 
literature review and subsequent analysis of the qualitative data that I have collected on Muslims 
and their use of hashtags aims to demonstrate that Muslims use hashtags not only to change, 
create, and insert themselves into dominant discourses about religion and identity in the public 
sphere, but use hashtags to create a space for the construction of their own individual and 
collective identities. Therefore, critiquing the study of online religion’s under emphasis on 
aspects of social media like hashtags, and building theories that help to understand the 
connection between social media and Islam is a necessary task, as more and more online activity 
moves from websites and chatrooms to Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, where hashtags are 
used regularly. 
 Facebook launched in 2004 and Twitter in 2006, with hashtags emerging in 2007 (Bruns 
and Burgess 2015: 26). Scholarship has yet to look closely at how religious people use social 
media, particularly hashtags. I suggest that hashtags could be one way in which scholars can 
begin to make sense of the complex ways in which religious people express themselves online. 
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To demonstrate this, I will now move on to apply the influential work of scholars of Islam and 
online religion (Bunt; 2009; Seib 2007; Dawson 2005) to understanding hashtags. 
 Much of the authoritative bodies of work on Islam, religion and the Internet (namely by 
Bunt 2009; Campbell 2013; Dawson 2005; Eickelman and Anderson 2003; el-Nawawy and 
Khamis 2009; Knut 2013; Helland 2005; Højsgaard and Warburg 2005; Ramji 2014) focus on 
websites, blogs and chatrooms, and mention social media in passing or not at all. While websites 
remain important in the construction and expression of religious identity and practice of Muslims 
in Canada, they have become increasingly mediated or have even been replaced by social 
media.21 It was not uncommon, when asking participants about the websites that have had the 
most influence on them, to get responses like, “I don’t know any websites, more Instagram and 
Facebook or Snapchat.” 
 In his study of Islamic cyberspace Gary Bunt (2009) introduced the concept of “Cyber 
Islamic Environments” (CIEs), a concept taken up by a number of other scholars of Islam online 
(see el-Nawawy and Khamis 2009; Grieve 2013). The concept is designed to explore “Islamic” 
spaces online (Bunt 2007: 1). In his exploration of CIEs, like many other scholars (Cameron 
2013; Hoffman and Larsson 2013; Echchaibi 2013a), Bunt primarily analyzes blogs and 
websites. Nevertheless, his observations remain useful for understanding hashtags and social 
media. Bunt suggests that, “what makes a site Islamic is perhaps in the eye of the individual 
surfer, especially when content is open to criticism or reflects views that some Muslims might 
describe as profane, heretical, schismatic, or otherwise against their interpretation and concept of 
beliefs” (Bunt 2009: 44). When extended to hashtags, Bunt’s point captures hashtags’ complex 
                                                                 
21 While a significant number of young people use social media, it is not used exclusively by young people. Many 
older people us it too, which seems to include the use of hashtags. The faces of the #JeSuisHijabi campaign, for 
example, were two middle aged women who even went on CBC to discuss the campaign and hijab (see Rabwah 
Times 2016). 
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intersubjective and polysemic nature and the types of discourses that they can potentially 
mobilize in the Muslim community.  
 Based on word choices and theological allusions, some hashtags might read as “Islamic” or 
instil a CIE. Recall Wills and Fecteau (2016)’s analysis of #muslimcandyheartrejects, where they 
observe that hashtags can create CIEs or what they call “Muslim-marking”: 
the Muslim-marking of the tweets in the hashtag is accomplished through the explicit 
use of words, phrases, concepts, and experiences that connect tweeters to other 
Muslims. By marking the space in this way, the participants claim it as Muslim and 
to express a unique experience of social life (41). 
  
Islamic hashtags create CIEs by generating and encouraging certain key words that foster a sense 
of solidarity and common identity, while creating a space for Muslims to express their own 
individual identities and ideas. Identifying these key words, who is using them, and how they are 
used in tweets that use hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi, are key to develop a methodology for 
understanding how individual and collective Islamic identity is expressed and constructed in a 
secular context. For example, the top three words used in tweets that used #JeSuisHijabi (see fig. 
4) were hijab, Muslim, and women, terms that shed light on the main topics of discussion. 
However, these words were often paired words like choice, Canada, and proud, (see Chapter 5 
for further discussion). Religious objects like the hijab, and religious identities, like Muslim, 
were often accompanied by “secular-liberal” nouns and adjectives when they used #JeSuisHijabi. 
This pairing captures how, as a CIE, #JeSuisHijabi facilitates the expression of Islamic identity, 
within a Canadian context. 
 Phillip M. Seib’s work (2007) argues that the Internet has solidified a diverse multinational 
online ummah (Islamic community). Seib eloquently explains how the network is established 
because the Internet does not “require uniformity. Members of dispersed groups can tie 
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themselves tightly or loosely, as they choose, to a central cultural identity” (13). The same can be 
said for hashtags. When attempting to make sense of Islam-related hashtags, one must look for 
where common cultural, religious, and national identities connect, intersect and clash in the 
messages that are communicated through such interactions. The collective identities and 
discourses that hashtags foster, in the case of hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi or 
#MuslimFerreroRocher, are a sum of unique individual ideas and identity statements presented 
using that hashtag, and may offer a way forward in addressing an issue that has plagued the study 
of online religion for a long time. Although written over ten years ago, Lorne Dawson (2005) 
sheds light on this issue, that remains today, stating that, 
the interactive religious potential of cyberspace remains largely a dormant and 
untapped capacity. It is difficult to say why this is the case (if indeed I am right), but 
I believe that part of the answer lies in gaining a better grasp of the nature, 
limitations, and reality of ‘interactivity’ on the Internet (16).  
 
Theorizing and analyzing hashtags’ place in the public sphere and how religious people use them 
can, help us to understand the complex nature of interactivity online. As text and “markers” that 
generates space and discourse, gaining a deeper understanding of how hashtags function for 
religious people in the public sphere can begin to unravel the complex connection between 
religion, society, identity, and social media.  
 Now that I have briefly explored and synthesized the literature on hashtags and how they 
are used as online religion, I now turn to Twitter. As a proxy for the public sphere, I suggest that 
Twitter can be conceptualised and understood as a space in which these multiple and intersecting 
discourses and identities created by hashtags arise. 
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Twitter as a Proxy for the Public Sphere 
 Twitter is often colloquially referred to as the ‘Twittersphere’ (Rocheleau and Milette 
2015), perhaps because tweets seem to exist in their own online world, with their own unique 
slang, idioms, debates and personalities, which often manifest themselves as hashtags. This 
particularity however, does not mean that Twitter is completely detached from the offline public 
sphere. In fact, in many ways it functions as an extension or proxy of the public sphere. This 
section explores how Twitter functions as this, and what implications that has for our 
understanding of hashtags in the public sphere. 
 Jürgen Habermas (2008) defines the public sphere as “a space of reasoned communicative 
exchanges” (12). Something similar is commonly cited by those who conceptualise the Internet 
as a public sphere (as with Bergie and Hodson 2015; Rambukkana 2015a; el-Nawawy and 
Khamis 2009; Graham and Smith 2016; Hoffman and Larsson 2013). These scholars, however, 
often provide an addendum to Habermas’ conceptualization, by stating that the Internet is hyper-
discursive, allowing people to communicate in seemingly boundless ways that would not be 
possible in face-to-face interaction (Rambukkana 2015a: 29; el-Nawawy and Khamis 2009: 56; 
Graham and Smith 2016; Hoffman and Larsson 2013: 4). In other words, the ‘real world’ public 
does not have the equivalent of a hashtag. While someone like Dauood can, in a conversation, 
take a piece of baklava and say out loud “hashtag Muslim Ferrero Rocher,” it does not have the 
same communicative or discursive effect as inserting it into a tweet, or in Dauood’s case, an 
Instagram post that is shared.  
 When someone inserts a hashtag into a tweet and publishes it they create and/or become 
part of a public thread. Whereas in an offline public sphere, unless one has the resources and 
influence to declare their views in front of a large crowd or an op-ed in a major publication, it is 
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difficult for a word or sentence uttered in public to attach you to a certain public or insert your 
voice into a certain discourse. By exploring works that conceptualize Twitter as a public sphere 
(Richelot and Milette 2015; Burgess, Galloway and Sauter 2015; Anotnakis-Nashif 2015; 
Vivienne and Burgess 2012; Bergie and Hodson 2015; Bonilla and Rosa 2015), and merging 
them with scholarly works on the role of Islam, religion, secularism and their role in the public 
sphere (Tweed 2006; Selby 2013; Asad 2003; Massad 2015; Mahmood 2005; 2016; Jeldtoft 
2013, Knott 2013; Cesari 2013) one can begin to understand the similarities and differences 
between online and offline public spheres and what this means for the expression of Islam within 
them. 
 Jean Burgess, Anne Galloway, and Theresa Sauter (2015) also seek to theorize hashtags 
and the publics that they create. Their analysis of hashtags is based on the assumption that 
“publics are multiple and emergent— that is, they are constituted through their material 
involvement with issues and events rather than pre-existing as a ‘public sphere’” (62).  The 
public sphere, as it exists on Twitter, is itself a broad overarching concept that is comprised of a 
series of publics that, much like the identities expressed within them, are constantly in flux; 
materializing and dissipating, converging and separating. This understanding of the public sphere 
calls to mind Thomas Tweed’s (2006) definition of religion as, “confluences of organic-cultural 
flows that intensify joy and confront suffering” (54). In Tweed’s definition, as in Burgess, 
Galloway, and Sauter’s understanding of the public sphere, religion is a broader term that is 
comprised of complex events and relationships taking place within it. Perhaps religion, if one 
accepts Tweed’s definition, and the online public sphere itself, share this multiplicity. In any 
case, Burgess, Galloway, and Sauter’s observation is invaluable when it comes to understanding 
Twitter as a public sphere and the place of hashtags within it, because it encapsulates its dynamic 
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nature. Hashtags are the way by which members of this public sphere map, navigate, and create 
space within it. 
 This is not to say that Twitter, as an online public sphere, and the offline public sphere are 
two distinct entities. In fact, both affect the other. What is unique about Twitter as a social media 
site is that, while has an algorithm like Facebook and Instagram that places Tweets at the top of a 
user’s timeline based on a user’s likes and who they follow, the company allows users to opt out 
of using that algorithm, showing users tweets in the order that they are tweeted. Anna Antonakis-
Nashif (2015) explains that "the structurally open form of hashtags (on Twitter) allows interested 
people to follow them by content, not necessarily by only the people they may know” (103). This 
makes Twitter, as a public sphere, much wider and user mediated than other social networking 
sites. On Twitter, people are more likely to see content from people that they do not know 
personally. This is because the best or most newsworthy content, assuming their followers have 
opted out of the algorithm, is judged by the users themselves through likes, retweets, and replies.  
 This user based mediation, however, does not mean that content on Twitter is entirely 
egalitarian. Although content popularity is largely determined by users, those with more access 
to knowledge, resources, and influence, like media companies and corporations, are more able to 
influence discourses and further their own private interests on Twitter by creating sponsored 
content or by simply having a large number of followers (Bergie and Hodson 2015: 256). 
Nevertheless platforms like Twitter, through hashtags, allow individuals with ideas and identities 
they would like to share to be read and disseminated to a massive audience. Religious 
practitioners are engaging with these platforms, inserting their voices in discussions from which 
they might otherwise be excluded. 
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 In her study of the religious arbitration debate in Ontario, Jennifer Selby (2013) suggests 
that “ideally…multi-voiced media-savvy engagement could reshape the so-called secular sphere 
to carve out space so that more religiously-motivated concerns could have a place in public 
debate, better reflecting a post-secular and de-privatized public sphere” (424). In modern secular 
articulations of the public sphere, religion is widely perceived as something that is best kept in 
the so-called private realm, thus undermining the voices of religious people in the public sphere 
(Asad 2003; Mahmood 2016: 9). As a source of media, Twitter turns the offline public sphere on 
its head however, blurring the boundaries between private and public, resembling what Jose 
Casanova calls “deprivatization” (5). For Muslims, this means that instead of being the 
hypervisible, passive observers of discourses about Islam in the public sphere (see Jeldtoft 2013), 
Twitter gives them a vehicle for greater authorship and visibility (see Antonakis-Nashif 2015; 
104), which resembles Jürgen Habermas’ (2008) concept of the post-secular public sphere.22 
Hashtags create a space in the ‘Twittersphere’ for religious voices to plug into debates and 
communities where they feel like their voices need to be heard, facilitating a  more open style of 
secularism that does not relegate religious views to the private sphere.  
 With this context in mind, it is important to acknowledge that while I see Twitter as a 
proxy for the public sphere, it remains most powerful in shaping and reshaping discourses within 
the public sphere, which may or may not inform public opinion. The hashtag of #MuslimRage is 
particularly illustrative of this point. In 2012, Newsweek magazine printed an issue with a 
controversial front cover. It showed a picture of two angry Muslim men with long beards and 
bore the title “Muslim Rage”.  The image was meant to portray the Muslim world’s response to 
an antagonistic American-made online video called ‘The Innocence of Muslims,’ which depicted 
                                                                 
22 I discuss Casanova and the concept of deprivatization alongside Habermas’ notion of the post-secular as it 
pertains Canadian Muslims experiences with the Internet in more depth in Chapter Four.  
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and generalized Islam as archaic, intolerant, and misogynistic. Newsweek’s use of the term 
‘Muslim Rage’ to cover the issue, as Schwell (2015) notes, is itself problematic, and served only 
to perpetuate Western notions of Islam as ‘other,’ since the term ‘rage’ runs in direct opposition 
of the West’s perception of itself as calm, rational, and tolerant (88).   
 Newsweek came under a large amount scrutiny for their front cover, and responded in kind 
by launching #MuslimRage to facilitate discussion. Much to Newsweek’s surprise however, 
Muslims around the world adopted the hashtag, and through humor and irony, altered the 
controversial and vitriolic discourse surrounding the hashtag. Instead of contributing to a 
discourse that assumes Islam and rage go hand in hand, users tagged menial, everyday 
inconveniences (see Schwell 2015: 85). Schwell cites many examples of tweets that completely 
changed the intended meaning of the hashtag in a way that humorously, cleverly, and 
powerfully, undermined the stereotypes of Islam that #MuslimRage initially perpetuated. For 
example, Schwell cites a tweet that says “A puppy licked me. NOW I HAVE TO MAKE WUDU 
AGAIN AND BURN MY CLOTHES. #muslimrage” (93). Tweets like these allow Muslims to 
interrupt and insert their voices into discourses about themselves, that before were controlled by 
traditional forms of media (i.e. newspapers, magazines, TV news networks etc.). Traditional 
forms of news media are beginning to adopt and merge with social media, like Twitter, to avoid 
becoming irrelevant, which is ultimately changing the way media content is created and 
communicated. 
 Nevertheless, while this merger does give more venues for Muslim voices, it by no means 
alters hegemonic and unequal power unbalances in these discourses. Schwell notices that there is 
a polysemic aspect to the humor and irony found in #MuslimRage, which as affective as it is in 
critiquing hegemonic discourses, there is still the possibility that they can be interpreted in a way 
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that reinforces them, rendering them an effective, yet imperfect rhetorical tool (Schwell 
2015:97). For example, the above mentioned tweet about having to burn their clothes after being 
licked by a puppy, could very well be interpreted in a literal sense by a misinformed or biased 
observer, thus counteracting the tweet’s intended result and perpetuating the stereotype of 
Muslims as angry, irrational and overly dogmatic. The issue of polysemy and its relation to 
hegemonic discourses is not new, and, while in the case of #MuslimRage, served at least in part, 
as a means of challenging a problematic discourse, the opposite can take place as well. This 
polysemy in more traditional forms of media is partially responsible for the many stereotypes 
that exist in their portrayals of Islam. 
 In their study of the way the media in Britain portrays religion, Knott, Poole and Taira 
(2013) offer a convincing explanation of how polysemy, if used carelessly, can create 
stereotypes and misunderstandings in mainstream media discourses. They eloquently explain 
how ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamism’ became one in the same in post 9/11 media discourses about Islam. 
They explain that 
It is important to note here the culturally embedded use of language and its 
implications for interpretation. Which categories routinely established, replicated and 
exchanged in media discourse, one term is easily replaceable with another- 
‘extremist’ with ‘militant’ or ‘radical’, for example. The meaning of one may thus be 
readily transferred to another. Whether ‘extremist’ or ‘militant’ is used, both may 
now carry the implication of terrorism. Islam is conflated with Islamism, the former 
as well as the latter becoming associated with irrational radical violence. ‘Islamism’, 
originally established in order to disassociate Islam from fundamentalism, is now 
used to describe myriad political groups and activities without reference to their 
‘actual practices’ and ‘discursive strands’ and how these are articulated in particular 
contexts. Added to this, the link to terrorism then criminalizes innocent groups and 
individuals (83). 
Twitter, as media and a proxy for the public sphere, is subject to many of the same issues that 
existed in more traditional forms of media before its inception. The multiple meanings that can 
be derived from a tweet or hashtag can be extremely effective in challenging hegemonic 
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discourses. However, it can also be interpreted in a way that contradicts the original intended 
meaning of s/he who first published the tweet, thus unintentionally contributing to that the 
problematic discourse that they may have sought to subvert.23 Schwell’s (2015) conclusion about 
the nature of #MuslimRage sums this point up nicely, by saying that,  
Potential polysemy is an inherent feature of #MuslimRage that cannot be resolved. 
Who laughs with who about who and why? The twitter-ego does not have to coincide 
with an actual person; #MuslimRage is about performance and parody, not about 
representation […] it is nearly impossible to determine whether a tweet is successful: 
whether over-identification is rooted in identification, whether it is a position of 
ironic distancing that leads to retweeting the joke for the joke’s sake, or whether the 
cliché is reproduced and reified (97). 
 
It is for this reason that when analyzing the nature of a hashtag and its role in the public sphere, it 
is important to focus on its intended effect and the rhetorical devices employed to achieve that 
effect and what it might say about the people who reference it, rather than trying to determine its 
actual outcome, which is almost impossible to measure. In other words, hashtags tell us more 
about how people wish to be perceived, which is telling and significant, but does not provide the 
whole picture.  
 With this in mind, Habermas’ definition of the public sphere can be readily critiqued as 
unrepresentative of the realities of the offline public sphere, namely wherein not everyone has 
access to “reasoned communicative exchanges.” This heteronormative public sphere grants 
unequal access to women, people of colour, the working class or minority religions (Vivienne 
and Burgess 2012: 366). Twitter, however, more closely seems to resemble Habermas’ definition 
                                                                 
23 A study by LaMarre, Landreville, and Beam, (2009) titled The Irony of Satire, looked at conservative and liberal 
perceptions to the American satirical show The Colbert Report, in which the host, Stephen Colbert, took on the 
persona of a conservative talk show pundit and commented on American politics. Interestingly the study found  that 
“there was no significant difference between the groups in thinking Colbert was funny, but conservatives were more 
likely to report that Colbert only pretends to be joking and genuinely meant what he said while liberals were more 
likely to report that Colbert used satire and was not serious when offering political statements” (212). In short, 
people watched the show through the lens of their own political beliefs and interpreted it in a way that fit their own 
personal agendas. A similar phenomenon can very well take place when people read tweets with any sort of 
semiotic, tongue-in-cheek humor, therefore reversing its intended affect. 
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because disembodied voices, through hashtags, arguably have more equal access to its platform 
and its debates regardless of race, gender or religion, allowing them, in a disembodied way, to 
carve out discursive space for themselves while influencing and challenging existing hegemonic 
discourses that have traditionally excluded them from the public sphere.  
 Hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi, #MuslimRage, and #MuslimCandyHeartRejects empower 
the publics that they form to traverse the once oppressively rigid and now questionably existent 
lines between religious and secular, online and offline, sacred and self, public and private, 
individual and collective, medium and message, citizen and other that keep people divided and 
unequal in the public sphere. While this thesis touches on some of these perceived binaries, it is 
mainly concerned with how #JeSuisHijabi nuances the relationship between religious and 
secular. 
To build on my discussion secularism on the Canadian context in Chapter One, I will 
now dive deeper in to the narratives that fuel certain problematic understandings of Islam and 
secularism in the public sphere and how they brought Canadian Muslims to the point where they 
see the #JeSuisHijabi campaign and other hashtags as a necessary means to counter these 
narratives. To briefly recap my understanding of the term “secular,” following Elizabeth Hurd 
(2012), am skeptical of its perceived status as neutral and passive, and see it as an active 
manager of religious expression with distinctly Western, and tacitly Christian, roots and goals.  
Furthermore, like Asad (2003), “I take the secular to be a concept that brings together certain 
behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life” (25), not excluding religious, and more 
specifically Islamic behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities. Joseph Massad (2015), in his book 
Islam in Liberalism would concur with this understanding of secularism, noting how the secular 
has historically framed Islam, as well as other ‘oriental’ religions, as “external other” (1). 
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Massad adds that its discursive force comes in having become an “internal constituent of 
liberalism” (1), by which he means that, as throughout history, as liberalism’s ideals were being 
developed, Islam has been portrayed within the liberal narrative as an antagonist to the liberal 
protagonist, being characterized as the thing that liberalism is not. Narratives like this are 
rehashed and reified in modern times when Canada’s Prime Minister says that “Niqab is rooted 
in a culture that is anti-women” (Chase 2015), or when a Presidential candidate for the United 
States can win an election after proposing a ban on Muslims and saying “I think Islam hates us” 
(Schleifer 2015). 
Likewise, this narrative also informs the assumption that hijab is a symbol of women’s 
oppression, and is, in a way, a product of liberalism’s use of othering as a means of justifying a 
very narrow view of women’s rights, and blinds people to seeing the hijab (and even the niqab 
for that matter) as an expression of a woman’s right to choose what they wear and even a means 
of expression their femininity and fighting patriarchy. Tweets under #JeSuisHijabi attempt to 
communicate this point (see Chapter Five) by demonstrating that a religious object like the hijab 
has “secular” benefits (i.e. pride, confidence, freedom, no bad hair days). Therefore, blurring the 
line between religious and secular and beginning to move their portrayal of Muslims within the 
liberal narrative from antagonist to protagonist. 
Kim Knott and Nadil Echchaibi point to how the separation of religious and secular has 
been a long time problematic pillar of the Western liberal imagination. In The Secular Sacred 
(2013) Knott points out that while the relationship between religious and secular is often 
assumed to be fixed and rigid in the making of law and policy, “their relationship is far from 
settled” (151). She notes that, 
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The ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ are frequently presented in opposition to one 
another, for example, as two counter spheres of interest with separate centres and 
peripheries, and distinctive powers, ideologies and hierarchies, as well as in the 
encounter between religion and secularism and their various ‘culture wars’ (149).  
The perceived binary relationship between religious and secular identity is enshrined in the 
overarching narrative of Islam vs. the West, and by blurring the line between religion and 
secularism through modern communicative media tools like hashtags, Muslims can directly 
undermine the hegemonic narrative that has historically posited Islam as antithetical to western-
liberal identity.   
Nabil Echchaibi’s (2013a) study of a website called Alt-Muslim picks up on this 
observation, in so far as he argues that “it is important to study these emerging Muslim media 
cultures as significant loci for the construction of contemporary Muslim subjectivities beyond the 
deterministic binaries of traditional religious and modern secular identities” (193). With this 
point in mind, #JeSuisHijabi, through its simultaneous communication of religious and secular 
identity, demonstrates that hashtags, and religiously influenced hashtags in particular, can open 
up new avenues of inquiry and serve for future researchers as an aufheben, in the Derridian 
sense, by aiding “in lifting up the binary oppositions of classical idealism, of resolving their 
contradiction” (Derrida 1972: 36).  At the same time, I do not mean to imply that Twitter is an 
online utopia of discursive equality. Bonilla and Rosa (2015) are correct in warning scholars that 
“we must avoid the common slippage made by journalists and others who tend to represent 
Twitter as an unproblematized ‘public sphere’ without taking into account the complexity of who 
is on Twitter, as well as how people are on Twitter in different ways” (6). 
When individuals participate in debates or discussions online, they do so while still being 
situated in an offline context (i.e. in their kitchen, their workplace, etc.), where they are still 
subject to the complex norms, customs, and values of that context (see Croeser and Highfield 
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2014: 3; Lövheim 2004). Likewise, problems like Islamophobia, securitization, racism, sexism 
are still issues that Muslims are subject to on Twitter and other aspects of social media (see 
Awan 2014; Nadeau and Helly 2016), and therefore affects what they say and do on that forum. 
Many of the participants in this study, for example, claimed that these issues contributed to their 
avoidance in discussing religion or using religious language online (See chapter 4). As one seeks 
to conceptualize Twitter as media and as a public sphere, a process that is ongoing and still 
requires much more research, one must at the very least acknowledge that when religion is 
expressed in the online public sphere it is intertwined with the secular offline public sphere. 
 The literature in this section of my literature review has discussed the nature of Twitter as a 
public sphere and as a source of media in which Muslims use hashtags to carve out space and 
blur the lines between religious and secular identity. However, while I briefly discussed the ad 
hoc Muslim response to #MuslimRage and #MuslimCandyHeartRejects, I have yet to discuss in 
depth calculated activist Muslim publics like #JeSuisHijabi, and how they use such a space to 
communicate their identities and (re)shape discourses. This investigation requires a deeper 
discussion of everyday activism, social movements, and their relation to hashtags and Islam in 
the public sphere. 
Muslim Hashtags as Everyday Activism 
 Noureddine Miladi (2016) studied the role of social media in the Tunisian revolution and 
how it has changed the political and religious identities of the country and its citizens. In his 
study he noticed that “the online self is presented in a way aligned with the offline self, i.e. a 
representation of the real self in the everyday environment” (37). In other words, what people do 
online, while certainly still performative and self-censored, is often seen as an extension of their 
offline social lives, activities, and even emotions. This in an important insight to consider as one 
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thinks about the way in which people express themselves online. As much as the online 
environment is full of sensationalistic and flashy rhetoric aimed at gaining people’s attention, it 
is important to acknowledge that there is equal value in the mundane expressions of everyday 
life and identity, which has its own activist agenda, and was a theme that came up constantly in 
the way many participants discussed their use of hashtags, which I discuss further in Chapter 
Four.  
 Within the academic study of religion, there is a growing trend toward examining the 
individual everyday lived aspects of religious life, which seeks to move away from a focus on 
religious organizations and institutions (see McGuire 2008:4; Fadil and Fernando 2015: 60; 
Dessing et al. 2013a; Goffman 1959; Schielke and Debevec 2012). While the normative 
assumptions of focusing on the everyday as a technique of anthropological inquiry is up for 
debate (see Fadil and Fernando 2015; Deeb 2015), scholars of new media are beginning to notice 
how marginalized, often seemingly voiceless communities are taking to online spaces and using 
hashtags to express their individual everyday experiences to counteract stereotypes about 
themselves and their communities (Vivienne and Burgess 2012; Antonakis-Nashif 2015; Graham 
and Smith 2016). When one looks at tweets under the hashtags #JeSuisHijabi, a focus on 
everyday lived religion is what one sees, which makes these hashtags not only a source to study 
lived religious expression and how it is being used to shape public opinion about Muslim 
Canadians and religion’s role in society, but of how Muslim identities manifest themselves in a 
modern secular online sphere. This last section of my literature review seeks to explore the 
congruencies in the scholarly literature on everyday religion and everyday activism, as a means 
of nuancing #JeSuisHijabi function in the Twittersphere. 
57 
 
 Manuel Castells (2015), a theorist of online social movements, eloquently helps to explain 
how online social media helps to amplify the voices of socially marginalized populations. 
Castells suggests that 
By engaging in the production of mass media messages, and by developing 
autonomous networks of horizontal communication, citizens of the Information Age 
become able to invent new programs for their lives with the materials of their 
suffering, fears, dreams and hopes. They build their projects by sharing their 
experiences. They subvert the practice of communication as usual by occupying the 
medium and creating the message. They overcome the powerlessness of the solitary 
despair by networking their desire. They fight the powers that be by identifying the 
networks that are (9). 
 
Castell’s description of how communities reclaim their voices online by “occupying the medium 
and creating the message,” when viewed alongside Rambukkana’s description of hashtags as 
“medium and message entangled,” illuminates hashtags’ form and function as they pertain to the 
empowerment of certain voices in the online public sphere. 
 Aforementioned, while they are often hypervisible in the media and the public sphere (see 
Jeldtoft 2013), Muslim Canadian voices remain largely invisible, causing stereotypes and 
assumptions to arise, which may further suppress their voices. Adopting new media technologies 
like #JeSuisHijabi are one way in which Muslims can gain greater visibility in public discourses. 
By occupying, and in turn, (re)shaping discourses about themselves, they redefine what “Islam” 
and “Muslim” means in the public sphere and in more traditional forms of media. In other words 
a hashtag, if used well, can capture others’ sensibilities, generate empathy, and equip subaltern 
communities with the means to influence what is said and thought about them. In the case of 
#JeSuisHijabi, it is often the inseparability of religious and secular identities in the everyday 
lives of Canadian Muslim women that lays at the rhetorical core of its tweets and the pejorative 
characterizations and many of the responses are gendered. 
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 Anna Antonakis-Nashif (2015) in her discussion of how hashtags help bring private 
experience into public debate argues that, "the specific communicative dispositions of hashtags 
have opened up new possibilities for political participation and contestation, especially to those 
who feel underrepresented in a traditional media public” (102). A common goal for hashtag 
campaigns is to be interesting or popular enough for their stories or commentary to be picked up 
by traditional media outlets, which is the case for #JeSuisHijabi (see CBC News 2015a, 2015c; 
Javed 2015; Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at 2015). In some cases the goal of certain hashtags is to 
subvert the messages being sent by traditional media outlets, therefore, when their message is 
featured in the media itself, it is considered an achievement because their hashtag has taken up 
discursive space in traditional media as well as online media (see Figs. 1 & 5). In the case of 
#JeSuisHijabi, for example, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at, the organization that launched the 
hashtag, issued a press release outlining why the hashtag was launched, serving somewhat as the 
campaign’s “manifesto.”24  The press release leads with “In light of the recent terror attack in 
Paris, France and the subsequent hate attacks on Muslim women around the world, Canadian 
Muslim women have launched a national awareness campaign to help Canadians better 
understand Muslim women’s identity” (Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at 2015). The opening 
sentence of this press release clearly demonstrates that while the nation Ahmadiyya organization 
was looking for media exposure, they were simultaneously looking to challenge the problematic 
understandings of Islamic identity that were influencing these attacks. 
                                                                 
24 Throughout the #JeSuisHijabi campaign, organizers, through the twitter page @JeSuisHijabi, were clearly 
monitoring and attempting to curate how #JeSuisHijabi was being used. Throughout the campaign it was constantly 
replying, thanking, and giving shout outs to those who used the hashtag. They were also diligent about addressing 
criticisms of the campaign. In one instance, when a user tweeted a criticism of #JeSuisHijabi for its similar form to 
#JeSuisCharlie, tweeting, “I am Charlie Hebdo #JeSuisHijabi,” @JeSuisHijabi replied to their tweet with a link to 
their press release, pointing to the fact that they see their press  release as the document which most clearly outlines  
#JeSuisHijabi’s goals and values. 
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 Prior to the rise of social media, networks of Muslims who wanted to have their voices 
heard existed, but they did not have the means to connect and amplify those voices. Hashtags, 
through social media, connect people with shared everyday experiences, thus empowering them 
to collectively speak out, share, and amplify a collective message comprised of individual 
identities and experiences. #JeSuisHijabi, with an “I” (or “Je”) statement embedded within it 
counters a similar narrative, but seeks to combine the voices and experiences of hijab wearing 
women to change common assumptions of the hijab and the women who wear them from 
religious objects of oppression and patriarchy to religious objects of liberation and identity 
expression .  
 It is evident through looking at #JeSuisHijabi that Muslims (and non-Muslims) are 
strategically using hashtags to communicate the small, menial, sad, and humorous day-to-day 
joys, challenges, and benefits of being a Muslim in a Canadian and global context. It seems as 
though expressing everyday identities and experiences appears to serve the intertwined purposes 
of countering stereotypes, expressing/constructing identity, fostering solidarity and generating 
empathy. In their discussion of ‘digital storytelling’ as a means of giving voice to marginalized 
communities, Vivienne and Burgess (2012) help to explain why the expression of everyday 
experience online serves these purposes, and has become a common communication strategy for 
marginalized communities to have their voices heard:   
Digital identity construction offers potential to speak across difference. Unlike face-
to-face performances of identity, digital stories offer the opportunity for a refined, 
reflective articulation of self. Through the construction of verbal narratives and the 
curation of material or digital artifacts, storytellers are able to make meaning out of 
an apparently random assemblage of life events and, while this capacity to 
summarize generally elides complexity, it also draws attention to nuanced human 
similarities that evoke empathy and speak across difference (374).   
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Identity construction and activism go hand in hand in hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi, and for people 
like Dauood when he uses #MuslimFerreroRocher. As they construct their own narrative and 
challenge existing narratives they, in turn, establish what it means to them to be Muslim in an 
individual and collective sense. The process of identity construction is dynamic and ongoing. 
Many stereotypes emerge from assuming that Islamic identity is static and resistant to change. 
By using secular language to demonstrate the everyday emotions, challenges and complexities of 
being Muslim through hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi, Muslims are generating empathy, and 
showing that their identities are just as complex as anyone else’s. 
 Nabil Echchaibi (2013b), while he does not discuss hashtags directly, offers valuable 
insight into the nature of Islamic activism online and its relation to identity construction in 
hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi. In his study of Muslimah Media Watch (MMW), a blog that critiques 
media portrayals of Muslim women, he notices that the site serves two overlapping purposes. 
According to him it “offers not only a critique of the established narrative of Muslim women’s 
experience, but also new images, subjectivities and a new way of imagining the Muslim subject 
no longer at the margin, but at the center of modern society” (861). A similar two-fold process 
takes place when people use the hashtag #JeSuisHijabi. 
 Furthermore, Echchaibi offers another helpful insight for scholars to consider when 
studying Islamic activism online. Echchaibi notices that it is easy for scholars to overlook blogs 
like MMW, as well as hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi, which both create performative spaces for 
Muslim women to make their voices heard. This is because are often viewed as an ambitious 
group of subaltern voices shouting amongst an array of others in a complex and largely 
misunderstood medium; leading many to underestimate their impact and value. However, it is 
important to analyze such blogs as part of a larger collective project of identity construction, 
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which even if they do not intentionally work together, as a whole they help to subvert dominant 
hegemonic voices (Echchaibi, 2013b: 858). It is for this reason that Echchaibi suggests that 
scholars must move their analysis of such online spaces away from evaluating how well they 
work and more towards understanding why they exist and the deeper, more cultural purpose that 
they serve (855).  
 In my own analysis of #JeSuisHijabi I take Echchaibi’s suggestion seriously and 
purposefully avoid trying to measure its impact, and instead employ the qualitative data from 
interviews with Muslim Canadians to understand the cultural forces that brought it into being and 
the discursive tactics that they employ to change those forces, all the while highlighting how 
Canadian Islamic identity plays into such tactics. 
 Using hashtags that help express the everyday is a powerful strategy for online Muslim 
activism because in an organized fashion it appeals to the wider public on a human level, shaping 
discourses while simultaneously creating a place to more freely express and construct identity.  It 
is for this reason, as I hope to have demonstrated in my discussion and synthesis of the above 
literature, that studying hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi as expressions of everyday activist 
religiosity in the public sphere, is a helpful way to understand modern Muslims in the so-called 
secular Canadian context.  
Conclusion 
In noting a lack of attention paid to social media and hashtags in the scholarly study on 
online religion, this literature review has sought to examine what I see as 3 major gaps in the 
field by (1) furthering the field’s theoretical understanding of hashtags and what they can tell us 
about religious identity online and offline; (2) demonstrating how social media, through the use 
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of hashtags, complicates the problematic binary between the so-called religious and secular 
spheres; and (3) shedding light on how everyday Islamic identity, expressed through hashtags 
can be an activist pursuit that challenges hegemonic narratives of Islam in the Canadian context. 
In doing so, I have laid the foundation for my coming discussion of how my interviews with 
participants analyzed alongside tweets under the hashtag #JeSuisHijabi, point to congruencies 
between religious and secular identities in the modern Canadian public sphere. 
As I hope to have shown in this preliminary discussion of the relevant literature on 
hashtags, online religion, Islam and everyday activism, and hashtags reflect a twining of the self 
and the digital, the private and the public, online and offline, and are changing the way Muslims 
express themselves online. This thesis seeks to gain a nuanced understanding of how Canadian 
Muslims in St. John’s and Winnipeg express their identities and shape discourses about 
themselves online. In addition, by analyzing hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi and how Muslims are 
using them, this research will help to move the study of Islam and online religion forward by 
looking at how Muslims and religious people in general are using hashtags to make their voices 
heard. Before moving on to that discussion, I will briefly outline my methodological approach. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodological Approaches 
Introduction 
 In seeking to recognize a twining and blurring of the religious and secular, the self and the 
digital, and online and offline life (see Hine 2000; Walker 2010; Campbell 2012; Croeser and 
Highfield 2014; Aupers and Houtman 2010), I employ a mixed-method approach to 
understanding hashtags used by some Canadian Muslims. Scholars have recently argued that 
online spaces like Twitter are not completely separate from offline spaces (Croeser and Highfield 
2014; Walker 2010). Both realms influence the other. A mixed-method approach, thus, best 
addresses online/offline to consider the content of tweets that use #JeSuisHijabi, but also how 
and why Muslims use hashtags through interviews with self-identified Muslims. This work 
therefore draws upon seventeen one-on-one semi-directed interviews with Muslims over 18 
years of age in St. John’s, NL and Winnipeg, MB and analyzes those alongside tweets containing 
#JeSuisHijabi. This approach effectively allows me to examine how Muslims use hashtags to 
express and construct identity in multiple publics: online/offline and religious/secular.  
 This chapter first discusses my method for recruiting and conducting interviews with 
participants in St. John’s and Winnipeg, how this data is related to a larger cross-Canada 
collaborative project called New Muslim Public Spheres in the Digital Age, and the theoretical 
position I take in incorporating offline perspectives when examining online content. I will then 
discuss my online ethnographic method for gathering and analyzing tweets under the hashtag 
#JeSuisHijabi, demonstrating throughout how I see these two methods complementing each 
other and mitigate their respective limitations. 
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Gathering, Analyzing, and Recruiting for Interviews 
 To initially recruit participants for my interviews, I created an electronic announcement 
(see Appendix 2) that I sent to relevant academic and Islamic institutions in Winnipeg and St. 
John’s (i.e. Muslim Student Associations, Islamic Associations, mosques, and Religious Studies 
Departments) asking if they would be willing to share it on their respective social media sites and 
list-serves. I then relied on a snowball method, whereby participants tell their friends and 
colleagues about the project, encouraging them to participate. The electronic announcement 
worked well in that the organizations that I contacted were very willing to help advertise the 
project. Through this recruitment I was able to recruit seven participants. The remaining ten were 
recruited through a snowball approach: they were told about the project by colleagues or by 
friends of friends who thought that they would be interested in partaking in the project. 
 All of the interviews took place in public places like cafes or university cafeterias, where I 
would conduct and record a semi-directed interview. The interview consisted of one hundred 
questions (see Appendix 3) and took anywhere from forty-five minutes to two and a half hours, 
depending on how much participants had to say or how much time they had. Before starting the 
interview, participants signed a consent form (see Appendix 1) granting their consent to record 
and publish their views while informing and assuring participants that all measures necessary 
would be taken to ensure that their identities would not be revealed, and that they could, without 
having to state a reason, withdraw from the study any time before April 17, 2017. 
 The interviews that I conducted are in coordination with a larger SSHRC-financed project 
titled, “New Muslim Public Spheres in the Digital Age: Identity, Community, Diversity and 
Authority in Canada.” In the summer of 2015, I began working as a research assistant for this 
project, and it is the title under which I conducted these interviews. The principal investigator on 
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this project is Dr. Roxanne Marcotte (Université de Québec à Montréal). My supervisor, Dr. 
Jennifer Selby (Memorial University) is one of the four co-investigators for the project. One of 
the goals of this five-year project is to collect approximately 250 interviews, of which my 
interviews for this thesis are a part.25 
 While I will draw on the entirety of the interviews in my analysis to contextualize 
participants’ views of hashtags, my research focuses on question number 64 a: “Do you use 
Hashtags? If yes, which hashtags do you use and how?” I would often ask whether they have 
used hashtags to challenge misconceptions about Islam as a follow up questions. It is this 
question that was helpful in shedding light on what Muslims think about hashtags and how they 
are using them. This initial direction seemed to encourage participants to think about hashtags in 
relation to their faith more contextually. 
In their study of #oo, a hashtag used to organize the “Occupy Oakland” movement, 
Croeser and Highfield (2014), use a similar method to accompany their analysis of tweets under 
the hashtag #oo, which was used by the Oakland, CA chapter of the Occupy Movement. Croeser 
and Highfield interviewed activists who were using the hashtag to understand how they were 
using it to communicate, organize, and subvert unfavorable media portrayals of the movement. 
This mixed-method approach (interviews and analyzing their tweets) was based on their 
observation that “some of the same factors which constrain activists within the place of Occupy 
Oakland (such as the repressive role of the state, as demonstrated by the crackdown on Occupy 
sites discussed below) also affect the space of #oo” (2). The same can be said for #JeSuisHijabi. 
                                                                 
25 The project is a cooperative effort between four universities across Canada: Memorial University, Université de 
Québec à Montréal, the University of Regina and Cape Breton University.  Each university will analyze qualitative 
data from the interviews by focusing on a specific theme (identity, community, diversity and authority). Dr. Selby 
and I are both interested in the question of authority. In the case of this thesis , authority pertains to the ability of 
Muslims to participate in public discourses about themselves and the world around them, and how they are 
expressing their beliefs, opinions and identities through hashtags to establish such authority. 
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While #JeSuisHijabi takes a very different approach to activism, and I did not interview any 
users of #JeSuisHijabi, issues like securitization, Islamophobia, racism, sexism, as I mentioned 
in both chapters 1 and 2, transcend online and offline spheres, and were expressed by 
participants as discrimination that affected the way they interacted online (see Chapter Four). 
Therefore, looking closely at a hashtag, while asking how Muslims are using hashtags, provides 
a more well-rounded account of how offline forces affect online behavior, and vice versa. 
Christopher Helland (2005) has also explored the methodological challenges of looking 
at religious expression online specifically as lived religion and offers insight into exploring what 
hashtags can elucidate. Helland observes that religious experience by its very nature is 
subjective, which makes it difficult to determine what is genuinely religious activity online, and 
whether offline methodologies are even applicable (5). While this observation was certainly true 
when he published this article in 2005, the advent of social media, as exemplified by the hashtag-
mediated #JeSuisHijabi campaign, has, I would argue, further intertwined online and offline 
worlds. This then makes online expression, while still highly self-censored, much more authentic 
and reflective of offline religious experience than it was when Helland made this observation. 
Therefore, the question is no longer whether offline methods are applicable to understanding 
lived religion online. Instead, the questions that social scientists ought to be asking when 
observing not only religious experience, but modern public life in general is: how can traditional 
offline methods be merged with methods that observe online behavior? 
For many, social interaction and expression online, has become intertwined with 
everyday offline social interactions, especially on social media sites like Twitter, Instagram, and 
Facebook, where hashtags appear most often (Meuleman and Boushel 2014: 51). As a result, 
anonymity, which often leads researchers to question a text’s authenticity has become taboo to a 
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certain degree, and is often associated with the type of people who seek to make malicious or 
hateful comments on online social media content, tellingly known as trolls. Therefore, interview-
based methodologies like those utilized by social scientists who study what is often called ‘lived 
religion,’ are useful for researchers in examining religious-related hashtags (Helland 2005; 
McGuire 2008; Orsi 2003). 
 Consider Dauood’s explanation for why he hashtagged a picture of baklava with the hashtag 
#MuslimFerreroRocher as an example of how interviews help to illuminate the relationship 
between hashtags and lived religious identity expression in the public sphere. If one were to 
simply come across his picture on Instagram, they could make note of how Dauood uses the 
hashtag to merge Muslim and seemingly mundane objects and ideas. However, in our interview 
Dauood confirms that behind the hashtag was the motivation to challenge mainstream media 
narratives of Islam and, in his words, “show, hey, we follow a certain religion, but we also have 
a family, we also have birthdays, we also have weddings, we also have food fests, we also go and 
watch movies in cinemas, we have Muslim desserts that we call non-Muslim names that you can 
kind of relate to.” Put differently, Dauood uses hashtags to show that religion is an important part 
of his life, but there are secular parts of himself and his community that are commonly 
overlooked in the mainstream media that he wants people to know about too; demonstrating all 
the while that these two parts of himself are not mutually exclusive. 
 To this end, the semi-directed interviews that I conducted help to illuminate the religious 
and secular forms, functions and motivations behind the use of hashtags in the public sphere. By 
complementing this interview-based approach with an analysis of a “Muslim” hashtag created by 
Canadians, like #JeSuisHijabi, a mixed-method approach allows for a more in-depth 
understanding not only of the content generated by hashtags, but the context that drives their 
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creation. With this in mind, I will now discuss my method for gathering and analyzing tweets 
under #JeSuisHijabi. 
Gathering and Analyzing Tweets: The Emerging Method of ‘Hashtag Ethnography’ 
 Using NVivo research software26, I analyzed 893 original tweets containing #JeSuisHijabi, 
generated by 333 individual Twitter users, which I retrieved from Twitter by using its advanced 
search function.27 I compiled the content of the tweets first into an excel spreadsheet, which was 
then transferred into the NVivo software for analysis. The tweets that I compiled were generated 
from December 1-5, 2015 (see Chapter 1 for context) and were found using Twitter’s advanced 
search option, which allows users to search specific hashtags and the dates that they were 
generated. These dates were chosen because the hashtag and campaign was launched on 
December 2, 2015 (Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at 2015), which allowed me to see how the 
hashtag was used before it was publicized, as well as how it was used for the first four days of 
the campaign. Originally I had planned to compare them to tweets using the hashtag for a five 
day period 1 month later, allowing me to analyse how discourses within #JeSuisHijabi changed 
over time; not just from day to day while the hashtag had momentum, but once media coverage 
and hype had settled. During the five day period of January 1-5, 2016, however, only four tweets 
were generated under the hashtag. While this is not enough data to make a proper comparison, it 
is worth noting that although #JeSuisHijabi tweets still sparsely emerge on Twitter to this day, its 
function as a calculated public created as a campaign, was temporary and heavily tied to the 
                                                                 
26 I specifically used NVivo version 11 to organize and analyze tweets gathered under #JeSuisHijabi. 
27 In conducting the advanced Twitter search, I was taken to the following link where I transferred each tweet and its 
relevant information into an excel document for coding into NVivo: 
https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=%23JeSuisHijabi%20since%3A2015-12-01%20until%3A2015-12-
06&src=typd&lang=en  
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media exposure that it garnered (see Chapter Four). Therefore, my focus will be solely on 
Tweets generated with the #JeSuisHijabi hashtag from December 1-5, 2015.28 
 At first glance, the above mentioned method of analyzing tweets under #JeSuisHijabi may 
resemble the method of participant “webservation” (see Varisco 2002), which can be seen as an 
Internet based form of content analysis, which serves to analyze the text found in tweets, and is 
useful for organizing and drawing out themes from individual tweets. In its most basic form, 
content analysis is based on the idea that by organizing words and phrases, one can begin to 
critically examine the categories that are created and extract various meanings and interpretations 
(for more, see Weber 1990), which I have done with #JeSuisHijabi tweets. 
 However, developed prior to the explosion of social media, the method of webservation 
has mainly been developed around the examination of a website or blog focusing on a certain 
issue or group, and does not take into account the uniquely interactive, discursive, and polysemic 
nature of social media. Since this thesis project is concerned mainly with hashtags on Twitter – a 
site that facilitates the creation of discursive cultural space as well as texts – a more robust 
Twitter-specific method that goes beyond content analysis and into the realm of anthropology is 
necessary. It is for this reason that I employ the methodology of “hashtag ethnography,” which 
was first coined by Bonilla and Rosa (2015) in their study of #Ferguson. This methodology 
conceptualizes sites like Twitter as an actual place where cultural interactions occur, viewing it 
as a space in which one can undertake ethnographic field work. 
 While hashtag ethnography is a “new” methodology, it stems out of the broader method 
of virtual ethnography, which was first described in 2000 as a response to the increasing need for 
                                                                 
28 One month later, January 1-5, 2016, only seven tweets were generated using #JeSuisHijabi during that time, 
which demonstrates the temporary nature and appeal of the campaign. 
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methodologies to adapt to the increasing merger of online and offline public spheres and how the 
Internet is being integrated into people’s everyday lives. To address this, Christine Hine (2000) 
introduced the notion of “Virtual Ethnography” in her book by the same title. To account for this 
merger, she conceptualizes the Internet “as culture and cultural artefact” (14). 
Building on Hine’s observations on the concreteness of the Internet, Dana Walker (2010) 
sought to further this approach with the caveat that   
one of the primary and ongoing challenges facing Internet-based ethnographic 
research is the question of how to construct the location of a project when the sites, 
technologically mediated practices, and people we study exist and flow through a 
wider information ecology that is neither fixed nor can easily be located as ‘online’ 
or ‘offline’ (23).   
This permeability issue still exists today, yet, in spite of this fact, scholarly works on the 
Internet and social media (Schwell 2015; Wills and Fecteau 2016; Bonilla and Rosa 2015), 
while often making incredibly helpful insight about the nature of social media, hashtags 
and their role in the public sphere, often fail to adjust their methodologies to account for 
this. This observation is echoed by Croeser and Highfield (2014), who, have noticed that 
“quantitative studies of social media are often quite broad and hashtag–oriented in their 
analysis” (2). It is for this reason that a mixed-method approach that accounts for offline 
perspectives of Internet use alongside an analysis of the content and interactions that take 
in networked cultural spaces, like Twitter, is increasingly becoming the most intellectually 
responsible means of studying the Internet, and must be developed further. 
One major sign of online ethnography’s newness is that academic works that employ the 
methodology often dedicate a great deal of discussion to attempting to make their own 
contribution the furthering and theorizing of the methodology itself. Schwell’s (2015) discussion 
of #MuslimRage, is one of these such articles. Schwell’s analysis is particularly useful to the 
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development of my own methodological understanding of online ethnography because her work 
is concerned with a Muslim specific hashtag. In her work, she refers to how her  
‘netnographic’ approach encounters various methodological and analytical 
challenges such as the complexity of the field, the multitude of relationships and 
networks, the unclear context and the many ways of content being disseminated. […] 
the question remains: what is the social context of the tweets and the blogs if the 
field consists of a multitude of actors, motives, intentions and geographical places 
(97). 
 
This is a question regarding multiplicity is one that that I too grappled with while compiling and 
analyzing #JeSuisHijabi tweets. I found that, even if none of them were tweets of #JeSuisHijabi, 
drawing on interviews with Canadian Muslims helped to mitigate the methodological problems 
posed by Schwell, which, as mentioned above, helped point to the possible motives and 
intentions behind using hashtags to counter misconceptions of Islam. Likewise, knowing that this 
hashtag emerged specifically out of the Canadian context allowed me to ground and focus my 
analysis within it. 
 As discussed in the literature in Chapter Two, in their study of #Ferguson, Bonilla and 
Rosa (2015) take their approach to online ethnography a step further than Schwell with the 
methodological concept of ‘hashtag ethnography.’ In doing so, they pose the very important 
methodological question: “Can a hashtag become a field site?” (5). As they explore this question 
further, they find that attempting to answer this question opens up an entirely new set of 
questions. They ask:  
What kind of field site does a platform like Twitter represent? Is Twitter the ultimate 
‘non-place’ […] of super modernity, a transient site of fleeting engagement, or is it 
an instance of a virtual world’ […], with its own set of socialities and form of 
engagement? And is the study of an event through social media a return to a previous 
era of ‘armchair anthropology’? Or is hashtag ethnography the next logical step in an 
anthropology of the 21st century, one that has become increasingly concerned with 
the ontological implication of digital practices? (5). 
72 
 
 
While these broad, over-arching methodological questions are important to consider and have 
significant implications for the study of human culture online, they are not the central research 
questions that this thesis seeks to address. Nevertheless, they are questions that I too grappled 
with and could not avoid as I thought about a how to compile and analyze tweets in a way that 
incorporates and acknowledges the complex social interactions and power dynamics that exist 
not only on Twitter itself, but between researcher and subject. For this reason, hashtag 
ethnography, to date, is the most apt methodological approach for analyzing #JeSuisHijabi, 
especially when paired with the narratives of my participants. While I have indirectly explored 
and addressed some of these questions posed by Bonilla and Rosa in my literature review, they 
also have methodological implications, which I turn to now. 
 In conceptualizing #JeSuisHijabi as a field site, addressing its interactivity within it is an 
important way forward in addressing the problems posed by Bonilla and Rosa. This interaction 
spurred by #JeSuisHijabi is why, as I coded the tweets in NVivo, I not only coded the content of 
the Tweets, but the retweets, likes and replies. Gathering these responses allowed me to quantify, 
to a certain degree, the reception, engagement and interactivity of #JeSuisHijabi. This approach 
is tied to how I conceptualized Twitter as a discursive public space, as I discussed in Chapter 
Two, where a series of discussions are constantly taking place and new publics are constantly 
forming and dissipating. Therefore, one cannot simply look at the content, but must also look at 
how others engaged with that content, just as one would if they were observing a discussion in an 
offline field site.  
 This approach was influenced by Wills and Fecteau (2016: 33), who in also acknowledging 
the discursive nature of Twitter, have developed and employed a helpful methodology for coding 
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tweets and including retweets, likes, and replies. Their work, while not being influenced by 
Bonilla and Rosa’s hashtag ethnography, reflects many of its insights. They are instead 
influenced by an astute observation by Bruns and Burgess (2015), who are in many ways the first 
to begin to take hashtags seriously as an object of social scientific inquiry. They were perhaps to 
first to point out that 
it is possible, in particular, to measure the extent to which contributors to any given 
hashtag are actively responding to one another— by sending one another publicly 
visible @replies, or retweeting each other’s messages[…] A high volume of such 
response messages would indicate that users are not merely tweeting into the hashtag 
stream but also following what others are posting; the more such messages are 
contained in the hashtag stream— and the greater the total number of participants 
who engage in this way— the more the hashtag community can be said to act as a 
community (5-6). 
 
Wills and Fecteau (2016) employ this method in their study of #muslimcandyheartrejects. They 
gather and organize the tweets under the hashtag and keep track of the retweets, likes and replies. 
Once sorted, they were able to analyze how these tweets helped reinforce and express Muslim 
diaspora identity amongst those who used it, which led to their insightful findings about the 
discourses that can emerge from a singular hashtag (Wills and Fecteau 2016: 34). It is this 
method that I employ in my own thesis project to analyze #JeSuisHijabi because, as mentioned 
in Chapter 2, these types of hashtags are similar, and this coding method will be an effective 
means of collecting and sorting data without undermining the interactive nature of tweets. 
 I recognize, however, that there are limitations to such an approach. A number of 
scholars have shown how the categorization and coding process of content analysis is 
particularly susceptible to bias and ambiguity (Weber 1990: 18). Nevertheless, tweets have a 140 
character limit, which means that the texts that I am analyzing are relatively succinct and have a 
limited number of words per tweet, arguably making the identification and categorization of 
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words, themes, and accompanying hashtags much more straightforward than longer texts. 
Likewise, just analyzing tweets does not illuminate the entire picture, which is why scholars who 
have taken interest in social media hashtags are beginning to look beyond the forums in which 
online content is created and interview users themselves (see Croeser and Highfield 2014; Illman 
and Sjö 2015; Glieg 2015; Echchaibi 2013). My methodology takes a similar approach in hopes 
of gaining a more well-rounded perspective not only on the use of #JeSuisHijabi, but of the way 
Muslims in general are using hashtags. To be clear, none of my participants themselves tweeted 
#JeSuisHijabi. Nevertheless, their insights into how they use social media and hashtags 
illuminates, contextualizes, and situates #JeSuisHijabi as an event within the larger modern event 
that is hashtagging. 
Conclusion 
As I have established throughout this thesis, online and offline public spheres are not 
completely separate, and my methodological approach to understanding Muslim hashtags seeks 
to account for this reality. By conceptualizing #JeSuisHijabi as a field site and analyzing tweets 
within it alongside in-person interviews,  I not only look closer at how online and offline spheres 
are intertwined, but what that means for Canadian Islamic identity and how it is expressed in the 
secular public sphere. With this in mind I will now discuss my findings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
How Islam and Hashtags Shape Participants’ Navigation of Canadian Secular Society 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines my participants’ use of hashtags and considers what it might say 
about their more general engagement with religiosity in a so-called secular Canada. As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, Habermas (2008) defines the liberal public sphere as “a space of 
reasoned communicative exchanges” (12). With this definition in mind we see that Habermas is 
concerned with the contours of the public sphere and the modes of communication that take 
place within it. Habermas aims to discern what rules of reasonable public discourse create the 
most equal playing field for citizens in pluralistic liberal societies. In a post 9/11 context, and 
while recognizing the deep historical debt that modern secular reason and liberalism owe to 
Christianity, Habermas, in formulating his concept of the post-secular public sphere has taken a 
particular interest in the rules of communication between religious and secular reason, and has 
built on his theory of communicative action to account for this.  
In doing so, Habermas describes a communicative process of collaborative translation 
between religious and secular reason, which, in his opinion, incorporates the nuances that exist in 
the interactions between religious and secular reason. At the same time, he seeks to a perceived 
polarity between citizens who operate under these two types of reason, that is religious and 
secular.29
                                                                 
29 To explain his reason for this translation process further, Habermas (2008) states that  “citizens of a democratic 
polity owe one another good reasons for their political positions. Even if the religious contributions are not subjected 
to self-censorship, they depend on cooperative acts of translation. For without a successful translation the  
substantive content of religious voices has no prospect of being taken up into the agendas and negotiations within 
political bodies and of gaining a hearing in the broader political process” (132). 
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This perceived polarity appears in Canada today, which I argue affects the everyday lives 
of Muslim Canadians. To address this issue, Habermas (2008) calls for a nuanced public 
understanding of religion’s role in secular liberal societies, which lies at the centre of his concept 
of the post-secular public sphere. In doing so he posits that: 
 
Even today, religious traditions perform the function of articulating an awareness of 
what is lacking or absent. They keep alive a sensitivity to failure and suffering. They 
rescue from oblivion the dimensions of our social and personal relations in which 
advances in cultural and social rationalization have caused utter devastation. Who is 
to say that they do not contain encoded semantic potentialities that could provide 
inspiration if only their message were translated into rational discourse and their 
profane truth contents were set free? (6) 
 
The following two discussion chapters are an attempt to decode and illuminate the “encoded 
semantic potentialities” embedded in hashtags used by Muslim Canadians as well as discussions 
among Canadian Muslims themselves, which are often overlooked when society divides 
religious and secular identity and shows favour towards the latter. In doing so, I demonstrate that 
the way in which some Canadian Muslims are using hashtags and the Internet to respond to 
public life complicates the so-called religious and secular spheres. In considering a blurring 
between these two spheres, this thesis demonstrates, through analyzing responses from interview 
participants alongside tweets that use the hashtag #JeSuisHijabi, that the identities expressed 
through “Muslim” hashtags and social media show how the religious and the secular are braided 
together in the lives Muslims in contemporary Canada. 
This chapter explores participants’ understanding of hashtags and social media, how they 
are used, the affect that they have on participants’ understanding of the relationship between 
Islamic and Canadian identities in the public sphere, and what that tells us about how the 
religious and secular playout in everyday lives. I do so by first looking at participants’ 
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perceptions of Islam, Canadian identities, and secularism. I then move on to discuss how 
participants co-express religious and secular identities online. From there, I discuss more 
specifically how participants use hashtags to communicate religious and secular identity and 
navigate the public sphere. 
 Following this more descriptive foray, Chapter Five analyzes tweets under #JeSuisHijabi, 
looking at how language in those tweets is used to communicate a blurring of the perceived 
divide between the religious and the secular in the lives of Canadian Muslims. Throughout both 
of these chapters, my findings point to the fact that the religious and the secular, as they are 
communicated through hashtags in the public sphere, coalesce around Canadian Muslim identity.  
Participants’ Perceptions of Islam, Canadian Identities, and Secularism 
As I discussed briefly in Chapter One, perhaps the most glaring finding from my 
qualitative research in St. John’s and Winnipeg is that all participants expressed a positive view 
of Canadian society and, to varying degrees, saw Canadian and Muslim identities as intertwined. 
This opinion echoes findings from the only other study of Canadian Muslims’ use of the Internet 
by Ruby Ramji (2014). In her study, Ramji found that the Muslim Canadians who she 
interviewed did not distinguish between being Muslim and being Canadian (115). My results 
echo this finding. In fact, the participants that I interviewed who grew up in a Muslim majority 
country prior to immigration would often express directly or anecdotally how Canadian 
secularism and pluralism has made them better Muslims. Likewise, as we saw in Mariam’s story 
in Chapter One, many participants who were born outside of Canada told me that before they 
moved to Canada they took their faith and identity as a Muslim for granted, praying, fasting, or 
wearing hijab because it was just what everyone else in their community did. However, upon 
moving to Canada, they were not only suddenly exposed to a number of different religions, but a 
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number of different ways of practicing Islam as well. This religious diversity caused them to 
question and engage more closely and critically who they were as Muslims, which many said 
strengthened their identity as Muslims instead of weakening it (see Moghissi, Rahnema, and 
Goodman 2009).  
To explain this growing movement further, I return to Mariam’s story from Chapter One. 
Mariam is a 27 year-old law student who came to Canada as a refugee from Kurdish Northern 
Iraq with her family when she was 12. She's considers herself a devout Muslim and wears hijab. 
I asked her what she thinks about living in a religiously plural society with secular values like 
Canada. She said,    
It’s awesome. It’s very awesome actually, because when you live in a place where 
most people look different from you, you kind of question like, ‘why do I look 
different?’ So when I first came to Canada as a child, like everyone was wearing the 
headscarf so I wore it too. Nobody told me. I just wore it. When we came here and I 
was in high school I was like, ‘oh no one else is wearing it. Well there’s a couple of 
girls. Most people are not wearing it so why do I wear it?’ So you start to question 
your own identity and later I took it off. Obviously because I didn’t know why I was 
wearing it. Later when I was much older then I started to question ‘wait, why am I 
Muslim? Why am I not something else?’ Then I started learning about the religion, 
and actually I feel like a convert myself, because I didn’t really know much about 
Islam even though I was born in a Muslim country and lived there for all my 
childhood. Then I learned about Islam and wanted to practice it. And now when I 
practice Islam I think it’s because I live in a country, in a secular plural country. 
On the surface, as many scholars assumed throughout the Enlightenment period and even today, 
that living in a country with secular values eventually leads to a decrease in religious sentiment 
amongst the wider population, and that secularism, often understood as a separation of religion 
and state, is a process that encourages relegating religion strictly to the so-called private sphere 
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and to private practice (see Berger 1967, 1999; Durkheim 1912).30 In Mariam’s experience, 
however, secularism can bring people to engage with what they believe in a way that strengthens 
their identity as a religious person, and even encourage them to express it publically. 
For Mariam, the initial shock of living as a religious minority caused her to question why 
she believed what she believed, leading her to temporarily end the practice of wearing hijab. 
Nevertheless, as she grew older, this same secular environment encouraged her re-engagement 
with her faith in a way that ultimately strengthened it to the point where she felt like a ‘convert.’ 
I will return to Mariam’s story, and why she decided to wear the hijab again more in Chapter 
Five, when I further explore Canadian Muslim women’s understanding of the hijab as it relates 
to #JeSuisHijabi. For now, however, I turn to the experiences of other participants to consider 
what their stories say about the nature of religious identity in a secular context. 
This insight into how religious identity is challenged and even strengthened by a secular 
context, as seen in Mariam’s story, is not new and is beginning to receive more attention from 
scholars of religion (see Cameron 2013, 2014; Knott 2013; Echchaibi 2013). Likewise, 
traditional theories of secularization as a process that disintegrates the role of religious identity in 
the public sphere have been successfully challenged by scholars like Jose Casanova (1994), who 
recognizes the validity of secularization theory’s core observation that religious institutions have 
been, and continue to be separate from the secular political sphere, while taking note of the 
resilience and push back by religious communities against the “privatization and 
marginalization” (6) of religious beliefs and practices that comes with it. Casanova (1994) calls 
this pushback against the relegation of religion to the private sphere as the “deprivatization” of 
                                                                 
30 In sociologist Peter Berger’s (1967) earlier work, The Sacred Canopy, he theorized that Western society was on 
course to become a-religious. However, later in his career, in the book The Desecularization of the World  (1999), 
Berger, in noting a resurgence of religious sentiment and identity in the West, retrac ted his earlier theory.  
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religion, which he defines as “as dual, interrelated process of repoliticization of the private 
religious and moral spheres and renormativization of the public economic and political spheres” 
(5-6). In other words, deprivatization is a process by which religious concerns and identities are 
increasingly expressed and recognized within the secular public sphere, pushing back a form of 
secularism that, due to secularism’s historical roots in the Christian West favours more Protestant 
forms of religion, thus assuming that religious expression is something that we can keep, and is 
best kept private (see Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2008; Asad 2003).  
The Internet, however, as a medium that blurs the line between private and public 
through social media sites like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, has most certainly played a 
part in fostering this process of deprivatization by allowing for religious everyday concerns and 
identities that were once private, like Dauood’s description of baklava as 
#MuslimFerreroRocher, to be shared in a public manner. Nevertheless, there are still offline 
constraints that affect how and what kind of information is shared when one discusses their 
religious identity online. Aisha’s story sheds light on this context. Aisha, is a 33 year old UK-
born Muslim woman of Pakistani heritage, who, like Mariam, feels at home in Canada and sees 
its secular values as an asset that aids in her religious expression. However, as a visible Muslim 
woman in the “secular” public sphere, she still feels required to constantly discuss who she is as 
a Muslim and to represent Islam in a positive light. In response to the question, “What does it 
mean to you to be a Muslim living in Canada?” She said, 
It means that I have a lot of freedoms, a lot of choice in how I want to practice my 
faith verses living in a so-called ‘Muslim’ country. It means I have a lot more 
responsibility I guess, because being a visible Muslim woman, I’m a walking, 
talking advocate for Islam and Muslims everywhere, because that’s what happened 
after 9/11. But for the most part I value all of the freedoms that I have. I’ve never 
really faced any Islamophobia that I can tell. If anything 9/11 gave me a platform, 
not as though I sought it at all. Like, I don’t see myself as an activist, I see myself 
81 
 
as very reluctant. Someone who has been pushed into that space because people 
wanted to hear from Muslims. 
 
While Aisha explicitly does not identify as an activist, she still feels a certain burden of 
representation (see Morley and Chen 1996: 9). As a Muslim woman, she feels constantly 
obligated to discuss and portray her religion in a positive light. This pressure speaks to a current 
tension present for Muslims in the modern secular public sphere: that their ‘Muslimness’ is often 
racialized and essentialized as their sole operative identity instead of being seen as a central facet 
of a complex and dynamic confluence of identities. This context constantly puts Muslims in a 
position where they feel obligated to discuss the Muslim part of their identity much more often 
than anything else.  
This myopathy is partially due to the media and academia’s focus on the most practicing 
and conservative members of Muslim communities (see Selby 2016: 72-73; Wong 2011), and is 
compounded by post-9/11 misconceptions of Islam as staunchly conservative, repressive, 
monolithic, and overly dogmatic. Therefore, even within a secular context, Muslims like Aisha 
are often pushed into a space where before they can discuss their identities as employees, 
students, parents, citizens, sports enthusiasts or trombonists, they must not only counter 
misconceptions of Islam itself, but reluctantly address the nature of their own ‘Muslimness.’ As 
Hoffman and Larsson (2013) point out, it is easy to become “blinded by the categorical powers 
of the terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’” (10). As scholars and citizens, Hoffman and Larsson remind 
us that “Muslims are not and do not act as Muslims all the time” (10). Not unlike how men who 
practice nursing are often referred to as a “male-nurse,” many Muslims often have to deal with 
the “Muslim-” before they move on to other aspects of their identity, because to be a Muslim and 
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something else is seen, within the “secular” liberal imagination, as salient, homogenous, a-
typical, and highly visible. 
Muslims are subject to this perception on the Internet as well (see Törnberg and Törnberg 
2016. At the same time, the world wide web has also become a place where Muslims can 
connect, express, and explore their identities in a way that, at the very least, lightens the burden 
of representation by giving them a unique platform to navigate and articulate the secular aspects 
of their religious identity in ways that they would not otherwise be able to, showing others that 
while Islam is a central part of their identity, it is not necessarily their sole operative one. In this 
next section, I will discuss how one participant in my project navigates this reality. 
Use of the Internet to Navigate the Public Sphere 
 
As a self-identified gay Muslim man, Alan often finds himself negotiating between two 
worlds that some perceive to be incompatible: the gay community and the Muslim community.31 
And just like it is easy to assume that living in a secular society leads to a decline in religiosity, it 
is just as easy to perceive the diverse and complex gay and Muslim communities as not only at 
odds, but as monolithic representatives of different sides of a religious/secular divide. However, 
recent scholarship has begun to shed light on the problematic aspects of this assumption. Queer 
theorist Jasbir Puar (2007) provides an authoritative critique of the perceived tension between 
queer secular identity and Muslim religiosity. She defines the common Western imagination’s 
understanding of the relationship between Islamic and queer identity as “resolutely secular, 
unforgiving in its understanding of (irrational, illogical, senseless) religion, faith, or spirituality 
as the downfall of any rational politics” (13). She goes on to observe that within this imagination, 
                                                                 
31 Winnipeg and St. John’s can both be very small places, especially when one is a member of both the gay and 
Muslim communities. So to ensure that Alan’s identity remains confidential, I have intentionally avoided disclosing 
any other aspects of Alan’s identity beyond that fact that he is a gay Muslim man. 
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“Queer secularity demands a particular transgression of norms, religious norms that are 
understood to otherwise bind that subject to an especially egregious interdictory religious frame. 
The queer agential subject can only ever be fathomed outside the norming constrictions of 
religion, conflating agency and resistance”32 (13). Put differently, in the commonly drawn 
Western imagination, to be gay is to be secular and liberated, while to be religious, especially 
Muslim, is to be restricted, repressed, and constrained, making it impossible to be both 
homosexual and Muslim at once without giving up some form of agency. 
In contrast, Puar observes that focusing on the “also,” as in “I am also a homosexual,” 
instead of the “or,” is a key to challenging the perceived adversarial binary between queer and 
Muslim identities (Puar 2007: 15). Alan’s story affirms this observation made by Puar. The 
Internet helps him to articulate and explore his identity as a gay man who is also Muslim, 
positing these parts of himself as different, but ultimately intertwined, complementary, and 
integral to who he is as a person.  
When I asked him about how the Muslim community uses the Internet, he said that,  
They [the local Muslim community] have a mailing list as well, which is regularly 
active and so they send out notices for if someone passes away and they call for a 
jinazza or burial, there’s a notice so we can go together and join somebody’s family. 
That’s really one of the most important things that I appreciate about being part of 
the Muslim community, because I like the communitarian nature of being part of the 
community. With my gay friends everybody is very individualistic and everybody 
just thinks of their own friends. 
Alan is out in his Muslim community and prays at his mosque regularly. While he says that his 
religious community’s attitude toward homosexuality is tepid at best, it remains important to 
him.33 He says that his Muslim community provides things for him that his gay friends do not, 
                                                                 
32 My emphasis added. 
33 A 2016 Environics survey of 600 self-identified Canadian Muslims asked the question “Do you think it should be 
possible to be both an observant Muslim and to live openly in a lesbian or gay same-sex relationship?” 26% of 
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and vice versa. More specifically, he admires the more altruistic and communitarian aspects of 
his religious community, while his gay friends, albeit somewhat individualistic, offer him 
camaraderie and acceptance as a gay man without judgment.34  
Alan is thoughtful, well educated, and takes great care to back up his understanding of who 
he is with rational arguments. He discusses how the Internet has helped him to explore what it 
means to be gay and Muslim in a way that he could not in a face-to-face conversation:  
Just the opportunity to indulge in an aspect of my identity without judgment or 
taking this rational distance from it, where you might not be able to have that 
distance if you’re talking to somebody in person. Being able to distance yourself 
from the arguments and from the emotional reaction that you might give by 
reviewing arguments and comments and statements that are made against you as an 
individual, which I still find quite problematic as a Muslim because we’re not 
supposed to be making any judgements against one another and we tend to be, as 
Muslims, making them all the time. It’s been very helpful in terms of just 
normalizing the idea that my family have been trying to engrain, that I am who I am 
for a reason and I should not be trying to change myself because somebody out there 
is trying to change me, and that has happened through these Youtube videos and 
online khutbas [sermons] that I’ve read and through reinterpretations of what was 
said 300 years ago by people who have alternative views on Islam and I think they’re 
just as valid as anyone else’s. 
In this passage, Alan shows how the Internet helps him to navigate around pressures against 
gayness that make seeking information about his identity difficult. In this case, he turned to the 
Internet to help normalize his identity as a gay Muslim outside of the supportive circle of family 
and friends, and cement his understanding of who he is as a gay Muslim in the wider offline 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
respondents answered “yes” and 18% of respondents answered “depends, don’t know, or not applicable.” The rest 
answered “no.” Interestingly, the majority of the respondents who answered “yes,”  36% were in the 60 and over age 
demographic, and was the age demographic to answer “yes” the most. The next highest age demographic was 18 to 
34, at 32%.  
34 In hindsight, I wish that I had asked Alan about what his gay friends think about his identity as a Muslim and his 
relationship with the Muslim community. Perhaps this question could have shed some light on what the gay 
community itself thinks about Islam and sexuality, and how having a gay -Muslim friend affects their understanding 
of the religious/secular divide. Unfortunately, it did not occur to me to ask such a question at the time. So to avoid 
speculation about how Alan's gay community may perceive Islam, I instead focus on Alan himself, his identity as a 
gay Muslim man, and the role that the Internet has played in helping him to explore and articulate his identity as 
such, and what they might tell us about the intersections between the religious and the secular. For a deeper 
discussion of queer secular understandings of Islam and religion see Jasbir Puar’s Terrorist Assemblages (2007), 
where she further explores the concept of ‘queer secularity’. 
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societal context, as well as within the Muslim community itself, a task that would be extremely 
difficult to pursue without access to the Internet. He went on to say that 
I find YouTube channels sometimes pretty helpful. Being a gay Muslim, I find one 
of the things that’s really helpful for me is looking up information on Islam and 
homosexuality in a non-judgmental way because I know that at my mosque I will be 
judged for it. Even though I’m out in my community I don’t know if my Muslim 
community even acknowledged it as such or as existing, because for some Muslims 
you cannot be homosexual, you can act, you can perform a homosexual act, but you 
cannot be a homosexual man. So I find looking up information online to be very 
helpful in the sense that there are particular Imams, there are particular searches, 
there are particular sources in terms of websites, and communities and networks that 
will provide additional information or will provide light into how people are 
resolving internal dilemmas about their religion and Islam their sexual orientation or 
gender identity. 
As a secular forum, the Internet allows for “alternative views on Islam.” And as long as they are 
well intended and based in fact and reason, they are, in Alan's eyes, “just as valid as anyone 
else’s,” allowing for a wide degree of views on religion and homosexuality, thus helping Alan to 
understand who he is as a gay Muslim man. Therefore, instead of moving him away from his 
religious identity, the Internet has helped him to more deeply explore the connection between 
these two central aspects of himself. As a homosexual man, an identity that is arguably more 
readily accepted in secular circles and non-Abrahamic religions, he seeks to demonstrate how 
this central part of himself is compatible with his religious identity as a Muslim without having 
to give up either, something that both his religious community, and perhaps even his gay friends, 
find difficult to grasp.  
More theoretically, I see Alan’s use of the web as an example of how the online sphere 
complicates the religious/secular divide. The rational arguments for homosexuality as a morally 
acceptable aspect of one’s identity, have for the past decade or so become accepted in 
mainstream Canadian political discourse, and in fact are becoming increasingly difficult to 
86 
 
rationally argue against.35 The Internet gives Alan the opportunity to explore what for him are 
rational Islamic arguments for homosexuality that can be overlooked, ignored, or frowned upon 
by both the Islamic and gay community, but exist online, thus allowing him to rationally 
negotiate, and in turn complicate, identities and concepts that are often perceived as binaries in 
Canadian society: Islam and homosexuality, religiosity and secularity, faith and reason.  
Hashtags can be shortened communicative manifestations of these “communities and 
networks” that reflect how some Muslims navigate and complicate these sorts of divides, and 
behind every hashtag that performs this function, there are countless stories like Alan’s. For 
Alan, the religious and secular aspects of his identity are, in the words of Kim Knott (2013), 
“two sides of a coin, the coin itself being of peculiarly modern mint” (149). This metaphor seems 
to be echoed not only in the way Alan and others use the Internet to negotiate two crucial parts of 
their identities, but how the Canadian Muslims that I interviewed view their own place in 
Canadian society. 
Now that I have discussed in depth, through Alan’s story, how the religious and secular 
coalesce, I will now move on to discuss how other participants express this coalescence online. 
 
The Co-Expression of Religious and Secular Identities Online 
 
To varying degrees, many of the participants that I interviewed expressed scepticism 
about whether an informed debate about religion can take place online. One participant for 
example said “I’m not that much fun online, trust me, because like, I don’t know. First of all I 
                                                                 
35 In 2005, in spite of pressure from numerous religious organizations the Catholic Church, the government of 
Canada officially recognized same sex marriage under Canadian law. This was after numerous Canadian provinces 
had already passed decisions in 2003 and 2004 to legalize same-sex marriage and began performing ceremonies 
themselves. 
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don’t believe you can have an informed debate online. It doesn’t make any sense to me you 
know.” While some expressed outright scepticism, others didn’t necessarily avoid discussing 
religion online, but were strategic about their use of religious language when discussing or 
posting publically online, preferring language that they believed would appeal to a more 
“secular” audience. It is this strategic use of language which highlights how the religious and the 
secular coalesce in the lives of participants, shedding light not only on the secular context in 
which they post online, but how they express themselves within that context.  
Tariq, for example, is a Canadian-Born Muslim of Pakistani origin. When I asked him 
whether there are any topics that he avoids online he said 
To be honest I don’t share as much religious content online for a couple of reasons. 
First of all, most of my Facebook isn’t Muslim and there’s certain things that people, 
you know, may not get. And I don’t share things for necessarily everyone on my list 
either, but for the most part I’m not super active in posting things anyway. And I find 
that when I do post things that are faith-based, they’re generally things that are 
accessible to the general population. I wouldn’t post a specific lecture series that 
pinpoints a specific incident in the life of the prophet Muhammad – peace be upon 
him – unless I think it’s relevant to current events, or it’s a good, sort of, thing that 
dispels myths that people may have about Islam and Muslims. But for the most part I 
tend to probably hold back a little bit, in terms of if I see something interesting, I’ll 
share that in my group chat with some of my Muslim friends, but otherwise my 
Facebook is a mix of film, trivia, photographs that I’ve taken, weird news things, 
maybe some cat memes here or there. 
Tariq, along with many other participants that I interviewed, intentionally avoids sharing content 
online that is completely religious in nature, not because he is ashamed of his religious identity, 
but because he is aware of his audience, which in the primarily Canadian online context, is 
religiously diverse, making cat memes much more relatable than a quote from the Qur’an. 
Nevertheless, Tariq will use the Facebook interface to engage religious material with friends, but 
in private manner. If the public content that he shares does have some sort of religious element to 
it, he makes sure that it appeals to wide range of people or speaks to an issue that everyone, 
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Muslim or not, can relate to. It is in these instances where Muslims like Tariq express how the 
religious and secular are intertwined and virtually indistinguishable in their everyday lives. It’s 
important to make clear, however, that Tariq’s strategic use of religious and secular language, 
while it serves to blur the religious secular divide, is not necessarily intended to do so. As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, my Muslim participants use a mixture of religious and secular 
language online for a number of inter-related reasons. Sometimes it’s to avoid harassment, other 
times it is to reach a wider audience. It may also simply be because the religious and the secular, 
for them, naturally coalesce around certain issues and ideas. 
Fawzia, for example, is a 20 year-old Canadian born university student of Somali 
heritage. Sometimes, if there is a tragedy, she told me that she’ll post prayers on Facebook.  I 
asked her “As you type [the prayers] out, how does that work?” She said, 
I don’t put anything really Islamic, that 100% is Muslim. I would just kind of be 
‘may Allah ease the families pain and bring them some joy’ or ‘may God help 
people find justice in moving far from this place.’ Things like that where everyone 
can be like, ‘we want that for them.’ So in general I don’t put in prayers anything 
specific where people would be like ‘I don’t really agree with that.’ 
 
In this case, even when posting religious content, like a prayer, Fawzia takes her mixed-belief 
audience into account. While Fawzia is expressing her grief and well wishes in an Islamic 
manner, she is well aware that since her Facebook friends are diverse, what she shares will be 
read by more than just Muslims, and what she does say may affect what they think about Islam 
and her identity as a Muslim. Her insight regarding audience is noteworthy. Muslims are not 
always posting about Islam or in an Islamic manner, but Fawzia, for one, thinks carefully about 
how her posts may be interpreted by a wider audience. Looking closer at the way my participants 
post online highlights – to borrow Robert Orsi's (2005) illustrative term – the braided 
relationship between religious and secular in the lives of Canadian Muslims, showing how 
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Canadian Islamic identity contains within it a tremendous array of “improbable intersections, 
incommensurable ways of living, discrepant imaginings, unexpected movements of influence, 
and inspiration existing side by side” (9).  
Whether it is Mariam’s personal journey with wearing the hijab; Aisha’s reluctant role as 
a “walking talking advocate for Islam;” Alan’s use of the Internet to explore his identity as a gay 
Muslim man; Fawzia’s Facebook prayers that are purposefully not 100% Islamic; Tariq’s 
vigilance in assuring that that the faith-based content that he shares is pertinent to more than just 
Muslims; or Dauood, whom I mentioned in Chapter 1, and his hashtagging of Baklava as 
#MuslimFerreroRocher; in the lives of these Canadian Muslims, the religious and the secular 
function in a braided manner, and it is demonstrated in the way that they interact online. 
 Likewise, as I have explored briefly in Dauood’s story throughout this thesis thus far, it is 
clear that this braided relationship between religious and secular carries over and is embedded in 
the way Muslims use hashtags, and is what I will now explore further. 
 
The Use of Hashtags by Participants to Communicate Religious/Secular Identities 
 
Of the seventeen participants that I interviewed, 13 said they used hashtags, but to varying 
degrees. Participants said that they used them for a multitude of reasons like sharing information 
at events, to show solidarity with a movement, to share news, to label a picture or tweet, or to 
simply get a laugh. These were by far the most prominent uses of hashtags for participants, and 
using them for religious expression or to challenge misconceptions about Islam was something 
that they did only every once in a while, if at all.  
Recall Dauood, who we met at the beginning of Chapter 1. After he told me about 
hashtagging baklava as #MuslimFerreroRocher, I went on to ask him why he uses hashtags. He 
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then told me a story also referencing food. 
 
[They] mak[e] it easier for everybody to interact. That’s why I would use hashtags. 
Like I posted another one on Ramadan. My nephew, the only time the Muslim kids 
get candies without a fear of somebody taking it from them is Ramadan. So I’m 
sitting and my nephew is having a Kit Kat right in front of me, and it’s 2pm and 
I’m fasting, and I cannot have his Kit Kat, as much as I wanted to. He probably 
didn’t understand that I was fasting or whatever, but I was just looking at him, and 
any other time I would just go and take a bite of it or a piece of it. So in that I used 
two hashtags just to show who we are. 
 
CF: Which hashtags? 
 
I can’t remember, like #Ramadan #fasting. I used #KitKat for that picture because 
that would bring somewhat of a crowd, and then people will see and they will laugh 
and they will understand and they will become curious, because I think that there 
are a lot of misconceptions. I think the purpose of a hashtag is to set a trend, and to 
set a trend is to raise awareness about certain things. I think a lot of people fear 
Islam or are scared of Islam because they don’t know it. And usually you’re scared 
of something that you’re not aware of. You’ll be scared of going to a new place 
because you don’t know that place, but you’ll feel very comfortable coming back to 
Winnipeg because you know this place. Like I’ll be very happy to go back to 
Toronto because I lived there. So, the fear of not knowing is there, and that kind of 
sets that perception in your mind. So that’s why I think that as a Muslim I think that 
it’s my job and my responsibility to find different ways, let that be hashtags or 
Islam Awareness Week where we set up a table in UC, to raise awareness in 
whatever way I can. 
 
To Dauood, hashtags facilitate interaction, and are used to “set a trend” and “raise awareness 
about certain things.” They are one tool amongst many that he uses to “bring somewhat of a 
crowd” to look closer at Islamic identity, understand it from his perspective, and make it more 
familiar. By attaching a secular hashtag like #KitKat to a story about Ramadan, he intentionally 
sheds light on the very humorous and human aspects of fasting during Ramadan and the 
dedication that it takes to take part in it. He hopes that if someone were to see his picture on their 
Instagram feed or search #Kitkat or #Ramadan, they would see, for that one moment, a glimpse 
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into “the ‘invisible’ and the noninstitutional” (Dessing et al. 2013b: 2) aspects of lived Islamic 
experience, thus challenging common societal imaginations of Islam as, in Dauood’s words, “a 
black [and white] picture of someone with an AK-47.” 
In Dauood’s case, the way in which he uses certain hashtags illuminates how he 
communicates his Muslim identity in the areligious context of Instagram. During Ramadan, 
Dauood, who loves food, gets hungry. To cope with the discomfort of his hunger, like many do 
when they’re uncomfortable, he uses humour. Moreover, he sees humour as an opportunity to 
communicate to a wider audience his small, but significant lived experience during the month of 
Ramadan, thus ideally generating empathy and humanizing Islam in the eyes of the wider public. 
This seemingly mundane statement of intertwined religious and secular identity channelled 
through Dauood’s use of #MuslimFerreroRocher, #Ramadan, and #KitKat, I argue, can and 
should be seen as an act of everyday activism that directly challenges a hegemonic narrative. In 
the social media age, we must not view small acts of dissent like these as insignificant in 
challenging hegemonic discourses on Islam, but as Nabil Echchaibi (2013), in his study of online 
activism, points out, “rather as ports of small but consistent disruptive flows of dissent, which are 
significant, precisely because of the nature of the intervention and the tactics of their resistance” 
(853).  The hegemonic discourse in this case is the perception of mutually exclusive relationship 
between the religious and the secular, which in the context of the post 9/11, positions Muslims as 
antithetical to Western-liberal values.  
A similar embrace of the mundane is used by Saleem when he uses hashtags. Saleem is a 
23 year old web developer from Winnipeg who was born in Pakistan. “Have you ever used 
hashtags to challenge misconceptions about Islam?” I asked. 
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“Yeah.” He responded. “Sometimes, I would get a good picture of the sky and if it’s 
really beautiful, I would just say something like ‘Beautiful sky #sky #beautiful #nature.’” 
Interestingly, Saleem didn’t see it as necessary to follow up with how these hashtags help 
challenge misconceptions of Islam, nor did I think to follow up with a question asking him as to 
why. This is because, in that moment, we both saw his response as self-evident. We both 
recognized that in using hashtags that have nothing to do with Islam and expressing a certain 
appreciation for nature, he in turn challenges the problematic misconception that a narrow-
minded and all-encompassing understanding of Islamic identity. As a practicing Muslim youth, 
Saleem’s actions are often already politicized. In this way, the perceptions of his use of 
Instagram or other social media unescapably placed within the religious/secular binary. 
Therefore, by being a Muslim who posts about mundane things, they are making an implicit, yet 
powerful statement that can complicate notions of what it means to be Muslim and secular.  
In this current historical moment, as a platform for the public expression of private 
identity, the Internet has made the everyday mundane expression of identity a powerful tactic for 
Muslims. Saleem and Dauood’s stories, and the stories expressed through #JeSuisHijabi, which I 
explore further in Chapter Five, highlight the important role that the mundane expression of 
intertwined religiosity and secularity plays in challenging hegemonic discourses, and requires 
further attention from scholars who seek to understand religious expression in the modern public 
sphere. 
Participants, although they expressed an awareness of powerful hashtags like 
#BlackLivesMatter, viewed hashtags as, for the most part, mundane, trivial, or strictly practical 
tools of online communication. Dauood’s rather in-depth and insightful answer and Saleem’s 
lack of an in-depth answer, however, suggests that perhaps, on a subconscious level, in using 
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hashtags in a mundane or clever fashion that highlights the “secular” aspects of their identity, 
they do hope to challenge misconceptions about their religion. Nevertheless, more research that 
digs deeper in to exactly why Muslims use hashtags, would need to be done on this question to 
confirm this observation.  
When I asked participants how they use hashtags, they would often discuss how helpful 
hashtags were at events. For example, when I asked Tariq, the Canadian-born Muslim of 
Pakistani heritage whom I mentioned previously, about whether he uses hashtags, he said 
If I do it’s because I’m attending some kind of event. Like if we’re attending a 
conference I might post about a conference and hashtag the name of the conference 
or the name of the event. Or even if it’s not something religious specifically. I went 
to the TEDx Manitoba and they were encouraging us to post about it and use the 
hashtag and some other groups have done that. I attended a conference in Toronto 
called ‘Reviving the Islamic Spirit’ where a lot of people like Suhaib Webb, Tariq 
Ramadan, a lot of these people are there and I’ve shared, posted about that using 
the hashtag #RIS, which is the acronym. So there’s some events that have been 
done locally. The Islamic Social Services Association released a handbook a few 
years ago talking about combatting extremism, so when I wasn’t able to attend the 
launch of the handbook I was posting stuff. I don’t know if it was live streamed. It 
might have been broadcast on some live streaming thing, so I was commenting on 
it and sharing news about it. So yeah that’s a really nice part I guess. I use it for 
Instagram, if I post a picture I’ll hashtag whatever it is. 
Tariq uses hashtags to contribute to wider conversations on a certain event. Sometimes those 
events are Islamic in nature, sometimes they are not. He does not view hashtags as an amazing 
emancipatory tool by any means. He sees it as convenient way to communicate, stay connected, 
and share what he is up to with the public. Likewise, Zainab is a 40 year old Canadian born 
Muslim woman of Bengali heritage who owns her own business, and when I asked her about 
how she uses hashtags she said  
I don’t use them a lot because I’m not on Twitter. We have a Twitter thing for our 
company. My sister manages it and she doesn’t use it a whole lot. When I use a 
hashtag it’s usually something humorous or to highlight what the content of this 
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photo is, or whatever. I just posted a picture of a cloud yesterday and said 
‘Winnipeg skies #Winnipeg,’ like it’s wasn’t anything exciting or anything, but it 
was just like, this is what it’s about. Or sometimes it will be something funny like, 
for example, my friends have done stuff like this, like, they’re having hijab issues 
and they’ll be like #MuslimProblems, you know what I mean? I haven’t used that 
particular one, but I would use something similar. 
 
For Zainab, hashtags help to facilitate expression, and share that expression with a wider 
audience and place what she posts online in a certain context. Likewise, through hashtags like 
#MuslimProblems, a relatively popular hashtag often used by Muslims to humorously are 
grievances about life as a modern Muslim, Zainab expresses what it means to her to be 
practicing.36 As I will discuss further in Chapter 5, Zainab, like Mariam, has gone through her 
own story about “hijab issues,” and I will explore her story alongside my discussion of 
#JeSuisHijabi.  
Many participants gave answers like Tariq and Zainab’s, and suggest, as one can expect, that 
Muslims use hashtags for much more than religious expression. Nevertheless, as we have seen in 
Dauood and Saleem’s stories, and to a small degree in Zainab’s, the content of those hashtags 
and the context in which some Muslims use those hashtags can help to shed light on everyday 
Muslim identities in a Canadian context. It can also shed light on identity expression within the 
Muslim community itself. 
Jamilah, for example, is a 19 year-old Somali-born university student who has used a hashtag 
called #BlackOutEid around the Islamic event of Eid. When I asked her how she uses hashtags, 
she said 
When Eid came around we had #BlackOutEid, because usually when Eid comes 
around, like the Arab people think that they’re more superior than coloured Muslims, 
                                                                 
36 Like most popular hashtags, #MuslimProblems, as one can imagine, is als o host to a number of other complex and 
overlapping discourses about Islam, which in itself could be its own study. 
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so I use it to show my appreciation of the Black Muslims. So we use hashtags like 
that. And we were trending too, worldwide. 
 
Jamilah accompanies #BlackOutEid with Instagram photos that she takes during Eid to shed 
light on issues of racism within her own Muslim community and show solidarity with her fellow 
black Muslims.37 Jamilah’s use of #BlackOutEid situates her in a discursive intersection of two 
online spaces that are known to many as ‘Black Twitter’ and ‘Muslim Twitter.’ Both of these 
spaces are what Ganaele Langlois (2011) would call “technocultural assemblage[s]” (3), 
whereby groups with a shared ethno-cultural identity create and gather in an online space to 
discuss, explore, and construct identities, while subverting hegemonic discourses and powers 
that may oppress or supress them. Sanjay Sharma (2013), building on Langlois, calls Black 
Twitter a “digital-race assemblage” (48). Black Twitter is perhaps one of the most well-known of 
modern online spaces, garnering a significant amount of online discourse and media attention. 
While at its very essence, Black Twitter is comprised of all of the Tweets crafted by Black 
people, there is no doubt that it is hashtags are the foundation on which Black Twitter is built. 
For example, if one were to look at the Wikipedia page for ‘Black Twitter,’ its table of contents 
is comprised almost completely of hashtags like #BlackLivesMatter, #ICantBreathe, and 
#HandsUpDontShoot, which it considers to be its ‘influences’ (Wikipedia 2017). While ‘Muslim 
Twitter’ has not garnered enough recognition outside Muslim circles to warrant its own 
Wikipedia page, it is still certainly conceptualized amongst Muslims as a digital space with its 
own Muslim-specific hashtags and inside jokes (see Dahir 2017). While Jamilah, or any 
participant for that matter, did not mention whether she was aware of the existence of Muslim 
Twitter, hashtags like #BlackOutEid, #MuslimProblems, and #JeSuisHijabi, would most 
                                                                 
37 Eid, also known as Eid al-Fitr, translates from Arabic as “feast of breaking the fast,” and  is a holiday, feast, and 
celebration that marks the end of the holy month of Ramadan, where Muslims fast from sunrise to sunset. Often, Eid 
celebrations take place in at mosques or public venues and is a time of gathering. 
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certainly be considered to be a part of it by certain Muslims who are engaged in the 
Twittersphere. 
Hashtags have also made their way into the “offline public sphere,” and Aisha, the UK-born 
Muslim who I mentioned earlier in this chapter, told me a story about how she verbally used a 
hashtag #ModestMuslimWoman to navigate a workplace scenario that, as a self-identifying 
modest Muslim woman, made her uncomfortable. Aisha is personable, witty, articulate, and, she 
says, is known by her friends and colleagues for her trademark sarcastic British humor, which 
she told me can get her into trouble sometimes. Aisha works in the non-profit sector, which she 
characterizes as fairly progressive, and for the most part she would consider herself as such. 
Nevertheless, she would often find herself as the only Muslim in her workplace, and, unlike 
many other workplaces, her colleagues enjoyed talking about religion and politics, which as 
someone with a keen interest in both those topics, is something she appreciated and was happy to 
partake in. Often the conversation would turn towards Islam, and as Muslim who, in the post 
9/11 era has been reluctantly pushed into being “a walking talking advocate for Islam and 
Muslims everywhere,” she felt she had a certain power and responsibility to represent Islam in 
those conversations. While she felt fortunate that her colleagues took an interest in understanding 
Islam and genuinely enjoyed their company, there were certain secular norms in her work place, 
however, that she still needed to navigate, such as discussions about sex. 
Aisha explained how she says “hashtag modest Muslim woman” in a playful tone to 
humorously defuse workplace conversations whenever they would go somewhere that made her 
uncomfortable. She said that Muslim modesty is an ongoing joke between her and her non-
Muslim friends, which she leverages in the form of a hashtag to communicate to her colleagues 
that, because of her faith, what they are talking about makes her uncomfortable. Aisha’s story 
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suggests that hashtags have jumped from online spaces like Twitter and Instagram into the 
modern vernacular, and are even becoming akin to rhetorical devices. What is particularly 
interesting about #ModestMuslimWoman is that, at the time of writing, it has only been used on 
Twitter twice and Instagram once, which suggests that its use originated in the offline sphere. 
The phrase “Modest Muslim Woman,” as it stands would be an awkward thing for Aisha to say 
in the work place on its own. However, by attaching a “hashtag” to it, the phrase is suddenly 
imbued with a certain humorous tongue-in-cheek quality, that would otherwise be difficult to 
portray without sounding uptight.  
By using a hashtag to humorously and publically express her discomfort, Aisha made her 
faith palatable to the “secular ear,” thus challenging a secular norm that tolerates inappropriate 
sexual discussion in the workplace. This in a way is an extension of the burden of representation 
that I discussed earlier. Describing her discomfort on the merits of faith alone is not enough to 
defuse a conversation about sex without potentially being perceived as uptight or dogmatic. 
Instead, Aisha must package her faith in the form of humour to make it something that people 
would actually listen to, without diminishing their view of Islam. While on the surface it may 
appear that Aisha is diluting or trivializing her faith to navigate an awkward workplace scenario, 
it is also important to keep in mind that she is cleverly using humour, through a hashtag, to insert 
her faith-based perspective in into a dominant secular discourse that normally does not take 
Islamic notions of modesty into account. In a way, Aisha's use of #ModestMuslimWoman is not 
dissimilar to the way that hashtags are used in an online context. Using what Holmes (2000) calls 
"contestive humour" to challenge institutional and implicit power structures within her 
workplace parallels the way in which women use #JeSuisHijabi to insert themselves into secular 
narratives about hijabs and Muslim women. When someone, for example, tweets "Perks of being 
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a #JeSuisHijabi No one knows how greasy ur [sic] hair is" they use humour to contest the 
assumption that hijabs are worn strictly for religious observance. Thus, when Aisha used 
#ModestMuslimWoman every time her co-workers take conversations to places that make her 
uncomfortable, she is taking part in the "small but consistent disruptive flows of dissent" 
(Echchaibi 2013:853), that work to insert Islamic perspectives into dominant secular discourses, 
whether that be about Muslim women and what they wear, or what conversations are appropriate 
in the workplace. 
Conclusion 
Based on my interviews with participants about their views on Canadian society, and how 
they use hashtags to navigate and challenge its secular norms, I have found that hashtags are 
useful tools for performing such tasks, not necessarily because of their salience or potential to go 
viral, but because they allow for the communication of mundane everyday aspects of Canadian-
Muslim identities. Prior to the rise of social media, one's humorous experiences during Ramadan, 
or a Muslim woman's feelings about hijab means to them were only accessible to people with 
whom they made direct contact, or in a speech or newspaper editorial. Now, hashtags allow 
Muslims to make what was once largely private, public and connect with others. In an age where 
perceptions and discourses of Islam as monolithic, dogmatic, and antithetical to liberal values 
inform media narratives and the decisions of policy makers, these everyday stories and identities 
serve as small but significant disruptors of such notions by offering a glimpse into the very 
human, and even secular or mundane aspects of religious life, demonstrating that just as Islamic 
and Canadian identity are tightly woven together in the fabric of modern Muslim-Canadian life, 
so is the religious and the secular.  This nuanced notion of religious/secular identities is similarly 
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reflected in the way that Canadian Muslims use the hashtag #JeSuisHijabi, and is what I will 
now discuss. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Religious and the Secular in #JeSuisHijabi 
Introduction 
In examining the language and tactics of tweets that use #JeSuisHijabi, this chapter 
considers how this hashtag is used by some Muslims to attempt to challenge discrimination and 
Islamophobia that not only leads to problematic associations between Islam and terrorism, but 
limits Muslims’ free speech in the public sphere. Throughout, I also examine what this usage can 
say about Canadian Muslim identity. I understand Twitter as an extension of the public sphere, 
and by using a hashtag to articulate a form of public reason that is compatible with secular 
liberalism, #JeSuisHijabi seeks to remind readers that religious practices can not only be 
translated in this accessible public sphere, but be consistent with so-called liberal secular values. 
In his discussion on the nature of secularism, Craig Calhoun (2011) examines the irony of 
contemporary formulations of the secular by noting that “secularists propose a limit on religion 
in the public sphere, which they take to be the basis for equal inclusion, but at the same time 
insulate themselves from understanding religious discourse, practicing an ironic exclusion” (76).  
In other words while often purporting neutrality, the secular typically has clear politics. In the 
Canadian context, Abdolmohammad Kazemipur (2014) offers the most succinct explanation for 
this irony, which lies at the centre of his book, The Muslim Question in Canada, where he 
depicts it as an issue of “Muslim exceptionalism in the context of Canadian exceptionalism” (9). 
At the end of his quantitative-based study, Kazemipur concludes that one way to resolve this 
seeming tension is through a “shift of attention from the theological to the social [which] implies 
that the solutions to various issues surrounding Muslims are more likely to be found in the realm 
of relationships, behaviors, and attitudes than in religious scripts” (180). In other words, we must 
pay more attention to what Muslims do rather than the texts from which they turn in their 
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religious beliefs. I take this suggestion into account, when examining #JeSuisHijabi, which 
offers a glimpse into this realm. 
 This chapter proceeds by first offering an overview of the hashtag to then discuss how 
religious and secular identities are reflected and communicated in #JeSuisHijabi through 
associating the hijab with liberal and secular values, emotions and characteristics. I then look at 
how female participants’ engagement and lived experiences with the hijab echo and nuance such 
associations. The chapter concludes with an exploration of the tactics and strategies used to 
change media narratives and challenge stereotypes about Islam and the hijab, and the insights 
that these tactics offer into the interplay between religious and secular identity in the lives of 
Canadian Muslims.   
“Religious” and “Secular” Language in #JeSuisHijabi 
Of the characteristics most commonly associated with the hijab in tweets that use 
#JeSuisHijabi, modesty came up often.38 Tweets about modesty would often look something 
like, “#JeSuisHijabi Covering up our body modestly is part of religious freedom that we enjoy as 
being a proud Canadian Muslim women!” or “Hijab is not just about modesty. It's about being a 
helper and giver. If you're in a jam I'll be there. #JeSuisHijabi.”  
Modesty can commonly be seen as a value that is closely, if not entirely, tied to religious 
beliefs and practiced because of religious convictions.39 However, based off many of the 
#JeSuisHijabi tweets that mention modesty, if one were to try and define the above tweeters’ 
                                                                 
38 In coding for “modesty” I also included uses of the word purdah, a Persian term used by some Muslims which 
translates loosely as “veiling.” It is also commonly used in #JeSuisHijabi to mean modesty. Under the umbrella of 
“modesty” I also coded for discussion that explicitly discussed covering as a value associated with hijab.  
39 Perhaps the most commonly referenced Qur’anic passage on modesty is found in Sura An-nur 24:30, which tells 
Muslims, men and women, to “lower their eyes and guard their private parts” (The Qur’an  24:30).  It also calls for 
women to cover their necklines and “not display their charms beyond what [it is acceptable] to reveal” (The Qur’an 
2010: 222), with the exception of other women, husbands, and close male relatives. This passage is widely seen as 
the Qur’anic basis for hijab.   
102 
 
definition of modesty in relation to hijab it would by no means be a static, singular, or entirely 
religious definition. 47 of the 893 tweets that I examined referred to modesty in some way. Of 
those 47, only 8 associated modesty with the hijab without mentioning another virtue or 
characteristic, or elaborating more about how it represents something more. This dynamic, 
complex, and individualized understanding of modesty was common in #JeSuisHijabi tweets, 
and echoes an insight made by Jane Cameron in her (2014) ethnographic analysis of religious, 
mostly Christian, and non-religious blogs that discuss modesty. Cameron observes that,  
Women’s motivation is far more complex than would be allowed by narrow 
definitions of what modesty is. It is also clear that women’s motivation for modest 
self-presentation cannot be contained within a binarised secular–religious 
dichotomy. To frame the discussion in this way would do an injustice to the 
complexity of women’s decisions and understandings of their place in the world. 
(154) 
 
Perceptions of modesty as a strictly religious value and practice is directly tied to problematic 
perceptions of a separation between the religious and the secular, and lead people to assume that 
women who practice modesty do not have agency. #JeSuisHijabi tweets that mention modesty 
directly challenge such perceptions, and aim to depict modesty as a complex and individualized 
practice that is inspired by religion, but not necessarily determined by it.  
This complexity is reflected in a photo that was used in tweets throughout the 
#JeSuisHijabi campaign, which illustrates how Muslim women seek to communicate to multiple 
audiences that the hijab represents not only their religious identities but their individual secular 
identities simultaneously (see fig. 1). It also quite nicely illustrates the discursive nature of 
#JeSuisHijabi, and its goals of not only starting conversations, but inserting itself into existing 
ones. 
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(Fig. 2) A tweet created by Ahmadiyya Canada’s official Twitter advertising the campaign and 
sharing a Toronto Star article about it. 
 
As figure 2 demonstrates, #JeSuisHijabi, as tweeted by the campaign’s official Twitter account, 
@JeSuisHijabi, has the clear goal of communicating that the identity of hijabi is compatible with 
and complementary to other secular identities.  
Of the 893 tweets that I gathered, I identified only 29 tweets (or 3.2%) that used purely 
religious language and reasoning to discuss hijabi identity. These tweets would look like 
“#JeSuisHijabi, you are hijabi cause God has asked u to do so, so keep up pleasing God and 
ignore what ppl say about #JeSuisHijabi,” or “Why do I wear Hijab? Simply because my creator, 
my God asked me to do so. I love my Allah, I love my Hijab. #JeSuisHijabi.” Such purely 
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“religious” tweets would often include references to Allah as the only reason why they wear 
hijab or use Qur’anic references to explain why wearing hijab is important. To be clear, while 
tweets like these appear in a significantly reduced number compared to tweets the combined 
religious and areligious language and reasoning, they are still significant in their own way, 
because they are religious sentiments that would not be heard otherwise, and hashtags like 
#JeSuisHijabi offer a means to express such sentiment in a public manner. Like anthropologist, 
Charles Hirschkind’s (2001) ethnographic study of Islamic cassette tapes in Egypt, this use of 
new media “does not map onto the constitutionally demarcated separation of public and private 
but, rather, traverses this distinction in a way that is often uncomfortable to those with secular-
liberal sensibilities” (11). #JeSuisHijabi provides a way to publically express religious reasoning 
and emotion in a in a way that serves to upset and complicate traditionally “secular” notions that 
religious expression does not have a place in the public sphere, even though, according to the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), it arguably does.  
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(Fig. 3) This was the first Tweet generated by the @JeSuisHijabi Twitter account on December 1, 2015, outlining 
the desired format in which its organizers wanted people to use the hashtag. 
  
Otherwise, besides tweets that use purely religious language, the remaining tweets combine 
religious and secular language and reasoning to discuss hijab and hijabi identity, portraying the 
hijabs as a religious objects that functions simultaneously a “liberal object.” This category 
collapse may be partially due to the fact that the #JeSuisHijabi campaign, in the attempt to form 
a calculated public, outlined a suggested format for using the hashtag, which involved sharing 
three aspects about oneself and posting a picture in one’s own handwriting (see Fig. 3). While 
many tweets did follow this format, many tweets did not, and users would use the hashtag in 
their own unique way. For example, tweets would look like:  
#JeSuisHijabi My Hijab. My story. My choice. @JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:12, L:14) 
 
Staying up studying Latin and then sleeping in because I don't have to fix my hair 
#JeSuisHijabi It's also why I need #coffee (R:0, RT:3, L:1) 
 
How can hijab be oppressive when in most countries it requires greater courage to 
wear it than to remove it. #JeSuisHijabi (R:2, RT:45, L:67) 
 
Confident. Compassionate. Canadian. #JeSuisHijabi @JeSuisHijabi (R:2, RT:16, 
L:13) 
 
#JeSuisHijabi @JeSuisHijabi I HIJAB, DO YOU? My makeup-> Smile, My 
Jewellery-> Hijab, My Clothing-> Confidence (R:0, RT:12, L:10) 
 
The hijab liberates me, ignorance suffocates me. #JeSuisHijabi (R:1, RT:14, L:13) 
 
My identity My choice. But i am still reliable, educated, hardworking, lovin and 
respecting NOT SCARY, please do not pre-judge #jesuishijabi (R:0, RT:9, L:10) 
 
#Hijab counters those men judging women for their outward appearances. That's 
the kind of freedom Islam gives to women! #JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:16, L:10) 
 
These tweets show that to those who are tweeting, the hijab is more than just a religious object. 
Nevertheless, to be clear, for the non-Muslims who are observing the #JeSuisHijabi campaign 
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online, through media coverage, or at booths set up in public spaces, I argue that the emotions, 
identities, and experiences that the campaign associates with the hijab does not trivialize it or 
even secularize it, but instead, in Habermasian terms, #JeSuisHijabi aims to place this religious 
object and the reasons for wearing it firmly “within the horizon of their shared lifeworld,” 
(Habermas 2008: 30) as opposed to the transcendental realm of religious reason in which hijabs 
are often perceived to exist.  In other words, through offering up secular reasons for wearing the 
hijab and encouraging non-Muslims to try it on, #JeSuisHijabi does not necessarily strip the 
hijab of its religious meaning and transform into a secular object, but instead 
detranscendentalizes it, demonstrating that while hijab is, at its core, a religiously inspired 
practice with roots in a religious text, it simultaneously instills a sense of freedom, confidence, 
empowerment, and pride, that counters oppression and addresses the male gaze, therefore 
showing that it is “a practice that copes with reality” (Habermas 2008: 32). In turn, it is hoped 
that those who interact with the #JeSuisHijabi campaign, whether online or offline, see the 
everyday reasons and emotions that are associated with wearing hijab, offering insight into the 
complex interplay between the religious and the secular, an insight to which modern secular 
liberal citizens are not often exposed (see Jeldtoft 2013). 
Of the 893 tweets that I coded, the 20 most commonly used words that appeared in those 
tweets offer a glimpse into the type of “secular-liberal” language that was communicated 
alongside the individual religious statement of #JeSuisHijabi (see Fig. 3). 
 
Word Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
Hijab 293 4.36 
Muslim 138 2.06 
Women 130 1.94 
Campaign 105 1.56 
@jesuishijabi 90 1.34 
Woman 62 0.92 
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Wear 48 0.72 
Hijabi 47 0.70 
Islam 44 0.66 
Choice 40 0.60 
#hijab 39 0.58 
Canada 36 0.54 
Proud 35 0.52 
Wearing 34 0.51 
Love 32 0.48 
Respect 32 0.48 
Canadian 29 0.43 
Modesty 28 0.42 
Like 27 0.40 
News 26 0.39 
 
(Fig. 4) The top 20 words used in #JeSuisHijabi Tweets December 1-5, 2015. Note that only 6 of the 
words are overtly “religious”: Hijab, Muslim, Hijabi, Islam, #Hijab, modesty.  
 
While the common occurrence of words like “choice,” “proud,” “Canada,” and “news,” point to 
the main themes within #JeSuisHijabi, these words alone, of course, do not tell the whole story. 
Nevertheless, as I will go on to demonstrate, a closer examination of the way they were used 
reveals that while the hashtag itself revolves around a religious garment, the hijab, the language 
used to describe, define, and tell stories about it is mainly “secular” in nature, commonly 
depicting the hijab as a symbol and means of choice, individuality, and freedom. This clear 
language choice thus imbues it this religious object with secular meaning, and positions it as 
compatible with Canadian liberal values. 
As mentioned throughout this thesis thus far, for many Muslim Canadians, it is not 
uncommon for a strong sense of Western individualism to embedded in Muslim identity (see 
Ramji 2013). The “Je Suis” in #JeSuisHijabi, along with the tweets that I have mentioned thus 
far, demonstrate this reality. However, this is often overlooked as a result of an orientalist 
dogma, which assumes that followers of Islam are more susceptible to passively accepting 
religious dogma (see Said 1979: 300-301); an assumption that has historical roots in the West 
viewing itself, and its own religions, as rational and superior, while viewing other cultures and 
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religions as the irrational monolithic “other.” Undermining this assumption is a key theme in the 
#JeSuisHijabi campaign, which highlights women’s individualized reasons for wearing the hijab 
based on each woman’s lived reality, which not only puts an emphasis on individualism, but also 
agency, therefore affirming the authenticity of the way in which women who wear the hijab 
understand themselves, their religious identity, and their place in the world. It also demonstrates 
that the hijab itself can be an expression of individualism and is therefore indicative of Western 
Islam’s acceptance of a fundamental principle of western liberal society. As a technological 
object and technosocial act (see Rambukkana 2015b), the #JeSuisHijabi hashtag taps into the 
deep connection between the sacred, the self, and the digital in modern Western society (Aupers 
and Hautman 2010), and in doing so, demonstrates how Muslim identity and meaning are 
constructed and maintained alongside the construction and maintenance of secular liberal values. 
As a result, by expressing lived religious identity, #JeSuisHijabi demonstrates to those who 
interact with the campaign that the hijab, as an Islamic object worn by Canadians, is a symbol of 
choice and freedom, and is comprised of both religious and secular meaning, which perhaps is 
the key point of the #JeSuisHijabi campaign.  
Feminist scholars of the Internet, like Michelle White (2015), notice how through things like 
the new domesticity movement, “mommy blogging,” and online “craftivism” are evidence of a 
post-feminist deprivatization and reclamation of traditionally “gendered” female roles, practices, 
and activities; premised on notions of individuality, political agency, empowerment, and the 
equitable involvement of men and women in said movements (see White 2015: 18-19). A similar 
reclamation, particularly in countries like Canada, has taken place with practices surrounding the 
wearing of hijab. Alla Myzelev (2009) similarly argues, practicing knitting can help to redefine 
gendered roles in society when multiple subjects, men, women, or otherwise, publically involve 
109 
 
themselves in a practice that is traditionally understood as feminine (148), #JeSuisHijabi seeks to 
demonstrate that hijab can help to redefine religion’s role in society when multiple subjects, 
Muslim or non-Muslim, man or woman (see Figs. 1 & 5), publically involve themselves in the 
practice. This post-feminist, agential understanding of hijab is also apparent in my participants’ 
understanding, and many female participants shared that the Internet played a large role in 
affirming and developing that understanding. Therefore, to better contextualize the content of 
#JeSuisHijabi, I will now discuss my participants’ stories about hijab and the role the Internet 
has played in their understanding of it before I move on to discuss the content of #JeSuisHijabi 
in more depth. 
Contextualizing #JeSuisHijabi through Participants’ Experiences with the Internet and the Hijab 
 
Before looking closer at more content produced with #JeSuisHijabi, it is important to 
understand how the Internet itself has effected how Muslims use, relate to, and engage with the 
hijab in Canadian society. In recent years Islamic dress has been a source of discrimination in 
Canada, from the proposed ban on religious symbols, including Islamic head coverings for 
public servants in Quebec’s proposed Charter of Values (Montpetit 2016; Nadeau and Helly 
2016), to the proposed Conservative niqab ban in Canadian citizenship ceremonies (Chase 2015). 
Often, as Canada-based political scientist Katherine Bullock (2011) points out, the political 
discourse surrounding such issues, excludes the voices of Canadian Muslim women, because 
“The image of the ‘veiled woman’ in the West functions to erase the identities of real Muslim 
women. For the hijabis, the symbol of ‘the veil’ erases them as subjects, because they become 
reduced to the ‘passive victims of oppression’” (162). One of the most prominent themes in 
tweets that used #JeSuisHijabi, was the direct and indirect challenging of the assumption that 
Muslim women are oppressed. To do so, tweeters would not only say that they are not oppressed, 
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but would often posit the hijab as a symbol of choice, freedom, and liberal values. Discussions 
with my interview participants echo this understanding of the hijab, and help to nuance how the 
choice, freedom, individuality and liberal values that are often mentioned in #JeSuisHijabi 
function in the everyday lives of Canadian Muslims. 
Recall Zainab, who described how her friends use the hashtag #MuslimProblems. Zainab 
is 40 and wore hijab for 23 years of her life, but in recent years has chosen not to wear it. Of the 
eight women I interviewed, Zainab was the only woman who did not wear a hijab, which is a 
practice that is also subject to its own stereotypes and assumptions under the Western gaze (see 
Fadil 2009). Katherine Bullock (2011) also observes that Western discourses on Islam exclude 
non-hijabis, because, from their perspective, “they are not the ‘veiled victim’ but they are not 
really Muslims either” (162). In other words, to wear hijab is to be perceived as a religious 
Muslim and to not wear hijab is to be perceived as a secular Muslim. It is clear, however, that in 
spite of the fact that Zainab did not wear hijab, she had thought about it a great deal, and her 
decision to stop wearing hijab did not come from any sort of disillusion with Islam, but from a 
deeper personal engagement with it. For her, the Internet played a big part in helping her to 
explore other people’s thoughts, identities, and stories surrounding the hijab, and assisted in 
cementing and justifying her decision to no longer wear it.40 Here she describes how her 
understanding of modesty shifted: 
So I used to wear a hijab for a long time, for like 23 years (LG), and before I 
became engaged with the Internet I had already been thinking about not wearing it 
anymore, and it was sort of my own personal journey. And based on experiences 
that I had and things that I had read, I was just thinking along those lines for a few 
years, but when you’re thinking along those lines it’s kind of lonely if you don’t 
                                                                 
40 Male participants did not discuss their experiences with modesty or hijab nearly as much as women, if at all. 
Nevertheless, there were male Muslim tweeters who tweeted #JeSuisHijabi. For the most part, male tweeters took on 
the role of ally, showing support for their wives and daughters and reiterating their choice to wear hijab and showing 
admiration for the piety that it represents.  
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sort of reach out and understand what other people have to say on the issue, or can 
you relate to someone else going through a similar experience. So I actually turned 
to the Internet for that and I found a lot of women online. I didn’t talk to them 
directly, but I read about their experiences. So there was several women. There was 
this one really good piece that was in the U.S., NPR, National Public Radio and 
they did this whole piece on several women who had taken their hijab off and they 
talk about why they did it. And I went through each one diligently and I just 
listened to them and, what they were saying, all of them, all of their reasons were 
so different. There was so much diversity. Each one of them resonated with me 
because that decision is so multi-faceted. You could do something in your life for 
certain reasons and that can change every year right? So everything that they said 
resonated with me. And I had read quite a few other articles by women, and so I 
think that Internet really had an impact on my final decision. Because I kind of 
knew that I was going to do it, so it wasn’t a matter of if, it was a matter of when, 
and I needed to sort of build up some courage. Because I’ve always been involved 
in my local community here and I didn’t want my act to be perceived negatively. 
This is where the faith/practice thing comes in. Like I didn’t want people to think 
that I was moving away from my faith, because that wasn’t the case. I was moving 
away from that practice, but it doesn’t mean that modesty is not important to me or 
that I don’t support my friends or other women that do wear hijab, because I 
understand the significance and I think that it’s important for women to do what 
they need to do at any point in their lives. So the Internet definitely had an impact 
on that specific practice that I did. 
For Zainab, her decision to no longer wear the hijab was a complex and individual decision that 
took place over a long period of time. In the process of making and justifying her decision, the 
stories that she was exposed to on the Internet fostered a sense of solidarity with women who 
have gone through their own unique experiences, which gave her the courage to stop wearing 
hijab, while maintaining a deep respect for the hijab itself and the personal identities of Muslim 
women who still wear it. For her “it wasn’t a matter of if, it was a matter of when,” she would 
stop wearing hijab, and the Internet helped her to take that leap and find the balance between 
faith and practice that was difficult to strike due to a fear of how she’d be perceived by her 
surrounding Muslim community. For Zainab, not wearing the hijab is still a very public religious 
practice, and the Internet helped to facilitate the deprivatization of her belief that she can still be 
a devout Muslim without wearing hijab. 
112 
 
Zainab also acknowledges that this “deprivatization” goes the other way, and she 
appreciates how the Internet has helped to encourage Muslim women to wear the hijab proudly 
and express themselves through it in different ways. She went on to tell me that, 
Now in the past couple decades even, I’ve seen a lot of change in what is acceptable 
in the mainstream community. So for example when you go to the mosque, for 
example, you see a lot of women wearing pants with tops, or skinny jeans with their 
hijabs, and make up or whatever that’s just more acceptable. If I were to have done 
that when I was a teenager, I think people would think that that’s not really great. So 
a lot of that type of practice becomes a lot more acceptable because of the Internet, 
because people are seeing each other. People are watching other Muslim women 
doing Youtube tutorials, they’re wearing hijab, but they’re doing Youtube tutorials 
on make-up or something like that. And when other people see other people doing 
that across the ocean they say, ‘Oh, people seem to be cool with it, there’s lots of 
positive comments.’ There’s some negative comments too, but it becomes a lot more 
acceptable when everyone realizes, ‘Oh, I’m not alone in this. Other people are doing 
it too, so it’s probably okay.’ So I think in that sense my practice has been shaped a 
little differently based on the Internet. 
 
Zainab points out that the Internet has brought about a new means of exposure to different 
embodied ways of wearing and identifying with the hijab, which has fostered a unique sense 
individuality, solidarity, and collective identity expression, thus helping Muslim women to 
cement and explore their identities as hijabis or non-hijabis. This, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
can be seen as a way in which the Internet is helping to foster what Casanova (1994) calls a 
“deprivatization” of religious identity – particularly that of hijabi identity – in the public sphere. 
Put differently, the Internet encourages women to engage more closely with and reclaim a public 
religious practice that before may have felt taboo and even unsafe in mainstream Canadian 
society. These norms were perpetuated by popular political discourses condemning Islamic dress 
and comportment as symbols of female oppression. 
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Zainab’s observation of this deprivatization of hijabi identity is echoed in Sonia’s story, a 
22-year-old Pakistan-born health sciences student whose faith, including her wearing of the 
hijab, is also heavily influenced by her use of the Internet. 
 
I feel like it’s really shaped the way people practice their religion. I feel that if it 
wasn’t for the Internet people wouldn’t be as practicing. Depending on who you 
follow, wherever you go you see all of these reminders: quotes of a hadith or 
Qur’an quotes. So I feel like it really influences your faith, and if it wasn’t for the 
Internet I don’t think that a lot of people would be practicing their religion. And 
even the hijab right? It was very difficult a few years ago to wear it, but now you 
go on Instagram. Recently there was this Youtube makeup artist called Nura Laila, 
who was recently chosen to be the ambassador of this really good famous makeup 
company. And even L’Oréal, recently it had Amina Kin, who’s a Youtuber, it 
featured her as well. And I feel like seeing all of these hijabs and all of these hijabi 
people in the community it kind of influences you, you know. Like, if they’re 
wearing the hijab and they’re so successful and they can be doctors, engineers, 
lawyers, they can have PhDs, they can be so educated, then so can I. And it feels 
like it’s helped me feel like Islam is not so restrictive, and helped me think that 
Islam is not restricting me from doing anything that I want. Anything that 
somebody who is not Muslim can do, I can do as well. So it’s really helped me in 
that way. 
 
Sonia uses the Internet to draw encouragement from other hijabis and looks up to empowered 
women who wear hijab, particularly those sponsored by mainstream companies, like L’Oreal, in 
“secular” forums like Youtube or Instagram. This is partially due to a recent merging of Islamic 
practices with Western consumerist practices, where Muslim women prefer to purchase modest 
clothing through mainstream retailers like Zara, H&M, and the Gap, to which they also have 
access online, as opposed to Muslim-specific stores or websites (Moors 2014). In Sonia’s case, 
she chooses to view make-up tutorials from a hijabi Youtube star who partners with L’Oreal. 
Sonia’s story is an example of how the corporatization of social media is making Muslim women 
more visible in a mainstream, faith-positive way, changing the way that Muslim women who 
wear hijab think about the practice and its place in Western society.  To Sonia, this increased 
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exposure sends her the message that those who wear hijab can also be educated, independent, 
have successful careers and wear mainstream-valued and commoditized clothing and cosmetics.  
However, this is not to say that the commercialization of social media is only serving the 
women and the Muslim community in a positive way. Demeaning images and hetero-normative 
portrayals of women and women’s bodies are still commonly reified in online advertising (see 
White 2015), and there are still numerous examples of stereotypes of the hijab and Islam that are 
being perpetuated by corporations on social media, like in Chapter Three’s example of 
Newsweek’s use of #MuslimRage (see Schwell 2015). These stereotypes loom over such faith-
positive understandings of the hijab online, and, as Sonia admits, even she has been influenced 
by them. This reinforces the observation that I made in Chapter Four, that when hijabis express 
themselves and how they feel about their hijabs online, they are addressing two audiences 
simultaneously. By associating the hijab with identities and emotions like pride, independence, 
freedom, and empowerment, alongside Muslim identity, they are not only trying to educate a 
non-Muslim audience, who may view the hijab pejoratively, but also to fellow hijabis, who when 
they see tweets like Figure 2, will think to themselves, “Like, if they’re wearing the hijab and 
they’re so successful and they can be doctors, engineers, lawyers, they can have PhDs, they can 
be so educated, then so can I.” 
 In addressing these two audiences, #JeSuisHijabi reflects many of the same goals, 
emotions, values and identities that Sonia and Zainab mentioned when they talked about what 
the hijab, or lack thereof, means to them in their everyday lives. As a facilitator of lived religious 
expression that seeks to communicate to a Muslim and non-Muslim audience simultaneously, 
#JeSuisHijabi communicates the religious and secular aspects of everyday life, and is what I will 
now move on to discuss.  
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#JeSuisHijabi as Lived Religion in the Canadian Context 
 
 “Je Suis Hijabi,” when turned into a hashtag communicates to its audience, through sharing 
and organizing personal experiences, thoughts, and identities, a collective limited script of 
individual lived religious expressions and meanings, which articulates, nuances and combines 
three core values of secular liberal society: individualism, freedom of religion, and freedom of 
expression. The study of lived or everyday religion, as a means of understanding religion beyond 
its traditional institutions and texts, is becoming a more common approach to religious studies 
(see Orsi 2006; McGuire 2008; Dessing et al. 2013b; Fadil and Fernando 2015; Fadil 2017). Of 
the tweets that I gathered under #JeSuisHijabi, I identified 55 unique tweets that made a 
particular reference to Canadian identity. Likewise, as mentioned previously I observed 142 
unique tweets that associated the hijab with secular values like choice, identity and freedom. 
Tweets like these can be seen as expressions of lived religion in the public sphere, and can help 
scholars, as well as the public, to gain a more nuanced understanding of Muslim Canadian 
identities. For example: 
#JeSuisHijabi I am a hijabi and a proud Canadian a teacher and community helper 
and a mother and wife. (R:0, RT:13, L:5) 
 
#JeSuisHijabi Covering up our body modestly is part of religious freedom that we 
enjoy as being a proud Canadian Muslim women!(R:0, RT:0, L:1) 
 
Being Canadian means being respectful and inclusive of other cultures. Xenophobia 
has no place here. Je suis Canadian. #JeSuisHijabi (R:1, RT:11, L:11) 
 
I am a Canadian , who is Blessed , optimistic , & Powerful #JeSuisHijabi 
@JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:12, L:21) 
 
Toronto Muslim show who they are, not just what they're wearing with #JeSuisHijabi 
campaign (R:0, RT:51, L:35) 
 
Confident . Athletic . Creative . Canadian #JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:12, L:12) 
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Many of the above tweets seek to communicate a fusion between hijabi identities and 
individualism, while demonstrating that their hijab does not limit them having other 
identities as well. The tweets that critique Canadian society do not critique Canada itself, 
but critique normative understandings of what it means to be Canadian, and negative 
portrayals of Islam that come out of such understandings. Nevertheless, while these tweets 
are significant markers of cultural expression and meaningful identity statements, they are 
still limited to 140 characters and represent the tip of the iceberg that is Muslim Canadian 
identity, which is why it is important to supplement them with more in-depth qualitative 
interviews to help explain the stories and context behind these limited, yet powerful 
cultural texts. 
 
Now that I have explored the content and common presenting of #JeSuisHijabi tweets and 
what they reflect about Canadian Muslim identity, I would like to consider one last participant’s 
response to help contextualize how Canadian, Islamic, and hijabi identity coalesce in the 
Canadian public sphere to better understand the identities that are informing tweets that use 
#JeSuisHijabi. To do so, I would like to go back to Mariam’s story, the 27 year old law student 
who came to Canada as a refugee from Kurdish Northern Iraq with her family when she was 12. 
In Chapter Four, she told described how when she came to Canada and noticed the diversity of 
perspectives that were possible, she found herself thinking differently about her faith and hijab, 
and began to engage with what it meant to freely believe what you want and choose what you 
wear leading her to tell me that “now when I practice Islam I think it’s because I live in a 
country, in a secular plural country.” When I asked her “What does it mean to you to be a 
Muslim living in Canada?” her response elaborated on why a secular plural country certainly still 
has its issues, but it can help facilitate a stronger sense of Islamic identity. She told me, 
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It can be good, it can also be very frustrating and scary at times. I think it’s really 
good for me, because in Canadian society we have freedom, and we have space to 
be who you are how you want to practice your faith. I think that’s really important 
because I grew up, I spent my childhood in Iraq, like a Muslim society. I wore the 
scarf, sometimes I prayed, I fasted, but I never really understood why we were 
doing it. I never even questioned it, because it was just what we did, it was like, our 
life, just our lifestyle. It was like eating, you don’t question, ‘why do we eat?’ You 
know? So when we came to Canada, it was like ‘oh we look so different, how come 
no one else is wearing a headscarf? Other people are not Muslim, so you start to, 
like, question, you know, ‘why am I wearing my headscarf?’ So when I was in high 
school I took off my headscarf because I was like ‘what’s the point of wearing it? 
How come others are not wearing it?’ So I wanted to, like, question it and really 
understand it and then put it back on, which is what I did some years later. So that’s 
the really good part, because you should question things before you do it, because if 
you really understand it and people ask you, you know why you’re wearing it. And 
also it’s not easy to be a Muslim these days, because you are bombarded with stuff 
about Islam and Muslims, when you are practicing your faith, and for a Muslim 
woman sometimes it means wearing a headscarf and for me I’m wearing one. So 
people expect that you have answers for things that happen in the world. So when 
there is a bombing somewhere that’s done by a Muslim, people expect you as a 
person of that faith to answer, ‘why did it happen?’ And you’re like ‘I don’t know. 
I don’t know those people. I never lived in that country. I don’t know who they 
are.’ But people still expect that you have those answers because in the media 
Muslims are all put into one box and it’s as if we all get together in one corner of 
the world and we all talk to each other and we all know each other, but there is so 
much diversity […] You know I’m constantly questioning and brainstorming, so 
it’s not like I’m blindly following things and doing things because a scripture told 
me to do it. So it’s a struggle to be visibly Muslim, but it’s also good because I 
have the freedom to go through that struggle and be who I am and dress how I 
want. 
 
To Mariam, the freedom that she exercises in wearing the hijab is not seen as a means to 
blindly follow religious dogma, although it is commonly perceived as such. Instead, to her it is a 
freedom that leads her to engage thoughtfully and critically with her identity as a Muslim 
Canadian woman. It is a similar understanding of freedom, struggle, and Canadian identity that is 
being articulated through #JeSuisHijabi. For Mariam, alongside expressing her Islamic identity, 
the hijab is about freedom and resilience in a time when religion, particularly Islam, is 
misunderstood. By communicating that the hijab, as a religious practice, is also a symbol of 
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choice, freedom, individuality, and subjectivity, Muslim women can turn the burden of 
representation that often comes with being a visibly Muslim woman on its head, using their 
visibility to directly address the assumption that they are victims of oppressive patriarchy and 
follow religion blindly. This critical individuality embedded in Mariam’s religious identity 
echoes a study conducted by Ruby Ramji and Peter Beyer (2013) who examined 1.5 and 2nd 
generation Canadian Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists between the ages of 18-27. They found 
that while almost all of their participants recognized that they inherited their religious traditions 
from their parents, they firmly believed that the construction of religious identity was up to the 
individual (Beyer 2013: 56). Drawing from the same data, Ramji (2013), in her own study of 
online Muslim practices amongst 1.5 and 2nd generation Canadians found that: 
Although a few of the highly [religious] Muslim participants were critical of various 
aspects of Canadian society, they also showed a greater tendency to mesh their Islam 
with dominant Canadian values and orientations. For them, to be Muslim was to be 
modern, kind, and peaceful: it was their role to make the world a better place. (115)  
 
Nevertheless, in spite of such scholarly findings and efforts by the Muslim community to 
communicate their intertwined Muslim and Canadian identities, assumptions and stereotypes 
about Muslims persist, creating more obstacles for the integration of Muslim women and 
Muslims in general into liberal society and its various discourses. As Sherene Razack (2004) 
points out, it is often assumed that behind every hijab is a patriarchal man stripping women of 
any agency when it comes to matters of public life (130). These salient assumptions are 
leveraged by those in power, as we saw with former Prime Minister Harper in the 2015 federal 
election campaign, to fuel discourses that legitimize their own political agendas that overtly or 
tacitly favor Western Christian ideals. #JeSuisHijabi, however, is a means for Muslim women to 
demonstrate that their hijab represents more than just religious devotion, and that their identity is 
theirs and theirs alone, using various tactics within the discursive space created by #JeSuisHijabi 
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to insert themselves into and (re)shape liberal discourses about themselves. It is these tactics 
which I will now consider in more depth. 
 
Changing Media Narratives and Addressing Stereotypes 
 
It is clear that in laying out its goals and choosing to launch in the form of a press release 
(See Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at 2015), #JeSuisHijabi had the clear intention of building a 
presence not just on social media, but in the mainstream media as well, which are becoming 
increasingly intertwined. 123 tweets with #JeSuisHijabi shared or mentioned some type of article 
or video from a mainstream media source about the campaign or were generated by mainstream 
media sources themselves (see fig. 3). 
 
(Fig. 5) A tweet from CBC journalist, Devin Heroux’s Twitter account covering the #JeSuisHijabi 
campaign in Saskatoon. A representative from the campaign appeared on CBC Saskatoon’s evening news 
that night. In the photos, non-Muslims, including a man, try on the hijab at a #JeSuisHijabi booth. 
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106 tweets were just of the hashtag, but were often accompanied by a picture. Some were 
selfies of women wearing hijab, some were pictures of non-Muslims trying on hijab at 
#JeSuisHijabi booths on campuses and other public places, and others were pictures that 
contained identity statements or quotes (see figs. 1, 5 & 6). Meanwhile, the opportunity for non-
Muslim women – and men – to try on a hijab, reflect on it, and hear from Muslim women about 
its emotional, individual, and societal significance in the offline public sphere, projects onto the 
hijab other meanings and personal significance, and when collapsed into an image and shared, 
disseminates these experiences to a wider audience. 
 
(Fig. 6) A Twitter user’s contribution to the online #JeSuisHijabi campaign. 
Likewise tweets would often directly address certain stereotypes, employing a variety of 
approaches to do so. Interestingly, many of these tweets read as though they were speaking 
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directly to those who stereotype Islam and the hijab with tweets like, “Judge me by my mind. 
Not the colour of my scarf. Find out who I really am. #JeSuisHijabi.” 
While coding tweets, I identified ten different tactics for how those who used 
#JeSuisHijabi challenged those stereotypes and assumptions that are informed by a perceived 
divide between the religious and the secular. Some tweets used more than one of these tactics at 
the same time, and looking closer at the content and tactics of these tweets highlights the ways in 
which users of #JeSuisHijabi understand the liberal-secular context in which they live, and the 
way they wish to be understood within it. I identified these tactics as:  
 (1) I’m not oppressed 
 (2) Pointing out double standards  
 (3) My identity is more than hijab 
 (4) Hijab is not just a Muslim thing 
 (5) Characterizing Islam as peaceful 
 (6) Critiquing society  
 (7) Addressing the male gaze 
 (8) Richard Dawkins is wrong 
 (9) Shifting perspectives  
 (10) Stop assuming and just ask me
(1) By far the most common tactic, as I mentioned briefly, was directly addressing the stereotype 
of oppression associated with hijab, which was present in 76 tweets. Examples include: 
Not oppressed, but free and proud. #JeSuisHijabi (R:2, RT:2, L:2)41  
                                                                 
41 Unless a tweet is created by a celebrity, it is not uncommon to see very few replies to a tweet. Often, retweets and 
likes are the most common interactions. Hashtags make it more likely that tweets are seen an interacted with because 
they are put on the hashtag’s thread on top of the user’s thread. Therefore using a popular hashtag increases the 
chances of interaction. It is difficult to say what the average retweets are per tweet and what that says about the 
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#JeSuisHijabi and if my husband doesn't like it, too bad for him. (R:0, RT:17, L:21)   
 
Do I wear Hijab by force? No, this is purely my own choice. I love my Hijab. 
#JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:9, L:9) 
 
Many of these tweets were clearly directed to a non-Muslim audience, an audience which they 
may not have been able to reach otherwise, in hopes of personally sharing with them how hijab is 
a choice and is tied to their personal identity. Likewise, (2) 13 tweets pointed out double 
standards that existed for women who wear hijab:  
#KhalifaOfIslam rightly put it, if Hijab is bad for the society, are all women's dress 
in the west in mid winter bad as well? #JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:7, L:6)   
 
#JeSuisHijabi if j lo shows her butt because she is free our muslim sisters r free to 
wear hijab end of talk (R:0, RT:0, L:1)   
 
I keep quiet seeing your tattoo, your nudity, your way of life clubbing and drinking. 
It's YOUR choice. Just as it's MY choice #JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:5, L:2)   
 
These double standards that these tweets point out exist, in part, because of Islam’s commonly 
perceived place in the Western-liberal narrative. Wherein, as I discussed in Chapter Two, 
regardless of whether Islamic practices are acceptable from a legal, ethical, or even traditionally 
liberal “live and let live” perspective, due to the historical and cultural forces that developed 
liberalism, Islamic beliefs and practices are still commonly upheld and caricaturized as an 
example of what Western liberal identity is not (see Massad 2015). In pointing out these double 
standards, through publically sharing opinions that are often kept private, these tweets aim to 
directly challenge this narrative. The user who tweeted about expecting others to respect her 
choice to wear hijab because she tolerates others’ tattoos, nudity, and drinking, appears to 
suggest that these critiques would be difficult to share in an offline setting. #JeSuisHijabi, for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
tweet’s popularity or viewership, but generally, for the average Twitter user, a tweet with more than four or five 
retweets means it has garnered a notable amount of attention. People tend to like  tweets more than retweet them. 
This may be because likes serve the function of acknowledging someone’s tweet, but retweets demonstrate that you 
wish to associate with that tweet. 
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this person, creates a discursive space to share this feeling in a safe, public manner; 
demonstrating a very liberal understanding of mutual respect and tolerance. Users of 
#JeSuisHijabi also used this discursive space to address the assumption that hijabi is a sole 
operate identity by sharing with the public that while their hijabs are important to them, (3) their 
identities consist of more than just their hijab:  
The #Hijab is not the only thing that defines me. There's more to me than meets the 
eye. #Student #Woman #Canadian #JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:7, L:5)   
 
My identity My choice. But i am still reliable, eduated, hardworking, lovin and 
respecting NOT SCARY, please do not pre-judge #jesuishijabi (R:0, RT:9, L:10)   
 
I cover my head.. Not my brain.. #JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:23, L:17)   
 
I identified 40 tweets using this strategy. As discussed in Chapter Four, in spite of Muslims’ 
complex, multi-faceted identities that transcend the putative religious/secular binary, their 
‘Muslimness’ is often essentialized in the Canadian public eye (Selby 2016). Often, as seen in 
the tweets above, they would claim that their hijab was not their operative identity, then follow 
the suggested format by the makers of the campaign (see Fig. 3) and list aspects of who they are, 
like teacher, Canadian, hardworker etc. Like Dauood’s hashtagging of baklava as 
#MuslimFerreroRocher to show that “we have Muslim desserts that we call non-Muslim names,” 
#JeSuisHijabi shows that the hijab is a Muslim practice that complements identities that are 
shared by many other Canadians, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. In a similar vein, 26 tweets 
framed hijab as a universal practice by claiming that (4) the Hijab is not just a Muslim thing. For 
example:  
Muslim women cover themselves just like Mary, mother of Jesus; a role model for 
all, chose Hijab for herself! #JeSuisHijabi (R:1, RT:6, L:6)   
 
Hijabi is not a monopoly of Islam alone! #JeSuisHijabi (accompanied by a picture 
displaying women from different religious traditions around the world and their 
various head coverings) (R:0, RT:86, L:46)   
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In using this tactic, the image or mention of Mary, Jesus’s mother, with her head covered was 
often invoked, assuming, interestingly, that the audience is Christian. This demonstrates that 
hijab, as an Islamic practice, can also be a secular practice, in the sense that modesty, a core 
reason for wearing the hijab, can be a universal value that transcends the traditions of Islam (see 
Moors 2014). Peace was another universal value that was often used, which is a common tactic 
in general that Muslims use to challenging stereotypes. In (5) characterizing Islam and 
themselves as peaceful, some users of #JeSuisHijabi sought to challenge the commonly upheld 
figure of the “militant and violent Muslim”:  
I am not afraid of commitment to my faith; a faith of peace and love #JeSuisHijabi 
@JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:6, L:11)   
 
I am a proud Hijabi , I do not believe in Jihad with sword instead I believe in Jihad 
with pen #JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:7, L:9)   
  
Humbled. Confident. Peace loving #JeSuisHijabi @JeSuisHijabi [accompanied by a 
picture with a of a Tim Hortons cup beside a piece of paper with “Je Suis Hijabi” 
written on it] (R:0, RT:14, L:17)   
 
The image of “the peace loving Muslim,” is an image that Muslims often find themselves having 
to portray. However, as Selby, Barras, and Beaman (forthcoming) point out, in having to 
constantly portray Islam as peaceful, these hashtags are inadvertently (re)producing the 
reductionist and binary figures of the militant and peaceful Muslim. Nevertheless, the hashtag 
still provides the opportunity to nuance overgeneralized or misunderstood Islamic terms like 
jihad, which are often interpreted as militant and violent, and reframe it in a more peaceful light. 
On a broader level, users of #JeSuisHijabi would take to (6) critiquing society itself: 
Being Canadian means being respectful and inclusive of other cultures. Xenophobia 
has no place here. Je suis Canadian. #JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:11, L:11)   
 
As a Muslim, I respect all people, from all religious backgrounds. Why can't I be 
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respected for wearing a Hijab? #JeSuisHijabi @JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:36, L:34)   
 
Hijab sets us free from the standards of beauty forced by materialistic world... 
#JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:14, L:9)   
 
This tactic, while closely tied to addressing double standards, takes on broader problematic 
concepts such as xenophobia and materialism, questioning and challenging their legitimacy and 
relationship to Islam. In critiquing society, many users took particular issue with, and sought to 
address specifically, (7) the male gaze and posited the hijab as a means of protecting against it: 
Hijab is NOT about OPPRESSION but FREEDOM from Evil Eyes!! #JeSuisHijabi 
@LajnaEdmonton @amsayeg #LoveForAllHatredForNone #Islam #Hijab (R:0, 
RT:0, L:1)   
 
because women should be seen as a human being, not as sex objects #JeSuisHijabi 
(R:0, RT:3, L:3)   
 
Compelling men to realize that women are not here to please their eyes but to 
contend with their minds. Checkmate, your move.#JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:0, L:1)   
 
In positing the hijab as a protector from the male gaze, users of #JeSuisHijabi problematize 
perceptions of hijab as a religious practice enforced by males, thus turning it on its head by 
demonstrating that to them, hijab is not a product of patriarchy, but protection from it. In 
portraying hijab as a feminist religious practice, the hijab is once again shown as an object that 
embodies both religious and secular qualities, offering freedom from the male gaze, while 
representing freedom to express oneself religiously. Nevertheless, this freedom that the hijab 
represents to many Muslim women is still overlooked by reductionist understandings of hijab 
that are informed by a perception of religious and secular identity as rigidly separate as well as 
other Islamophobic and neocolonialist tendencies.  
 
Renowned British biologist and outspoken advocate for atheism (8) Richard Dawkins can 
be viewed as a prominent figure who holds fast to such an understanding, and in many ways 
represents and embodies many of the problematic notions of secularism that I have critiqued 
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throughout this thesis. #JeSuisHijabi was used as a means for Muslims to directly address 
Dawkins and his views online, which prior to the rise of social media, would be much more 
difficult, if not impossible. Interestingly, it just so happened that on the same day that 
#JeSuisHijabi launched, he shared an op-ed in The Guardian on Twitter entitled, “As a Muslim 
Woman in Britain I was never fearful in Britain. But today I’m afraid” (see Rahim 2015). In his 
tweet Dawkins commented on the article saying, “Moving heartcry by Muslim woman fearful of 
hateful abuse in UK…Why not remove hijab in Islamic defiance of ISIS?” Here Dawkins 
references the series of attacks in November 2015 in Paris. The tweet received 99 replies, 121 
retweets, and 215 likes. That day he also tweeted that, “Veil not compulsory in Islam. Defiant 
gesture of Islamic solidarity. How about removing it now as a gesture of Islamic solidarity with 
Paris?” This tweet received 323 replies, 305 likes, and 643 retweets. As one can imagine, many 
readers took issue with his controversial statements and saw it as an uninformed understanding 
of the relationship between hijab and Muslim women’s identities. In response, nine people used 
#JeSuisHijabi to critique his comments on Twitter with tweets like: 
@RichardDawkins Let #JeSuisHijabi fill your information gaps bc you r completely 
unaware. To be a true rationalist, you must open ur mind (R:0, RT:1, L:1)   
 
@RichardDawkins throws out reason for zillionth time & employs a false analogy to 
justify his bigotry #JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:2, L:2)   
 
Gotta be a special type of ignorant to come up with ideas like this lol #JeSuisHijabi 
(R:0, RT:15, L:12) 
 
By tweeting about what Richard Dawkins said including the @mention of his Twitter handle, 
these users of #JeSuisHijabi are not only able to share their opinions publically, but put their 
opinions and ideas directly into Richard Dawkin’s notification inbox on Twitter. What’s 
particularly noteworthy about people’s use of #JeSuisHijabi to critique Richard Dawkins – who 
is well known for framing religion and reason as mutually exclusive (see Dawkins 2006) – is 
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that, in defending the hijab through #JeSuisHijabi, they attack his use of reason. By accusing him 
of using a “false analogy,” having “knowledge gaps,” and implying that he is not a “true 
rationalist,” these hashtags use Twitter and #JeSuisHijabi to publically demonstrate that there are 
“secular reasons” for a religious practice. Users of #JeSuisHijabi would also do so by (9) shifting 
perspectives, which was often done in the form of a question, challenging readers’ notions of 
freedom, modesty and individuality with tweets like, 
#JeSuisHijabi Covering myhair provides me protection&respect,self-confidence& 
independence.Whatdoes your uncovering your hairprovide toyou? (R:1, RT:7, L:1) 
 
HIJAB-> You Only See What I Choose You To See. Is That Not Freedom? 
#JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:9, L:7) 
 
#JeSuisHijabi Why is my Hijaab your problem? (R:0, RT:23, L:17) 
 
These tweets seem to directly address those who stereotype Islam, suggesting that those who use 
the hashtag see it as a chance to speak to a wider audience. There is also an air of frustration in 
these tweets with the inability of others to see a perspective that seems so obvious to them: that 
hijab is a choice that is closely tied to a practicing Muslim woman’s identity. 
This frustration is also apparent in the final tactic that I would like to discuss, the tactic of 
(10) “stop assuming and just ask me.” Tweets with this tactic would look like: 
If you ever want to know the truth about anything, please please please ask an 
insider before making assumptions #JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:1, L:1) 
 
Get to know us. And discover the truth about Islam. #JeSuisHijabi (R:0, RT:9, L:7)
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This tactic is also apparent in Figure 2. In saying “ask us who we are,” the picture in Figure 2 
speaks to a belief that underlies and informs the entire #JeSuisHijabi campaign and the tactics in 
which people use #JeSuisHijabi to challenge stereotypes. This belief is that the truth about 
Muslims and their place in Western liberal societies can be better understood if there were a 
greater direct dialogue and empathy between Muslims and non-Muslim citizens. Creating a 
hashtag is a way in which this dialogue can be facilitated by helping to insert Muslim voices into 
mainstream discourses and starting conversations that are imagined as transformative. This 
clearly discursive goal at the centre of #JeSuisHijabi is reflective of the (discursive) nature of 
hashtags themselves, as discussed in Chapter 2. It is further amplified by the performative nature 
of #JeSuisHijabi (see Figs. 1, 2, and 3) through pictures and hashtags themselves. 
Indeed, as described by Rambukkana (2015) in his definition of hashtags, hashtags have a 
performative element to them. #JeSuisHijabi is by no exception, and in fact, may be more 
performative than most. In their study comparing calculated and ad hoc hashtag movements, in 
which #JeSuisHijabi would qualify in the former, Axel Bruns and Jean Burgess (2015) explain 
the performative nature of hashtagging a tweet, explaining that “to include a hashtag in one’s 
tweet is a performative statement: it brings the hashtag into being at the very moment that it is 
first articulated, and— as the tweet is instantly disseminated to all of the sender’s 
followers…announces its existence” (23). People who use #JeSuisHijabi often, but not always, 
take it a step further by accompanying their tweet with a picture, which was encouraged by the 
campaign itself, giving it an extra-performative quality. Of the tweets that I gathered, 283 shared 
pictures, which varied from hand drawn pictures of #JeSuisHijabi (see Fig.1), to lists of identities 
and characteristics, to selfies, to inspirational quotes (see Fig. 6). There were also, of course, 
derogatory pictures of women in full burqa, used to criticize Islamic head coverings as well. 
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 A growing argument within the Canadian public discourse on the hijab, particularly in 
Quebec, is that it should not be permitted in the public sphere (see Montpetit 2016). If we 
understand Twitter as a proxy of the public sphere, using it to publicly express, through images, 
one’s pride, agency, and citizenship as either a wearer and/or supporter of the hijab, directly 
challenges this argument, which can often be premised on assumptions of oppression and 
pseudo-citizenship that further perceptions of otherness. Likewise, establishing a presence in 
public spaces and posting pictures of people positively interacting with the hijab (see Fig. 5) in 
those spaces make up many of these photos, and is another strong extra-performative aspect of 
the #JeSuisHijabi campaign that directly challenges these perceptions. 
Each of these tactics that I have explored in this section is amplified by their 
performativity and contribute to #JeSuisHijabi’s role as a “counter public,” a term used by 
Charles Hirschkind (2001) to explain the public that formed with the introductions of Islamic 
cassette sermons in late twentieth and early twenty-first century Egypt. He explains that the 
circulation of these tapes reflected the twinning of mass media with a religious response to the 
secular liberal nationalism that became highly present in mainstream Egyptian media and was 
perceived as a mechanism of Western cultural imperialism (Hirschkind 2006: 33). When read 
with #JeSuisHijabi in mind, Hirschkind’s insights underscore the political and communicative 
forces that make it what it is. He defines a counter public as people who have “cultivated 
sentiments, loyalties, and styles of public conduct that stood in tension with the moral and 
political exigencies and modes of self-identification of national citizenship” (Hirschkind 2001: 
13). To be clear, not all Canadians would view hijabis as falling under this definition, nor would 
all hijabis see themselves as being perceived in this light, and I do not want to further collapse 
hijabi identities by collapsing them all into one category of “counter public.” Nevertheless, the 
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concept of a counter public helps to make sense of many hijabis’ responses to online and media 
discourses surrounding conspicuous religious symbols in Quebec, the proposed ban on the niqab 
in citizenship ceremonies, or even in public discourse after the 13 November Paris attacks, where 
it is not uncommon to see hijab and niqab framed as a style of public conduct that runs counter to 
what it means to be Canadian (Bakali 2015: 416-17; Chase 2015; Khan 2015; Reitz 2015). Thus 
affecting how Muslims and non-Muslims see hijab and Islam itself in the Canadian context and 
the policies that affects them directly. With that said, #JeSuisHijabi, as a response to this 
perception, forms a counter public comprised of the people who fall within this frame alongside 
people who want to help them. To change their situation, like in Hirschkind’s study of cassette 
tapes, hashtag users harness the medium as a communicative tool to mobilize a counter-narrative 
in hopes of changing their perception in society.  
 Conclusion 
In sum, I have demonstrated in this chapter that #JeSuisHijabi, is a hashtag designed to 
create discursive space for Muslims to communicate identities, challenge hegemonic narratives 
about Islam, and facilitate the generation of cultural texts. Together these notions may point to 
how Muslims, particularly hijabis, wish to be perceived in the Canadian online public sphere. In 
doing so, my analysis of the language, reasoning, and tactics used to communicate hijabi identity 
shows that many of those who use #JeSuisHijabi transcend private and public, religious and 
secular binaries, as a means of portraying the hijab as a religious practice that symbolizes 
freedom, choice, and agency; values that mesh with so-called secular liberal values. These values 
are also reflected in my participants’ engagement with the hijab, and suggests that not only do 
Canadian Muslims wish to be perceived as integrating liberal values into their identities, but 
truly do see Islam and hijab as intertwined and compatible concepts in Canada that manifest 
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differently from person to person, thus demonstrating that one cannot simply separate how the 
religious and secular function in the everyday lives of Canadian Muslims. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
General Conclusions 
 In a broad sense, this thesis is a contribution to the ongoing modern scholarly project of 
blurring binaries and collapsing categories, a project that for reasons that I have discussed 
throughout this thesis often overlooks the religious/secular binary. By examining the 
#JeSuisHijabi campaign alongside the use of hashtags by Muslims in Winnipeg and St. John’s, 
this thesis shows that through hashtags social media is changing the way that Muslims express 
themselves in the public sphere, which, in turn, sheds light on the complicated and intertwined 
relationship between the religious and secular spheres in the lives of Muslim Canadians. This 
new means of expression and communication behoves scholars and citizens alike to rethink what 
it means to be religious in the Canadian context, a context in which many do not, and perhaps 
should not, separate the religious and secular parts of themselves.  
As I write this conclusion in June of 2017, Statistics Canada has reported that hate crimes 
against Muslims rose 60% from 2014 to 2015, which some Muslim groups attribute to the 
negative political rhetoric about Muslims that took place during political events like debates 
surrounding the 2013-proposed Charter of Values in Quebec and the 2015 Canadian federal 
election (see Harris 2017). More recently a resurgence of such problematic rhetoric took place in 
online and offline conversations about Islamophobia after the non-binding parliamentary motion, 
M-103, was proposed. M-103 condemned hate speech, particularly Islamophobia, and called for 
a study into Islamophobia in Canada. In public debates around the motion, hashtags like #M103 
were used by opposing citizens and politicians to stoke fears of creeping sharia law, framing the 
term “Islamophobia” as a means of silencing critics of Islam and undermining free speech (see 
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Funk 2017). Undergirding such rhetoric, as I have argued throughout this thesis, is a problematic 
Western-liberal-influenced assumption that religious, particularly Muslim, and so-called secular 
identities, are best kept separate and relegated to their respective private and public spheres. 
Islamophobic and neo-colonial beliefs that Muslim and Canadian identities run counter to each 
other are also deeply rooted in Western liberal history and culture, and are, in part, responsible 
for such a disturbing rise in hate crimes and hate speech towards Muslims. Nevertheless, while 
social media, particularly hashtags, serve to amplify and empower such problematic narratives 
and assumptions about Islam, it also offers a way for Muslims to directly challenge them. 
One does not need to look far to see the ways in which hashtags are being used to, for 
better or worse, shape narratives about important social issues. Whether one seeks to show that 
#BlackLivesMatter in American institutions and society, demonstrate their #pride as a person 
who identifies as LGBTQ, or tell the world that they want to #MakeAmericaGreatAgain. This 
thesis has shown that when Muslims use hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi, #MuslimFerreroRocher, 
and even #KitKat, they communicate everyday religious and secular identities as a means of 
shaping and influencing hegemonic narratives about Islam’s place in Canadian society. 
Particularly since the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 and the 
Multiculturalism Act in 1988, Canada has often fancied itself on the world stage as a 
multicultural and religiously diverse nation. But multiculturalism and religious diversity, much 
like identity itself, are ongoing, complex, and dynamic processes, and as the rise in anti-Muslim 
and religiously motivated hate-crimes suggests (see Harris 2017), they are projects that are by no 
means perfect or complete. Natasha Bakht (2012), in her analysis of public discourses 
surrounding the niqab, eloquently describes the dynamic nature of Canadian multiculturalism as,  
A normative project […] wherein people from many different walks of life with 
diverse and deep commitments try to live peacefully together will always entail 
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negotiation and renegotiation. But this dialogical discourse […] can occur only 
where we leave open the possibility that our political and social certainties might be 
transformed in the process of getting to know the Other. (71) 
 
Currently, in much of the Western world, there is growing discussion and recognition that social 
media mainstream media, with their respective personalized algorithms and tight ideological 
groupings, have helped people to create social, political, and discursive “bubbles” around 
themselves (see Shafer and Doherty 2017). In these bubbles people are more likely to read about 
and discuss issues that bolster their opinions instead of constructively challenge them, further 
bolstering social divisions along religious, ideological, and cultural lines. In other words, the way 
we use social media is hindering “the process of getting to know the Other” (Bakht 2012: 71) 
that is so crucial to the well-being of multicultural society like Canada. Nevertheless, while the 
problem lies within social media and the way we use it, so does the solution. 
This thesis has shown how the use of hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi, 
#MuslimFerreroRocher, #MuslimProblems, #ModestMuslimWoman, and others may shed light 
on and help facilitate the complex inter and intrapersonal negotiations that are taking place for 
Canadian Muslims in the multicultural and so-called secular context that is Canada. Hashtags 
offer up a new modern means of deprivatizing, in the Casanovian sense, religious identity in the 
public sphere, challenging notions of secularism that relegate religious expression to the realm of 
the private. This deprivatization takes place when Muslims publically communicate identity 
online to a diverse Muslim and non-Muslim audience, aggregating disparate publics that in turn 
disrupt traditional notions of the role of religious and secular identities in public life. Whether it 
be through a formal campaign like #JeSuisHijabi, telling a story about Ramadan with #KitKat, 
mundanely hashtagging the sky as #beautiful, or telling co-workers that they are a 
#ModestMuslimWoman, Muslims, through hashtags, tacitly demonstrate the coalescence of 
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religious and secular identities in their lives, thus serving to challenge, blur, and complicate 
widely held perceptions of a binary relationship between religiosity and secularity and 
disseminating those identities to a wider public. Furthermore, for my participants, 
religious/secular identities are not only articulated and constructed through hashtags, but in the 
way that they use the Internet in general to make decisions about how and whether to wear the 
hijab, balance gay and Muslim identities, or understand what it means to be both Muslim and 
Canadian. 
Scope and Limitations 
While this thesis has begun to make clear how hashtags help speak to the everyday 
“negotiations and renegotiations” (Bakht 2012: 71) that are taking place in the lives of Muslim 
Canadians and what that says about their identity, it is beyond the scope of this thesis, and 
extremely difficult, to determine or measure whether such hashtags are helping Canadians to get 
to know the Other, or are in any meaningful way transforming the public’s problematic “political 
and social certainties” (Bakht 2012: 71) about Islam. Nevertheless, I would like to use this one 
sentence to make the modest suggestion that if more people would pay attention and be open to 
how Muslims use hashtags, or even spend more time with Muslims in-person, that such a 
transformation can perhaps take place. 
Of course, tweets and hashtags alone cannot tell us everything about Canadian Muslim 
identity, which is why I supplemented my analysis with offline interviews. These interviews, 
however, have their own limitations. Although the participants that I interviewed come from 
diverse cultural backgrounds and each have unique stories to tell about their religious identities, 
they are more educated than the average population. While many are no longer students, many 
have advanced graduate degrees; Canadian Muslims with less education may have given much 
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different responses. Nevertheless, it is important to note that on average, Muslims in Canada are 
more highly educated than non-Muslims (see Kazemipur 2014). 
 Likewise, all of my participants, while diverse in many ways, all identified to some 
degree as practicing Sunni Muslims, and I did not interview anyone who identified as Shi’a, 
Ahmadi, Ismaili, or any other minority within Islam. I also did not interview any non-practicing 
or atheist Muslims, who may also have given much different responses, particularly in 
discussions surrounding secularism and the role of Islam in Canadian society. Therefore, the 
scope of this thesis is limited to understanding how practicing Sunni Muslims, are 
communicating identity through hashtags to tacitly complicate the religious/secular divide. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
As “medium and message entangled,” (Rambukkana 2015: 4) hashtags like #JeSuisHijabi 
and others mentioned in this thesis offer up new ways of publically transmitting, translating, 
expressing, and inspiring religious identities and ideas. They breathe new life into networks and 
generate discourses of meaning. They connect and amplify the voices of those outside of 
positions of authority and work to dismantle the structures that keep those voices apart. With this 
in mind, while I have focused heavily on the more functional and discursive aspects of hashtags 
throughout this thesis, hashtags are not simply discursive tools to communicate and construct 
identity, but must also be analyzed within the aesthetic and affective space that is Twitter. Doing 
so would open up entirely new avenues of inquiry that illuminate the ever-growing 
technocultural and technosocial aspects of religion. For these reasons, the potential contributions 
that hashtags have to offer the study of religion are immense and require attention from scholars 
who wish to understand religion, the Internet, and the publics they create when they intersect.  
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Within the scope of this study in particular, hashtags offer up exciting and challenging 
new ways to understand not only lived Islam in the modern context, but lived religion in general. 
As I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this thesis, in particular through my discussion of 
methodology, the space and concept of “Muslim Twitter” contains within it numerous 
possibilities for understanding modern Canadian Muslim identities, that remain relatively 
unexplored. To do so, scholars must theorize and explore the hashtags that comprise it. As this 
exploration takes place, the methodological approach of hashtag ethnography, which 
conceptualizes hashtags as field sites, must still be developed further, and be supplemented by 
sociological methods that involve offline personal interviews with subjects about how they 
interact online and think about their religious identities. 
 Likewise, since this thesis employs such a two-fold method that examines hashtags 
themselves alongside interviews to understand hashtags and their relation to religious identity, it 
is my hope that more scholars will apply this approach to other hashtags and religious traditions 
and refine it, using it to confirm or challenge my findings about religious identity in the secular 
context. Doing so, I believe, will move forward scholarly discourses that are in much need of 
theories and methods that help to make sense of the complex interactivity that takes place on 
social media and explain religious identities, experiences, and ideas online. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Consent Form 
Participant Consent Form 
 
 
Title: Hashtags and Everyday Life for Muslims in Winnipeg and St. John’s 
 
 
Researcher:             Cory Funk 
           Department of Religious Studies 
          Memorial University of Newfoundland 
          St. John’s, NL A1C 5S7 
          Email: cfunk@mun.ca 
  (204) 330-1688 
 
 
Supervisor:   Dr. Jennifer Selby      
 Department of Religious Studies        
 Memorial University of Newfoundland    
 St. John’s, NL  A1C 5S7              
 Email:  jselby@mun.ca         
  (709) 864-8059  
 
You are invited to take part in a research project entitled “Hashtags and Everyday Life 
for Muslims in Winnipeg and St. John’s.” 
 
 
This form is part of the process of informed consent.  It should give you the basic idea of what 
the research is about and what your participation will involve.  It also describes your right to 
withdraw from the study.  In order to decide whether you wish to participate in this research 
study, you should understand enough about its risks and benefits to be able to make an informed 
decision.  This is the informed consent process.  Take time to read this carefully and to 
understand the information given to you.  Please contact the researcher, Cory Funk, if you have 
any questions about the study or for more information not included here before you consent. 
 
It is entirely up to you to decide whether to take part in this research.  If you choose not to take 
part in this research or if you decide to withdraw from the research once it has started, there will 
be no negative consequences for you, now or in the future. If you have any ethical questions 
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about this project please feel free to contact ICEHR if they have issues with the researcher, 
research or if you feel that you have been treated unfairly. 
  
Contact: ICEHR at icehr@mun.ca or by telephone at 709-864-2861. 
 
Introduction 
My name is Cory Funk, I am a research assistant at Memorial University of Newfoundland. I am 
originally from Winnipeg, Manitoba and completed my undergraduate studies at the University 
of Winnipeg. As part of my Master’s thesis, I am conducting research under the supervision of 
Dr. Jennifer Selby. Dr. Selby is an Associate Professor at Memorial University of 
Newfoundland. Her research focuses on contemporary Islam and secularism in France and in 
Canada. This research project is funded primarily by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council Insight Grant, as part of a nationwide study titled “New Muslim Public Spheres in the 
Digital Age:  Identity, Community, Diversity and Authority in Canada.”  
 
This research aims to help foster a more complete understanding of Canadian Muslims’ religious 
experiences that moves beyond fear and Islamophobia. In short, this project seeks to understand 
the modern Muslim experience in Canada during the digital age.  
 
Purpose of study: 
The purpose of this study is to collect information on how digital technology and the Internet 
might shape Islam, how local Muslims are using the Internet, and what they are accessing online.  
The project will address this question through four related research areas: (1) sense of identity; 
(2) sense of community; (3) sense of diversity; and (4) religious authority. Each of these four 
areas of research will pay particular attention to the impact of digital technology on women, 
youth, and religious leaders. 
 
What you will do in this study: 
Your participation consists of taking an individual semi-directed interview during which time 
you will be asked questions about your experience with digital technology and the Internet as a 
Canadian Muslim (or former Muslim).  The interviews will be in English.   
 
Length of time: 
With your permission, the interview will be digitally recorded to ensure we do not misinterpret 
your statements.  The interview should take between one to, no longer than, three hours of your 
time.  The place and time of the interview are to be agreed upon by interviewer and interviewee.  
 
Withdrawal from the study: 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary; this means that you are accepting to 
participate in this project without any obligation or external pressures.  Moreover, you are under 
no obligation to answer any question.  The deadline for withdrawal from this project is April 
30, 2017. Before this date, you have the right to withdraw your participation, for any 
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reason, without having to provide any justification for doing so. Upon your withdrawal all 
the information pertaining to you, which has been securely stored in locked filing cabinets 
of the university offices in the Religious Studies Department, will be immediately destroyed 
(unless you say otherwise).  
 
Your consent to participate in this project also means that you consent that the research team 
uses the collected data (see above, Anonymity and Confidentiality) for the purpose of this 
research and the dissemination of research results (articles, theses, dissertations, conferences, 
scientific communications, books, etc.).  The deadline for withdrawal from this project is 
April 30, 2017.  
 
Possible benefits and risks: 
Your participation will contribute to the advancement of our knowledge of the place digital 
technology and the Internet play in the lives of Canadian Muslims.  We hope to gain a better 
understanding of the importance, the roles and the functions that digital technology and the 
Internet play in shaping Canadian Muslims’ experiences and understanding of ethno-religious 
identities, communities, diversity and religious authority.  Your contribution will help 
researchers and the general public to better understand Canadian Muslims' points of view. 
 
Possible risks: 
Your participation to this interview should not lead to any significant discomfort or harm.  
However, issues might revive unpleasant emotions associated with past experiences you may 
have had, in which cases, you remain free to refuse to answer any question that you may find 
uncomfortable, and this, without having to justify your refusal to answer.  You should also know 
that there are no “right” or “wrong” answers to the questions we ask.  The Chairperson of 
Memorials ethics committee can be reached if you wish to discuss your situation 
(icehr@mun.ca or 709-864-2861).   
 
It is the responsibility of the interviewer to interrupt or terminate the interview, if the interviewer 
feels that your well-being is at stake.  If this were the case, the interviewer would help you in 
finding useful resources to assist you. Should you require assistance with your emotional 
state after participating in or during this research, you will be directed to the appropriate 
resources.  
 
The following services are available in Winnipeg. 
 
 24-hour mental health crisis line: (204)-786-8686 (province-wide). 
 Mobile Crisis Response Team: (204)-940-1781 Winnipeg Region. 
 Community Mental Health Services Intake Line: (204)-788-8330. 
 Health Sciences Emergency Department Winnipeg: (204) -787-3661. 
 
 
The following services are available in St. John’s: 
150 
 
 
 
 24-hour mental health crisis line: 737-4668 (local) or 1-888-737-4668 (province-wide). 
 Mobile Crisis Response Team: 1-888-737-4668 St. John’s Region. 
 Psychiatric Assessment Unit: 777-3021 or 777-3022 24 hour Walk-in Crisis Service at the 
Waterford Hospital Site on Waterford Bridge Rd. 
 Health Sciences Emergency Department in St. John’s 777-6335. 
 
Confidentiality 
Information collected during the interview is confidential.  Only members of the research team 
will have access to this data, i.e., (the recording and transcripts of your interview).  Data that 
identifies participants will be preserved by research team co-applicants in a secured place 
separate from that of the files of digital audio recordings and transcripts of interviews and online 
questionnaires.  
 
Anonymity: 
Whatever you say will remain confidential.  Nowhere will we identify you by name or by any 
other means that may point to your identity (ie. workplace, associates, positions held etc.).  Only 
participants who have clearly stipulated in writing (in this consent form) that their name be 
mentioned could be identified (or left anonymous) in research outputs or research publications.  
 
Recording and Storage of Data: 
All collected data – i.e., files of digital audio recordings of interview, together with the files of 
transcripts and online questionnaires – will be put on external hard drives and securely stored in 
locked filing cabinets of the university offices in the Religious Studies Department.  Data 
will be kept for a minimum of five years, as required by Memorial University policy on Integrity 
in Scholarly Research.” 
 
Reporting of Results: 
The data collected will be used in a Master’s thesis and will use direct quotations but will not 
provide personally identifying information.  As mentioned above, this research project is 
funded by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Insight Grant, as part of a 
nationwide study titled “New Muslim Public Spheres in the Digital Age:  Identity, 
Community, Diversity and Authority in Canada” and the data collected will be published 
in their report.  
 
Sharing of Results with Participants: 
All theses at Memorial University are available to the public once completed. Upon completion, 
my MA thesis, which the data from this interview may contribute towards, will be available 
through Memorial University’s Queen Elizabeth II Library, which can be accessed online at this 
address: http://collections.mun.ca/cdm/search/collection/theses. 
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Questions: 
You are welcome to ask questions at any time during your participation in this research.  If you 
would like more information about this study, please contact:  
Cory Funk 
Email: c.funk@mun.ca or contact me by cellphone (204) 330-1688 
 
Or my supervisor Dr. Jennifer Selby  
Email: jselby@mun.ca or phone (709) 864-8059 
 
ICEHR Approval Statement  
The proposal for this research has been reviewed by the Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in 
Human Research and found to be in compliance with Memorial University’s ethics policy.  If 
you have ethical concerns about the research, such as the way you have been treated or your 
rights as a participant, you may contact the Chairperson of the ICEHR at icehr@mun.ca or by 
telephone at 709-864-2861. 
 
Consent: 
Your signature on this form means that: 
 You have read the information about the research. 
 You have been able to ask questions about this study. 
 You are satisfied with the answers to all your questions. 
 You understand what the study is about and what you will be doing. 
 You have the right to withdraw your participation, for any reason, without having 
to provide any justification for doing so.   
 The deadline for withdrawal from this project is April 30, 2017. 
 You understand that any data collected from you up to the point of your withdrawal 
will securely stored in locked filing cabinets of the university offices in the Religious 
Studies Department.  
 Following the point of withdrawal from the project, your information from you will 
be immediately destroyed (unless you say otherwise).  
 
If you sign this form, you do not give up your legal rights and do not release the researchers from 
their professional responsibilities. 
 
Your signature:  
 
       I have read what this study is about and understood the risks and benefits.  I have had                
adequate time to think about this and had the opportunity to ask questions and my 
questions have been answered. 
 
  I agree to participate in the research project understanding the risks and contributions of 
my participation, that my participation is voluntary, and that I may end my participation. 
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I agree to be audio-recorded during the interview                           Yes    No 
I agree to the use of quotations.                     Yes    No 
          
A copy of this Informed Consent Form has been given to me for my records. 
 
 
 _____________________________  _____________________________ 
Signature of participant     Date 
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Appendix 2. Online Recruitment Poster 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
154 
 
 
 
Appendix 3. Interview Schedule 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE  
(2014.09.27  VERSION) 
INFO QUESTION–TYPE  
 
DEMOGRA 
PHICS 
 
- Age 
 
 
- Family  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
- Ethnicity 
 
 
- Religion 
 
 
1. How old are you ?     
2. Where were you born ?    
3. Where did you grow up ?     
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-   
4. Where were your parents born (or lived before, if they immigrated) ? 
5. When did your parents  [ for immigrant parent ], or you come to Canada ?    
6. Why was Canada chosen ?    
7. Do you have any brothers and sisters ?    
a. [ If  yes ]  Where are they born ?     
8. What is the occupation of your parents ? 
9. What is you marital status ? 
[ e.g. single, civil union, married, separated, divorced, any children ]  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
10. How would you describe your “ethnic” background ?    
           [ e.g. Moroccan Berber, Pakistani, Indonesian, Egyptian,  Iranian 
Kurd, etc.]  
 
11. How would you describe your “religious” background / identity ?    
            [ e.g. very religious, atheist, liberal, traditional, Salafi, etc.]  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-   
12. Are you a long term or short term resident of Canada ?  Can you specify ? 
[ e.g., Canadian citizen, permanent resident, international student, 
etc.] 
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- Nationality 
 
 
 
 
 
- Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Employment 
 
13. How long have you lived in Canada ?   
[ DO NOT SKIP  this question for Canadian born participants, some 
of them may have lived outside Canada for few years ] 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
14. What is your highest education degree  ? 
[ e.g. PhD, MA, BA, College degree, High School leaving certificate, 
other… ]  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
15. What kind of elementary and secondary school did you attend ?  
[ e.g. public school (or private non-Islamic school), home schooling, 
Islamic school ] 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
16. Are you employed ?  
a. [ If  yes ]  What is your current occupation or profession ?  
b. [ If  no ]  Are you unemployed, unable to work, or a student ?  
i. [ If student ] In which field of study ? 
 
 
 
INTERNET  
 
17. Has your Internet usage increased, or decreased, in the last 5 years ?    
 
18. On average, how many hours – per day, per week, per month – do you use 
the Internet ?   
[ e.g., including cell phone, checking emails, for work or study, etc. ] 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-   
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19. So, on the topic of what you do online, do you use the Internet for 
“religious” or “spiritual life”?    
a.  [ If  yes ]  How is the Internet impacting, or affecting  your 
“religious” or “spiritual” practices, beliefs, values, or attitudes ?   
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
20. Do your faith – beliefs and practices – affect how you use the Internet and 
what you do online ?    
 
21. Do you have any faith-based limitations ? 
a. [ If  yes ]  In what ways ?    
i. Can you give some examples ?  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
22. Do you think the Internet   –    
(i) enhances your faith,    
(ii) operates more as a distraction or    
(iii) changes your faith in any way ?    
 
23. For better or worse ?    
a. Can you explain or give examples ?   
 
IDENTITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. What does it mean to you to be a Muslim living in Canada ?  
 
25. How do you identify yourself, religiously and nationally ?   
Do you see yourself as a Canadian Muslim, a Muslim Canadian, or other ? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
26. Do you tend to have friends of the same “ethnic” or  
“religious” background as you, or not ?   
a. Any reasons why this might be so ?    
b. Has the circle of your offline friends changed as you grew older ?     
i. [ If  yes ]  In what ways ? 
c. Has the circle of online friends changed also ? 
i. [ If  yes ]  In what ways ? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
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IDENTITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27. Do you change your way of behaving depending on the “ethnic”,  
or “cultural” background of the group of friends you are with ?    
a. What about when you are with Muslim  versus  non-Muslim friends 
?    
b. How so ?    
c. What about online ?    
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-  
28. Do you feel a generational, or cultural, or linguistic, or a religious gap with 
your parents ?      How so ?   
[young  participants – e.g.,  act differently at home as compared to 
outside the home]   
[adults  not living with parents – e.g.,  act differently in the presence 
of their parents or of elders of the family ]    
 
29. Would you discuss with them all your online interests and activities?    
a. [ If  yes ]  Can you give examples of things you discuss or share 
with them ? 
b. [ If  no]  Why not ? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
30. Does gender play a role in how you socialize or do not socialize or interact 
with some people ?    
 
31. Who do you socialize with ?   
a. Mainly with the same gender ?  
b. Any ethnic, religious, or intellectual preferences ?  
 
32. Where do you socialize ?   
[ ex. parks, coffee shops, community centers, bars, mosques, etc. ] 
 
33. If you wish to remain gender segregated, how is this maintained online ?  
   
34. Do you find that online communities offer opportunities to find friends, 
companions, or a life partner / spouse ?   
a. Have you used online communities this way ? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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-    
35. How has the Internet affected the way you feel connected to your Muslim 
and non-Muslim friends in Canada, or in other places ? 
a. [ If  yes ]  Which online communities or groups ?  
      [ e.g., local, national or international – country or countries ] 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
36. Does (i)  information you find online and the (ii) communities or people 
you relate to online affect your religious practices and beliefs offline   
                         [ e.g., since childhood, in the past 5 years ] ?    
a. Can you explain or give examples ?  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
37. Do you use online media in the practice your faith ?      For example, for… 
a. buying religious goods  [ e.g., for prayer rug, hijabs, etc. ] 
b. accessing religious literature  [ e.g., for Qur’an recitation, religious 
sermons, scholars opinions concerning debatable issues, etc. ]  
c. using applications (Apps) regularly  [ e.g. for the direction of 
prayer, the time to start fasting for Ramadan, etc. ] 
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38. Does your usage of the Internet include visiting  
a. sites to read the Qur’ân ?    
b. sites that deal with Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) ?    
c. hadith (prophetic sayings) search engines ?    
d. Islamic Blogs ?    
e. Arabic language instruction websites aiming to read the Qur’ân ?   
[ for non Arabic speakers ]  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
39. How do you decide whether an “Islamic” site is authentic or appropriate, 
and that you can trust it ? 
 
40. What signs do you look for to ensure it is authentic, or appropriate ?   
 [ e.g., use of language, cited sources, logos, references to known 
scholars, known Qur’ânic verses (suras) or hadiths, website interface, 
links, etc. ] 
 
41. What are the “Islamic” websites that have had the most influence on you, 
or that affected your beliefs and practices?  
a. Can you give examples ? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
42. When you visit websites, are particular schools of jurisprudence 
(madhhab) important in your determination of their appropriateness ?   
 
[ Sunnis: Hanafi | Hanbali | Shafi’i | Maliki ||| Shi’as: Ja’fari | Ismaili | 
Zaidi ] 
[ IMPORTANT to mention doctrines OTHER than the one of participant, 
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because Sunnis might  state they are open to other interpretations -- 
i.e. other Sunni interpretations – but not to  Shia, Ahmadi, or Sufi 
interpretations ]  
 
43. If you attend a mosque – that is affiliated with a particular school of 
jurisprudence (madhhab,) – does it have an impact on your selection of 
Islamic websites ?    
a. [ If  no ]  Do you accept, or are you open to, all interpretations and 
doctrines?   
 
44. What kind of information do you find most helpful in an online context ?  
[ e.g., in comparison with an offline engagements with your 
religious beliefs and practices ]     
 
45. Are there certain situations or moments where online spaces offer better 
support, or Islamic information than offline spaces ?   
[ e.g., for more private matters,  such as questions related to sex, 
alternative lifestyles, etc. ] 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
46. What are your feelings encountering online interpretations that differ 
from, or conflict with your own beliefs or practices ?   
[ e.g., Shia, Sunni, secular interpretations, etc. ] 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
47. What would you consider a radical or very conservative websites ?  
a. Have you encountered such radical or very conservative 
websites ?    
b. Do you think they are easily identifiable ?  How ?   
c. How would you describe them ? 
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48. If you seek out Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) online, do you believe that it 
should be interpreted for a Muslim minority context?    
 
49. Or, do you see interpretation of religious texts, such as the Quran, hadith, 
and legal fatwas, as unchanging, irrespective of place, time, or context_?  
   
50. Have your opinions to this end changed in the last 5 years? 
a. [ If  yes ]  Has your usage of the Internet anything to do with that 
change_? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
51. Which scholars or thinkers do you feel are most important as sources of 
religious authority ?    
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
52. If you visit a Muslim website hosted in Canada – of a Scholar or an 
organization that is from Canada, have you noted any differences between 
so-called  “local”, or “national”, and “non-Canadian”, or “foreign” 
perspectives ?    
a. [ If  yes ]  can you describe how they differ in their presentation_? 
  
 
COMMUNITY  
 
 
 
53. What Muslim group or community do you affiliate yourself with ?   
[ e.g. some would say they are affiliated with the “Maliki-Sunni”, 
or with a “Sufi-humanist” community, etc. ] 
 
54. Is that because of family, friends, or personal choice?    
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-   
55. Do you belong to a religious group, or mosque – not necessarily through 
a formal membership, but where you regularly attend ? 
 
56. How regularly do you attend?  
[ e.g., attend all activities, prayers, online community outings, etc. ] 
 
57. What kinds of activities, if any, do you participate in outside of worship ?   
  
58. How important is that community to you ?   
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
 
 
 
59. If you attend a mosque, does it use the Internet and how ?   
   [ e.g., websites, chat rooms, blogs, Twitter, Facebook, etc. ] 
a. [ If  yes ]  Is it for internal communication with members, 
promoting your local mosque or group, or for correcting 
misinformation about Islam ?  
i. How might the usage of the Internet be improved ?  
ii. Anything the mosque can do better to improve their usage ? 
b. [ If  no]  Why might that be so ?    
i. How might their usage be improved ?  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
60. Is your Muslim community, or religious group, using the Internet 
adequately ?  
           [ e.g., local Islamic organizations, Muslim associations, MSA, 
etc.] 
a. [ If  yes ]  Can you explain how the Internet is used ?  
i. How might the usage of Internet be improved ? 
b. [ If  no]  Why might that be so ?    
ii. How might their usage be improved ?  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
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61. Do you use the Internet to you access information about Muslim events or 
gatherings ?  
[ e.g., Muslim Fest, Islamic Spirit, Canadian Muslim Day,42 
international speaking tours of Muslim preachers or scholars ] 
 
 
Online 
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62. Are the online groups to which your offline friends belong different from 
yours ?           
[ e.g. online forums, Facebook, chat rooms, etc.]      
a. Why is this so?    
b. Can you give examples?  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
63. Can you describe the type of activities in which you engage online with 
members of your group or faith community ?   
[  e.g. mosque, Muslim association, Muslim Student Associations 
(MSA), transnational group, etc.] 
 
64. How much do you contribute and interact with others online ? 
[ e.g., commenting, posting, sharing articles, etc.] 
         a. Do you use hashtags? 
 [e.g. #Islam, #Canada, #Religion, #PBUH, #Muslim, #Cdnpoli, 
#Ramadan,    #HumanRights, #Allah, #IslamisPeace, #deen, etc.] 
 
            i. [If yes] Which hashtags do you use and how? 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
65. Have you joined Islam related self-improvement activities ? 
[ e.g., weekend seminar, leadership seminars, etc. ]   
 
 
 
                                                                 
42 Muslim Fest (www.muslimfest.com), Islamic Spirit (http://www.revivingtheislamicspirit.com), Canadian 
Muslim Day (http://www.muslimday.info), 
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66. Have you taken any online ?    
a. [ If  yes ]  What did they consist of ?  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
67. Have you ever changed some of your views before, or after joining a 
group, whether offline  or  online ?    
a. [ If  yes ]  Can you give examples ? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
68. How do you evaluate the quality of your time spent online ?  
[ e.g.,  with individuals or with groups] 
 
69. It is worth the time spent, or do you believe you are wasting too much 
time ? 
 
 
Online 
community 
 
 
70. Has an online community or a religious group ever   
a. helped deepen your understanding of an issue, or 
b. given you some solidarity when you may have disagreed with the 
teachings of your faith community or family ?    
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
71. Have you found that the Internet has provided you with a faith community 
or a religious group that you otherwise might not have accessed ?    
a. Do you feel you share more or less with people online?    
b. Does anonymity help or hinder ?    
c. Have you ever moved on to meet others of an online group face-
to-face ?    
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
72. Have you ever left an online community or a religious group ?    
a. [ If  yes ]  Why ?    
b. Were there any conflicts ?    
 
  
73. Do you have Muslim friends who are from groups or communities other 
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than the one to which you belong ?  
[ e.g. non-Sunnis IF you are a Sunni, etc.;  how many, some / all ]  
   
74. What about online ? 
    
75. What kinds of issues are discussed with them online ?   
[ e.g., do you discuss beliefs, dogma, creationism, etc. ] 
 
76. Are these similar or different from those discussed offline ?   
[ e.g. diversity within Islam, differences between Islamic doctrines, 
etc. ] 
 
 
 
77. Do you avoid – either online or offline – any topics or websites ?  
a. [ If  yes ]  Why? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
78. What do you think about the different interpretations, different beliefs and 
practices within Islam and the Muslim communities ?   
[ e.g., Sunnis, Shi’as, Sufis, Ahmadis, Ismailis, Alevis, Alawiayya, Salafis, 
etc. ]     
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
79. What sources do you rely upon to inform you about diversity within Islam 
and the Muslim community ?  
[ e.g., mosque, family, friends, religious leaders, readings, the Qur’ân, 
the hadiths, etc. ]     
 
80. And, what about the Internet ?   
[ e.g., websites of other Muslim groups, of religious scholars, social 
media, blogs, etc. ]   
 
81. How often do you access information on other Muslim groups or 
doctrines on the Internet ? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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-    
82. Have your beliefs or practices about differences that exist within Islam and 
the Muslim community changed in the last 5 years ?    
 
83. And, why do you think that is ?    
 
84. Has your Internet usage anything to do with this change ? 
  
 
Inter-religious 
dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85. Do you have friends who are non Muslim ?        [ how many, some / all ]    
 
86. What about online ?  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
87. What do you think about living in a religiously plural society,  
and a society with secular values such as the Canadian society ?    
 
88. What kinds of topics are discussed with your non-Muslim friends online 
about inter-religious diversity ?    
 
89. Are these topics similar or different from those discussed with them offline 
?    
 
90. When you are with non-Muslims – either off or online – do you avoid any 
topics or websites ? 
a. [ If  yes ]  Why ? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-   
 
91. Have you been (i) involved in, or (ii) do you participate in any formal inter-
faith groups or events – either inter-religious or intra-religious offline ? 
a. [ If  yes ]  can you explain and give examples ? 
 
92. Have you (iii) accessed online interfaith groups or blogs?     
[ e.g., interfaith Facebook, blogs, online forums, etc. ]     [ If  yes ]   
a. How much of an influence do they have on your personal faith ?    
167 
 
 
DIVERSITY  
 
Inter-religious 
dimensions 
 
b. What about on your public practice ?    
c. Do you feel they deepen your faith, or that they trouble it ? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
93. What sources do you depend upon to inform you about people of other 
religions ? 
[ e.g., mosque, family, friends, religious leaders, readings, Qur’ân, 
hadiths]     
 
94. And what about the Internet ?   
[ ex. websites of non-Muslim religious groups, of non-Mulim religious 
scholars, social media, blogs, etc.]      
 
95. How often do you access information on groups of other faiths on the 
Internet ?   
[ e.g., always, often, rarely, never ]  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-    
96. Have your beliefs or practices about differences between Muslims and 
non-Muslims changed in the last few years ?   
 
97. If your beliefs or practices about those differences have changed, …  
a. Why do you think that is ?    
b. Has your usage of the Internet anything to do with it ? 
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98. Is the influence of the Internet MORE or LESS importance than the 
influence of …     [ rank according to importance ] 
i. religious leaders 
ii. religious text(s) 
iii. your parents/caregivers 
iv. your siblings 
v. your other relatives 
vi. your friends 
vii. printed media  [ e.g. magazines, books, etc. ] 
viii. electronic media   [ e.g., online TV, videos, audio] 
ix. Other ?  Please specify… 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-   
99. How important are the Internet and digital technologies for you as a 
Muslim living in Canada ?    
 
100. Can you explain further and give some examples ? 
 
 
Additional 
Information 
 
 
101. Is there anything else you would like to add – regarding your experience 
with the Internet and digital technologies as a Muslim living in Canada ? 
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